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ABSTRACT
This research project contributes to the debate about what constitutes access to justice
within the context of the Australian federal civil justice system. It is the story of how
the case transfer processes of one federal court, when transferring so-called 'less
complex' cases to another federal court, can have a negative impact on access to justice
for litigants within the system. This is so despite it, on the surface, appearing to
function in accordance with principles of due process in the majority of cases and as
the legislature intended. The nature of those sometimes hidden transfer processes and
their implications, as well as the realities and tensions underlying the objectives of law
reform, are revealed. The lesson learned is that recognising the vital role procedure
plays in the justice system is essential in the delivery of quality justice in the
implementation of law reform.
The research explores the fact that significant reform of the federal civil justice system
occurred in 1999-2000 with the establishment of both the Federal Magistrates Court of
Australia as an additional federal court and a statutory system governing case transfers
between it and the Federal Court of Australia, known in this thesis as the Federal
Concurrent Jurisdiction System (FCJS). The legislature intended the FCJS to enhance
access to justice by granting litigants greater choice of forum by providing a new
cheaper, simpler and quicker forum for the resolution of general federal law disputes.
At the same time, the Federal Court is granted power to change the forum by
transferring matters it regards as more appropriate for determination by the other court,
and thus reduce its workload to concentrate upon its 'more complex' cases.
The operation of the FCJS has been an overlooked area of public attention, both at the
scholarly and court level. This is remarkable given the Federal Court utilises the FCJS
to reduce its workload more than it does any other statutory case transfer scheme. The
few previous empirical studies undertaken of the workings of the Federal Magistrates
Court in relation to accessibility to justice have tended to focus upon matters
commenced within the Court, and particularly with regard to the family law
jurisdiction. This research redresses the absence of public examination of how the

xviii

FCJS operates in both theory and practice in relation to general federal law cases
commenced in the Federal Court, but then transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court.
The study answers the main research question - whether the operation of the FCJS
creates any impediments to access to justice for cases transferred by the Federal Court
to the Federal Magistrates Court - by taking a group of 204 finalised transferred
matters. It evaluates, using quantitative and qualitative research methods, the extent to
which the transfer processes employed in those matters accord with four principles of
procedural justice (equality, openness, fairness and the provision of adequate reasons
for decision). Access to procedural justice, rather than any other approach to
evaluating access to justice, is chosen because of the discretionary power invoked to
override the original choice of forum, and the importance of litigants participating
fully in an accountable court system that instils public confidence by affording due
process, fairness and transparency. The research methods employed are novel in that
they evaluate the impact of law reform and the delivery of procedural justice through
in-depth investigation of court computer records that reveal what transpires during
case transfer processes.
The overall findings of the research are generally positive for the operation of the
FCJS. The true value of the findings, however, is in what they expose about the
operation of the FCJS at the micro level and how this affects the administration of
federal justice. To the extent the study reveals weaknesses in the delivery of procedural
justice, it is argued the problem lies with both the nature of the statutory scheme and
its implementation as part of managerial judging practices of the transferring court.
The law reform objective of maintaining court efficiencies (reducing workload) should
not prevail over the objective of providing access to justice.
The implications for litigants (access to justice), the courts (workloads, accountability
and public confidence) and the development of procedural jurisprudence are identified.
The main solution to the problem is relatively straightforward - enhance transparency
in transfer decision-making processes and public discussion in relation to this
procedural, yet integral, part of the federal civil justice system.
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PREFACE

The interest of the researcher in the research topic first arose shortly after the
commencement of the Federal Magistrates Court (FMC) and developed during her
almost decade-long appointments as a registrar of both the Federal Court of Australia
(FCA) and the FMC from 2000 to 2009. During her time with those courts, the
researcher noted cases were transferred from the FCA to the FMC at varying stages of
the proceedings and often at the instigation of the former court. Being aware generally
of how the case transfer system was to operate theoretically under the relevant court
legislation and rules, she grew increasingly interested in how it was operating in
practice across the entire FCA within a broader justice context. Assuming the judges
have valid judicial power to transfer cases, it raised in her mind the question of what
impact the transfer process under the system has on the attainment of access to justice
for litigants whose matters are commenced in one court, but then transferred to another
court? The researcher was keen to test some of her assumptions; namely, that selfrepresented litigant matters, certain types of 'less complex' proceedings (such as
unlawful discrimination matters) and matters in 'busy' registries (such as in New South
Wales) were most likely to be the subject of transfer to the FMC.
The views and findings expressed in this thesis are purely those of the researcher and
do not reflect the views of the FCA and FMC, unless indicated expressly otherwise.

1

PART I –
FEDERAL CASE TRANSFERS AND THE
NOTION OF JUSTICE

2

CHAPTER 1: A NEW FEDERAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
Enhancing access to justice and reducing court workloads.

1.1

Introduction

This thesis is about how cases are transferred between two Australian federal courts
under a statutory system for inter-court case transfers, and the impediments to access
to justice that arise from the operation of that system. Since the turn of this century, the
Federal Court of Australia (FCA) has transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court
(FMC) some 2000 cases of a supposedly 'less complex' nature. The FMC was
established on 23 December 1999, and officially commenced sitting on 3 July 2000, as
a court positioned beneath the FCA and the Family Court of Australia (Family Court)
within the hierarchy of Australian federal courts.1 The FMC may hear and determine
matters transferred to it by the superior federal courts because it exercises concurrent
(or shared) jurisdiction with the FCA in respect of a gradually growing array of general
federal law areas,2 and with the Family Court for matters involving family law and
child support.3 The system governing the ability of litigants to commence proceedings
in either the FCA or the FMC in an area of concurrent jurisdiction, and for any such
matter to be transferred between the two courts by judicial order made in accordance
with statutory transfer provisions, is referred to in this thesis as the Federal Concurrent
Jurisdiction System (FCJS).
Given the FCA may, under the FCJS, change the forum of proceedings brought before
it, either with or without the consent of the parties, it is important such case transfer
decision-making reflects the notions of fairness and due process (procedural justice)
and is in the interests of the affected litigants and the administration of justice. This
research demonstrates that, even when most cases are transferred with sufficient due
process, the transfer of cases under the system inconsistently with the principles of
procedural justice serves to undermine the otherwise positive law reform objectives of
1

The FMC was established by the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) ('FM Act'). The jurisdiction of
the Court is conferred by the Federal Magistrates (Consequential Amendments) Act 1999 (Cth).
2
The areas of concurrent general federal law that operated during the relevant periods of this study are
considered fully in Chapter 2.
3
This research is concerned only with the general federal law jurisdiction and so will not consider in
any detail case transfers between the Family Court and FMC.

3

the FCJS. It does so through the findings of a case study of all (non-migration law)
matters transferred by the FCA to the FMC under the FCJS during two periods in the
early years of the operation of the system.
Public knowledge of FCA-to-FMC case transfers is limited. The findings of this study
show that the manner in which the FCJS has operated in practice to date leaves various
facets of the FCJS veiled and uncertain. Although the system has been in existence for
over a decade, its operation and statutory framework remain overlooked subjects of
scholarly attention and other public focus. In this regard, the realities of the operation
of the FCJS are 'hidden' because of the absence of sufficient scrutiny and knowledge of
what is occurring within the system in practice. This research seeks to fill the gap in
empirical knowledge of the operation of the FCJS, particularly as it relates to
procedural justice and the objectives of law reform.
This thesis argues that a phenomenon as seemingly inconsequential and procedural in
nature as case transfers under the FCJS can nonetheless have a significant effect on the
attainment of justice, the development of jurisprudence, judicial accountability and
public confidence in a court as vital to the administration of federal civil justice as the
FCA. An opinion is offered as to whether the findings and conclusions reached stem
from the statutory nature of the FCJS or the manner of its implementation (or both). In
the process, this thesis exposes the tension that exists between the objectives of civil
justice law reform generally and specifically as regards to the FCJS; namely, that of
enhancing access to justice within courts whilst dealing with finite resources and
maintaining court efficiencies through case workload reduction. Recommendations for
law and policy reform are made, many of which are relatively straightforward and
cost-effective to implement.
On a practical level, this thesis examines the nature and apparent anomalies of the
statutory framework governing the FCJS (including the uncertainty that arises
regarding the transfer criteria). It explores also the processes by which the FCA makes
case transfer decisions as part of its case management approach of 'managerial
judging'.

4

1.2

Objectives of the FCJS

In understanding the operation of the FCJS, it is helpful to outline briefly the
underlying law reform or policy objectives of the federal legislature for its
establishment. The broader context for the introduction of the FCJS and FMC is
considered in Chapter 2.
In recognition of the need for Australian federal civil justice law reform in the late
1990s, the then federal Liberal Government advocated a two-fold rationale for creating
the FCJS (including the FMC) in relation to general federal law litigation:4
(a)

To provide litigants with greater access to justice by establishing
the FMC as a ‘cheaper, simpler and quicker’ forum than the
FCA for federal law litigation,5 whilst retaining choice for an
applicant to commence proceedings in either court; and

(b)

Enable the FCA to reduce its workload by providing judges with
the ability to transfer matters to the FMC, where such matters
are regarded by a judge as ‘less complex’ and therefore not
requiring the utilisation of FCA resources to hear and determine
the disputes.6 The federal magistrates have generally reciprocal
transfer powers in respect of ‘more complex’ matters conducted
within the FMC.

The two main objectives of the FCJS, therefore, are: (a) the enhancement of access to
justice through the provision of choice of forum to litigants and a potential new forum
that is cheap, simple and quick for the resolution of general federal law disputes; and
(b) FCA workload reduction to enable the Court to concentrate on 'more complex'

4

Explanatory Memorandum, Federal Magistrates Bill 1999 (Cth) 2-3, 5-6.
See also Daryl Williams, 'Law and the Government: Past, Present and the Future' (Address to the 31st
Australian Legal Convention, Canberra, 10 October 1999); Sue Pidgeon, 'Reforming the System:
Proposed Reform in the Federal Arena' (1999) 92 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 84; Daryl
Williams, 'Federal Magistrates Service' (2000) 11 Public Law Review 3.
6
In this regard, the FCJS is similar to the United States Federal Magistrates system, which was created
to enable the reduction of the heavy workload of the United States District Courts through the delegation
of judicial powers to federal magistrates so they may undertake duties more appropriately suited to be
performed by a lower tier judicial officer. See generally Sander M Bieber, 'United States Magistrates:
Additional Duties in Civil Proceedings' (1976-1977) 27 Case Western Reserve Law Review 542.
5

5

matters. This thesis examines the interrelationship between these two objectives of the
reform of the federal civil justice system.

1.3

The Research Project

The primary purpose of this research project is to determine whether the operation of
the FCJS, through the transfer of cases by the FCA to the FMC, creates any
impediment to access to (procedural) justice for litigants whose matters are transferred
under the system. The thesis provides a case study of all 204 matters transferred
nationally by the FCA to the FMC during two specific periods in all areas of
concurrent jurisdiction applicable at the time, with the exception of migration matter
transfers (the study group matters).7 The periods of study are 1 July 2000 to 30 June
2001 and 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003 (the study periods). The particular periods
chosen reflect a goal to evaluate how the system operated in its first year and, with an
interval of 12 months, in the third year of operation, by which time any teething
problems should have settled. The benefit of selecting the study group matters for
study is that they have all been finalised, thereby enabling a full history of the matters
from commencement to any final appeal in the FCA.
In deciding how the question of access to justice would be approached for the purposes
of this research, it was noted that access to justice within the federal courts may be
perceived in a number of different ways:
(a)

Increased physical access to the courts (including problems relating to
distance and accessibility for the disabled, people of non-Englishspeaking backgrounds and the like) and financial barriers to litigation
(such as lack of sufficient or any personal or legal aid funding for the
payment of court fees and lawyer costs);

(b)

Access to substantive justice, based upon perceptions of whether the
judicial decision-maker erred in law or fact; and

7

Prior to late 2005, migration matter transfers represented a distinct case management phenomenon in
the FCA. For the reasons explained in Chapter 4, they are not included in this study.
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(c)

Access to procedural justice based upon principles of equality,
fairness and other notions of due process.

Although all of the above approaches to evaluating access to justice may be relevant to
the operation of the FCJS, as Chapter 3 explains, this thesis is concerned with access to
procedural justice. Procedural justice is studied because case transfers under the FCJS
fundamentally involve the processes of case management and procedures. More
specifically, the FCJS vests the FCA with the power to alter the forum for the
management and determination of proceedings brought before it, notwithstanding the
applicant to the proceedings has chosen the FCA and the legislature has conferred the
statutory right upon them to do so. The exercise of such judicial discretion in case
transfer decision-making requires the utmost of transparency and fairness and the
ability of affected litigants to participate meaningfully in that process. Such due
process is particularly necessary because the transfer decision is not appealable. The
focus of analysis of this thesis is the operation of the transfer process under the FCJS
in the case of the study group matters, rather than to provide an evaluation of the
substantive outcomes of those matters or to consider why they were transferred and
other FCA matters were not.
The concept of 'access to justice' examined in this thesis is, therefore, approached from
the perspective that for a litigant to receive adequate justice during the transfer process,
and regardless of the otherwise substantive merits of the transfer decision, the process
by which the transfer occurs must be in accordance with notions of due process. In
other words, the operation of the FCJS will serve as an impediment to access to justice
where procedural justice is not adhered to or promoted sufficiently during the transfer
process.
In evaluating the impact of the operation of the FCJS on access to justice, the research
addresses the extent to which the FCA transferred the study group matters to the FMC
consistently with each of the following four main principles of procedural justice
studied:
(a)

equality (were certain types of litigants, matters or
registries singled out during transfers?);
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(b)

openness in transfer decision-making (was the transfer
process transparent?);

(c)

fairness (did the study group matters have an adequate
opportunity to be heard during the transfer process and
was the FMC a 'more appropriate' court than the FCA for
the resolution of their matters?); and

(d)

the provision of adequate reasons for transfer decision
(to what extent were adequate oral or written reasons
provided on the transfer of the study group matters?).

The legal basis for each of these four principles constituting access to procedural
justice, and how they are defined and tested in this thesis, is explained further in
Chapters 3 and 4.
Where the findings reveal apparent weaknesses in the delivery of these principles in
practice, the reasons for study group matters seemingly not receiving adequate access
to justice are examined, including the inherent tension between the delivery of
procedural justice and the law reform objectives and implementation of the FCJS (and
of law reform generally). The FCA case management practices (and managerial
judging) are examined also to appreciate how the outcomes to the research are able to
occur and whether at least the Court achieved the second objective of the FCJS
(workload reduction).
The emphasis within this study is on FCA transfers to the FMC as part of the
fulfilment of the 'FCA workload reduction' objective of the FCJS, however, FMC
transfers to the FCA are also considered in the context of study group matters that
were re-transferred to the FCA by the FMC. The first objective of the FCJS
(concerning the ability of the FMC to deal with transferred matters in a cheaper,
simpler and quicker manner) is evaluated within the context of whether the study
group matters were transferred fairly (see Chapter 7).
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1.4

Why Study Case Transfers?

It is reasonable to believe at first glance that the topic of case transfers from the FCA
to the FMC must necessarily be mundane, with only possible short-term relevance to
the parties to the proceedings and the courts most directly affected by the transfer
decisions. Such transfers may be regarded as essentially procedural in nature, and so
do not ordinarily attract much, if any, scholarly interest or public (including media)
attention. As discovered in the course of this research, the jurisprudence in this area of
civil practice and procedure concerning a superior federal court is also conspicuously
limited.
The primary reason for this study is that greater recognition is required of the notable
role played by case transfers between the FCA and FMC in the administration of civil
justice and in seeking to meet the objectives of law reform. The operation of the FCJS
needs to be understood better in light of the significant and ongoing use of the transfer
mechanism by the FCA, and given the dearth of empirical work on the subject
generally, and specifically within the context of its effect on access to (procedural)
justice. In the first three financial years of the operation of the FCJS alone, the FCA
transferred to the FMC almost 1100 matters across all areas of concurrent jurisdiction
applicable at the time. Although not as voluminous as Family Court transfers to the
FMC,8 transfers under the FCJS represent the vast majority of all FCA inter-court
transfers.9 Such case transfers arise in respect of the business of two vital federal
courts in the course of the administration of civil justice. The FCA represents itself as a
'world class civil court' applying and upholding the rule of law,10 and the FMC is
described in the media as the 'workhorse of the federal judiciary'.11

8

In 2000-01, almost 2500 family law matters were transferred to the FMC - see Federal Magistrates
Service, Annual Report 2000-01 (2001) 10.
9
The high number of transfers by the FCA to the FMC, relative to transfers to other courts, is examined
in detail in Chapter 9.
10
FCA, Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001)10 ('FCA AR 2000-01'); FCA, Annual Report 2002-2003
(2003) 13 ('FCA AR 2002-03').
11
Michael Pelly, 'Federal Magistrates Court Architect Urges Against Axe', Australian (Sydney), 2 May
2008, 29.
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1.5

Broader Relevance of this Research

This research complements other Australian and overseas works that encourage the
adoption of an empirical or quantitative approach in assessing the delivery of justice
within various contexts (including the Australian federal civil justice system), and
specifically in relation to the case management practices of the FCA.12 It provides
insights into the actual workings of the FCA, its relationship with another federal court
and its approach to dealing with certain types of litigants (including those that are selfrepresented). The two main objectives of law reform, as reflected in the policy
rationale for the existence of the FCJS, appear to sit comfortably together. Maintaining
court efficiencies by reducing case workload can enhance access to justice for matters
transferred to a more appropriate forum. Without this empirical investigation of the (at
times unknown) workings of this system, however, it would be difficult to appreciate
fully the realities of the operation of the FCJS, particularly whether the objectives of
law reform are compatible in practice.
In the course of researching and writing this thesis, it soon became apparent that the
literature is mainly silent in evaluating empirically how the principles of procedural
justice are applied by FCA judges during case transfer (and other discretionary)
decision-making. As may be drawn from Chapter 3, any literature that exists on the
general application of these principles within the context of the FCA or other federal
courts, tend to focus upon just one or two principles. Similarly, the limited empirical
work that exists on the subject of the workings of the FCJS is confined primarily to
family law matters in the FMC, and does not provide a detailed analysis of the effects
of case transfers by the Family Court to the FMC within the context of access to
procedural justice.13 This research aims to provide a more comprehensive qualitative
and quantitative evaluation of the delivery of all four main principles of procedural
justice studied in this thesis in respect of the discretionary decision-making processes
of the FCA as part of the operation of the FCJS.
12

See, eg, ALRC, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report No 89 (2000)
('Managing Justice Report'); Martin Gramatikov and Malini Laxminarayan, 'Weighting Justice:
Constructing an Index of Access to Justice' (Legal Studies Working Paper No 18/2008, Tilburg
University, December 2008).
13
In relation to the workings of the FMC in resolving disputes in family law, see Donna Cooper, 'When
Rolls Royce and Holden Justice Collide: An Analysis of the Operations of the Federal Magistrates
Service in Queensland in the Family Law Arena' (2003) 3(2) Queensland University of Technology Law
and Justice Journal 1. Court user evaluations commissioned by the FMC are discussed in Chapter 9.
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From a more practical perspective, this work may be of relevance to legal practitioners
and other users of the FCA by providing guidance on the nature and application of the
statutory criteria governing case transfers by the Court to the FMC. Despite there being
recent changes to some of the transfer provisions under the relevant rules of court, the
analysis provided in this thesis extends to the old and new provisions. In any event,
due to the absence of any detailed and informative published material on the practical
operation of the FCJS (including the interpretation and application of the transfer
criteria), precisely how and when matters are likely to be transferred from the FCA to
the FMC arguably remains somewhat of a mystery for the majority of court users. For
persons (including the legislature and courts) interested to learn whether the FMC is a
cheaper, simpler and quicker court for matters transferred to it by the FCA, the results
of this research may also be of value.
Finally, this thesis recognises and addresses some of the concerns and predictions
expressed publicly by various legal stakeholders immediately prior to the
establishment of the FMC (and the FCJS), as examined next.

1.6

Initial Concerns

Given its potential importance for federal civil justice, the proposal for a separate
federal magistracy and FCJS received significant attention within legal and political
circles.14 Some of the attention was positive. For example, the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission (as known then) supported the introduction of 'user
friendly' procedures and the choice of forum between the FCA and FMC for the
adjudication of human rights matters in this country.15 The FCA itself expressed public
support for the new court, which it saw as both appropriate and necessary in dealing
with less complex matters and thereby saving valuable FCA judicial resources.

14

The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee received some 31 submissions on the
subject.
15
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission No 5 to Senate and Constitutional
Legislation Committee, Federal Magistrates Bill 1999 and Federal Magistrates (Consequential
Amendments) Bill 1999, 8 August 1999, 1.
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Moreover, the FCA saw the establishment of the FCJS as a means of avoiding a further
increase in its own organisational size.16
Although founded upon the noble premise of seeking the enhancement of access to
justice in the federal justice arena, the proposed new system met with considerable
opposition. Even the Family Court, which for years had been in favour of the
introduction of a two-level judicial structure for family law cases, was in 1999
concerned the establishment of a separate court would
…defeat the object of providing a summary method of disposal of cases
in a speedy and efficient way and [would] result in a less satisfactory
service to the Australian community. The potential for public
confusion, forum shopping and waste of resources on shuffling matters
between courts is high.17

Perhaps the greatest opposition politically was seen from the then Labor Shadow
Attorney-General, Robert McClelland MP, who argued the FCJS would (amongst
other things) fail to reduce delays in the federal courts, the system would be complex
and it would be financially inefficient.18 Within a decade of the creation of the FMC,
the federal Labor Government and Attorney-General Robert McClelland MP indicated
a desire to implement a re-structure of the FCJS. This was based on an impression the
arrangements between federal courts for the conduct of Commonwealth law matters
have 'led to confusion amongst litigants, inefficiencies in funding and administration
and impeded access to justice for the community'.19

16

FCA, Submission No 13 to Senate and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Federal Magistrates
Bill 1999 and Federal Magistrates (Consequential Amendments) Bill 1999, 13 August 1999, 2.
17
Family Court, Submission No 4 to Senate and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Federal
Magistrates Bill 1999 and Federal Magistrates (Consequential Amendments) Bill 1999, 6 August 1999,
1. The Family Court filed a further two submissions in opposition of the proposed court.
18
See, eg, Robert McClelland, 'Federal Magistracy Complex and Cumbersome' (Media Release, 13 May
1999); 'Federal Magistracy a Sham' (Media Release, 2 June 1999); 'Williams Confused on Federal
Magistracy' (Media Release, 4 June 1999); 'Federal Magistracy About Politics Not Efficiency' (Media
Release, 16 June 1999); 'Federal Magistracy Won't Reduce Delays' (Media Release, 22 November
1999).
19
See Robert McClelland, 'Rudd Government to Reform Federal Courts' (Media Release, 4 May 2009);
Robert McClelland, 'Rudd Government Introduces Legislation to Improve Access to Justice' (Media
Release, 22 June 2009); Access to Justice (Family Court Restructure and Other Measures) Bill 2010
(Cth).
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For the purposes of this study, the concerns of the Law Council of Australia (Law
Council) are of most interest. It counseled in 1999 that any changes to the current
federal courts system
…must be made carefully so as to not offend the Constitution, or
undermine fundamental principles of our legal system – such as fairness
and natural justice. The Law Council is concerned that the
Government’s proposal may result in court procedures which do not
adequately protect the fundamental principles of our legal system.20

Similarly, in relation to the objective of the federal litigation system being cheaper,
simpler and quicker, it advocated:
The idea of ‘no frills’ justice cannot be achieved by simply changing
practices and procedures to make litigation faster, apparently cheaper
and less technical. To ensure that we retain the fundamental purpose of
our legal system, all law reforms must pass the test of fairness. We need
to ask if the reforms make the legal system more just or more accessible
to all Australians? Do they improve the quality of justice dispensed, or
are they simply shifting or veiling the real cost of justice?21
The national law body was also critical of the proposed inter-court transfer provisions.
It perceived deficiencies in, and potential problems with, the relevant provisions not
enabling the FCA to order the transfer of a FMC proceeding to itself under its
supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts. It was concerned further about the
possibility of the FMC fragmenting a matter by transferring the part over which it
lacked jurisdiction and retaining the balance in respect of which it is legally
competent.22

20

Law Council, Submission No 17 to Senate and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Federal
Magistrates Bill 1999 and Federal Magistrates (Consequential Amendments) Bill 1999, 16 August
1999, 9.
21
Anne Trimmer, 'Thinking Smarter: Access to Legal Services in 2001' (Address to the National Press
Club, Canberra, 15 May 2001) 3 (emphasis in original).
22
Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Parliament of Australia, Consideration of Legislation
Referred to the Committee: Provisions of the Federal Magistrates Bill 1999 and Federal Magistrates
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 1999 (1999) 30 [3.67]-[3.68].
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The findings in this study address the predictions of the above opponents of the FCJS
insofar as they relate to the potential inefficiencies in the administration and delivery
of fair and quality justice.

1.7

Underlying Assumptions

It should be clarified this research is based upon the following premises.
First, the statutory transfer provisions (the subject of discussion in Chapter 2) are
enacted validly pursuant to the legislative powers of the federal Parliament, and the
judicial officers of the FCA and FMC involved in the application of those provisions
during the study periods were properly authorised to act in this regard. So, too, the
FMC is a constitutionally valid federal court under Chapter III of the Commonwealth
Constitution and may legally exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, as
held in Re Bryant; Ex parte Guarino.23
Secondly, this research is predicated on the notion the study group matter applicants
had commenced their litigation in the FCA by choice, whether its exercise was based
on advice obtained from a legal practitioner (similarly exercising choice) or on the
personal state of knowledge, experience or preference of the applicant. Admittedly,
some applicants had brought their proceedings prior to the establishment of the FMC
and so had only the option of the FCA. Applicants appealing decisions made by the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) were required to commence any such
proceedings in the FCA under legislation,24 and regardless of whether they might have
also intended to ultimately apply to be transferred to the FMC. Other applicants
perhaps commenced their legal action after the establishment of the FCJS but, through
lack of sufficient public education or for other reasons, were unaware of the possibility
of commencing in the FMC. By contrast, the respondent litigants found themselves the
subject of FCA proceedings primarily because the applicants had brought them to that
forum (at least initially). Nonetheless, the attainment of procedural justice is of equal
importance to applicants and respondents in the study group.

23
24

(2001) 75 ALR 57 (Hayne J).
Pursuant to Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44AA ('AAT Act').
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1.8

Thesis Outline

This thesis is set out in 10 chapters, divided into three main parts. The first part
outlines the background to the FCJS, and the nature of this research, the key statutory
provisions and principles of justice studied. The second part covers the research
methodology and results of the 204 study group matters examined to assess the
practical effects of the operation of the FCJS on access to procedural justice. The final
part addresses the findings on the research questions of whether, and if so the extent to
which, the FCJS operated in the case of the study group matters consistently with the
principles of procedural justice and thereby served to enhance access to justice. The
broader aspects and implications of those findings are considered for the
administration of federal civil justice and law reform.

PART I
Chapter 1 sets the stage for understanding the establishment of the FCJS (including
the FMC) and the general nature and objectives of that system. It explains the nature of
the research project and its purpose in seeking to fill the current gaps in the knowledge
of both the operation of the FCJS in the area of FCA-to-FMC case transfers and its
potential effect on access to procedural justice for litigants whose matters are the
subject of such an order. The broader relevance of the research is canvassed, including
how it addresses the concerns raised by initial opponents of the system. Key
assumptions underlying the thesis are stated, and an overview to assist with navigation
through its chapters is unveiled.
Chapter 2 deals with the statutory framework underlying the operation of the FCJS. It
begins by providing a general overview of the law reform context for the creation of
the FMC and a system governing inter-court transfers. It also outlines the nature of the
FCA and FMC and their concurrent jurisdictions relevant to the periods of study. An
explanation of how a matter is typically transferred, from the date of commencement
in the FCA to the time of the making of a transfer order, is provided prior to examining
closely the statutory transfer provisions that govern the making of such transfer
decisions. Potential ambiguities and anomalies of the transfer provisions are
highlighted, including the uncertain position regarding the level of complexity of a
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matter as a formal criterion of transfer. A brief comparative analysis of the transfer
policies of the FCA and FMC is presented. Justification is provided for the contention
in this thesis that transfer decision-making under the FCJS is discretionary in nature.
Chapter 3 gives explanation for the selection of procedural justice (and specifically
the participation model) as the appropriate construct for the analysis of justice in this
thesis. The four main principles of procedural justice adopted are elucidated - equality,
openness, fairness and the provision of adequate reasons for decision. Working
definitions of each principle are provided. The notions of judicial accountability and
public confidence in the federal justice system are also introduced briefly. They are
issues of paramount importance to the FCA in the performance of its functions and
duties, and which flow on from the adherence to, or promotion of, procedural justice
by the Court. These themes are developed in the final chapter.

PART II
Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the research methodology adopted in this
thesis. It reflects the fact the study involves a mixed-methods approach, using both
quantitative and qualitative research methods. The justification for various primary
research tools being employed in preference to others is explained. How the adopted
research methods and measures apply in respect of the working definitions for the
principles of procedural justice is clarified, and the limitations of the chosen
methodology are acknowledged.
There are four empirical results chapters surrounding the research question of whether
the study group matters appear to have been transferred in accordance with each of the
four principles of procedural justice. The question of 'equality' is approached in
Chapter 5 from a quantitative perspective. The incidence of transfers within the study
group are examined in relation to the variables of 'who, what and where', so as to
establish whether there exists evidence of any particular type of litigant or matter being
singled out predominantly during the transfer decision-making processes during the
study periods.
Openness in transfer decision-making is examined in Chapter 6, again using a mainly
quantitative approach. It is examined whether the study group transfers occurred
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mostly in open court or in the privacy of judicial chambers. The extent to which
registrars were involved in transfer decision-making is also explored.
The fundamental concept of fairness in relation to the study group matters is examined
in Chapter 7, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This is done by reference to two
main criteria. First, whether the study group parties had a real opportunity to be heard
on the question of transfer; and secondly, whether the FMC was a more appropriate
forum for the resolution of the legal dispute between the parties (by being vested of the
necessary jurisdiction and resources, and by being cheaper, simpler and quicker court
than the FCA).
The primary focus of Chapter 8 is to reveal the extent of the existence of written
reasons for transfer decision published during the study periods, and the degree of
elucidation of the reasons for transfer within them. How the practices of the FCA in
respect of the publication of written reasons for transfers under the FCJS compares
with other examples of FCA inter-court and intra-court transfers is examined. To the
extent the written judgments shed little light on explaining the transfer of the study
group matters, the adequacy of any oral reasons provided to the parties in open court is
also considered from a quantitative perspective.

PART III
Chapter 9 draws together the results relating to the four principles of procedural
justice considered in Chapters 5 to 8. It answers the question of whether, at least in the
case of the study group matters, the FCJS operates in a manner consistent with the four
principles of procedural justice. To the extent the findings cast a shadow over a
positive conclusion, the chapter goes on to consider the compatibility of the FCJS and
access to procedural justice. In doing so, the role of managerial judging is examined,
as well as what is actually being achieved by FCA case transfers to the FMC.
In the final chapter, Chapter 10, the researcher reflects upon the experiences and
outcomes of the research and what questions remain unanswered, as well as what is
revealed about the true nature and tensions of access to justice law reform. The chapter
considers what the operation of the FCJS means for interested stakeholders. Finally,
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suggestions are offered for law and policy reform and for future research in the field of
federal civil justice, before the concluding remarks of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Understanding how the FCJS should work.

2.1

A System for Transferring Federal Matters

As seen in Chapter 1, case transfers by the FCA to the FMC occur under the FCJS, a
statutory system. This chapter provides a general overview of the law reform context
for the creation of a new federal court and a statutory system for the transfer of cases to
it by the FCA. This chapter provides also an understanding of how the transfer system
is designed to operate by considering the nature of the jurisdictions of the two courts
and the salient features (and apparent deficiencies) of the statutory transfer provisions
of the FCJS, primarily as applicable at the time of the study periods. The notion that
the level of complexity of a matter, the main transfer criterion espoused by the
lawmakers during the establishment of the FCJS, was translated from political rhetoric
into law is explored. The basis for viewing transfer decision-making as involving the
exercise of discretionary power is explained also. Such fundamental understanding of
the nature of the FCJS, alongside the principles of justice considered in the next
chapter, lays the foundation for evaluating in this thesis whether the study group
matters were transferred in a manner that appears to have promoted the delivery of
quality procedural justice.

2.2

The Broader Context for Creating the FMC and FCJS

The suggestion of a federal magistracy, originally as part of the Family Court, was
raised initially in the mid-1990s as an option for the improvement of the family law
system and for resolving state-federal jurisdictional problems in the area of child
protection.25 The ultimate creation of the FMC in the late 1990s arose as a result of
concerns to address a number of issues affecting the operation of the FCA and

25

See generally Jennifer Norberry, Federal Magistrates Bill 1999, Bills Digest No. 59 of 1999/2000, 9
September 1999.
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(particularly) the Family Court at the time,26 including those arising from perceived
case backlogs, high legal costs27 and a culture unfriendly to court users with less
complex disputes.28
The addition of another federal court, branded publicly at first as the 'Federal
Magistrates Service', may be viewed also within the context of Australian legal system
law reform. Calls to reform the federal civil justice system, predominantly by the
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), have tended to emphasise the need for
enhancement of access to justice by making the court system more efficient, equal and
fair, accessible and less expensive for all users. At the same time, it is recognised that
courts have finite resources and that there is a 'policy choice between individualised
"Rolls Royce" justice on the one hand, and affordable, robust, high volume social
justice, on the other'.29 Of course, Australia is not alone in respect of its justice law
reform agenda and is part of a global interest in access to justice issues.30
Chapter 1 introduced that the politically stated law reform objectives of, and rationale
for, the creation of the FMC and FCJS was to enhance access to justice for federal
justice system users. This was to be achieved by the establishment of a more userfriendly lower level federal court that is cheaper, simpler and quicker than the existing
federal courts - the FCA and the Family Court. The new court shares various areas of
jurisdiction with the other federal courts. Litigants can choose to commence
proceedings directly in the FMC or, relevant to this thesis, they may file their matter in
26

Ibid 3-5. See also Daryl Williams, 'Law and the Government: Shaping the Future' (Press Release,10
October 1999); Justice Robert French, 'Federal Courts Created by Parliament' in Brian Opeskin and
Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System, (Melbourne University Press, 2000) 123,
147.
27
Field has questioned the perceptions in the 1990s of the high cost of civil justice in Australia - see Iain
D Field, 'Judicial Mediation and CH III of the Commonwealth Constitution', PhD thesis, Faculty of
Law, Bond University, 2009, 26.
28
Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, above n 22, 1 [1.4].
29
ALRC, Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Discussion Paper No 62 (1999) 22 ('Review of the
Federal Civil Justice System'). See also Managing Justice Report, above n 12. Another key, earlier
report, on the subject of access to justice law reform in Australia is Access to Justice Advisory
Committee, Access To Justice: An Action Plan (1994) ('Access to Justice: An Action Plan'). For a more
recent example of Australian government approach to federal civil justice, see Attorney-General's
Department, 'A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System: A Guide
for Future Action' (Access to Justice Taskforce Attorney-General's Department, September 2009).
30
For a good background discussion of some of the overseas initiatives in this field, see Justice Ronald
Sackville, 'From Access to Justice to Managing Justice: The Transformation of the Judicial Role' (Paper
presented at the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Annual Conference on Access to Justice The Way Forward, Brisbane, 12-14 July 2002) 10. A notable report from the United Kingdom is that of
Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in
England and Wales (HMSO, 1996).
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the FCA. If the applicant chooses to file in the FCA, a judicial order potentially may be
made to transfer the matter to the FMC in accordance with transfer criteria under
relevant legislation (including the FCA legislation and rules of court - examined
below), on the grounds the matter is 'less complex' in nature. A further objective of the
creation of the FMC and the system of FCA-to-FMC case transfers is the reduction of
FCA workload by removing such 'less complex' maters to the FMC, thereby enabling
the FCA to focus on 'more complex' matters more appropriate for its case management
and determination.
This approach to law reform is not novel; there exist a number of other examples of the
legislature establishing a system for the transfer of proceedings between courts with
the primary objective of the improvement of efficiency in the administration of civil
justice in Australia.31 Similar to some of these other instances, what is borne out by the
Explanatory Memorandum and other political material32 pertaining to the
establishment of the FCJS is that the transfer of a matter under the FCJS is seemingly
predicated on the level of complexity of the matter. Put simply, the FCA should hear
and determine matters that are 'more complex', and 'less complex' matters more
appropriately belong in the FMC. A matter filed in the FCA, but which a judge regards
as falling within the latter category, should be considered for transfer to the lower-level
court. The converse applies also. The level of litigation complexity as the main
statutory criterion of case transfer is challenged later in this chapter, when the specific
nature of the FCJS statutory framework is examined.
It is understandable that both the FCA would support a statutory initiative by which it
could reduce its workload through the transfer of matters to a lower level federal court
and that a statutory ability for the FCA to do so was conceived by the legislature. The
workload of the Court was arguably significant during the few years immediately
leading to the establishment of the FCJS. During the period 1997-2000, the FCA had
around 21 300 new filings alone.33

31

See, eg, Courts (Case Transfer) Act 1991 (Vic) s 1; Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987
(Cth) s 5 ('Cross-vesting Act'); High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 31.
32
See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 June 1999, 7367
(Daryl Williams, Attorney-General).
33
FCA, Annual Report 1999-2000 (2000) 129 ('FCA AR 1999-2000').
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As evidenced in Chapter 5, in the first year of the operation of the FCJS (the first study
period of this thesis), there were 5395 filings in the FCA in all areas of jurisdiction
(including those areas it shares with the FMC). By 2002-03 (the second study period),
that number had dropped to 4840 filings. The study group (non-migration law) matters
transferred - 145 matters (2.7% of overall filings) in the first study period and 59
matters (1.2% of filings) in the second study period - do not constitute a substantial
reduction in the workload of the FCA. As explored fully in Chapter 9, however, the
significance of the process of case transfers from the FCA to the FMC is that it
represents the most exercised means of inter-court transfer on the part of the FCA, and
therefore plays a notable role in relation to its case management practices and the
administration of justice at the federal level. The process of case transfers under the
FCJS also serves to reduce the workload of the FCA in other ways borne out by the
findings of this research (see Chapter 9).

2.3

Nature of the Courts and Concurrent Jurisdiction

The FCJS involves the inter-relationship of two federal courts exercising concurrent
jurisdiction in a number of key general federal law areas. The legal and operational
nature of each court is outlined briefly below, followed by consideration of the
concurrent jurisdictions relevant to this study.

2.3.1

The FCA in Brief

The FCA is a federal superior court of record and a court of law and equity, created
under Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. It was established by the
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and formally commenced
operation on 1 February 1977. Section 71 of the Constitution vests the judicial power
of the Commonwealth in the FCA and authority to exercise federal power is found in
s 77, and thereby ss 75 and 76, of that instrument.34

34

See generally Justice James Allsop, 'Federal Jurisdiction and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Court of
Australia' (Paper presented to the New South Bar Association Bar Practice Course, Sydney, December
2002) 4.
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Not unlike the FMC, the FCA itself assumed jurisdiction formerly exercised by other
courts, including in part by the High Court of Australia (High Court) and in whole by
the former Australian Industrial Court and Federal Court of Bankruptcy.35 The FCA
was created originally for two main reasons. First, it is to reduce the workload of the
High Court in matters arising under federal or territory laws. Secondly, the Court deals
with areas of law (including industrial law, bankruptcy, trade practices and judicial
review of federal politicians and bodies) that should most appropriately be dealt with
by a single federal court, rather than by a variety of state courts.36
In addition to exercising accrued and associated jurisdiction,37 as a creature of statute
the FCA exercises original jurisdiction conferred upon it by hundreds of federal
statutes, ranging broadly from legislation concerning aboriginal matters to workplace
relations.38 Appellate jurisdiction is exercised by the Court in respect of, amongst other
things, decisions of single judges of the Court and the Federal Magistrates Court
pursuant to ss 24 and 25 of the FCA Act.
The practices and procedures governing the conduct of matters before the FCA are set
out principally in the Federal Court Rules and, to a lesser extent, in the various
practice notes issued by the Chief Justice of the FCA.39 There are also separate rules of
court pertaining specifically to the areas of bankruptcy, corporations and admiralty. 40
The FCA engaged in a major re-vamp and simplification of it rules of court in 2011.
The new Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (new Rules) commenced on 1 August 2011
and apply to proceedings started in the FCA on or after that date or essentially that
were still on foot as at that date (r 1.04). The version of the rules of court relevant to
the study periods of this research is that of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (FCA
Rules). All references in this thesis to the rules of court of the FCA will be to that
original version, unless indicated otherwise.

35

See, eg, FCA AR 2000-01, above n 10, 1.
See Justice Robert French, 'What Do Federal Court Judges Do?' (2000) 77 Reform 12, 13.
37
For an explanation of such jurisdictions, see generally Justice R V Gyles, 'Commercial Litigation in
the Federal Court' (Paper presented at the Commercial Litigation 2005 Conference, Sydney, 27 October
2005).
38
The FCA publishes a full list of the statutes under which it may exercise jurisdiction in its annual
reports.
39
The practice notes of the FCA are accessible on its website at
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/how/practice_notes.html>.
40
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005 (Cth); Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth);
Admiralty Rules 1988 (Cth).
36
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During the study periods (2000-01 and 2002-03), the FCA had a total of 49 and 46
judges respectively,41 sitting in state and territory district registries (offices) of the
Court located in all capital cities in Australia. Registrars may perform some of the
work of the judges in various less complex matters, such as routine bankruptcy
matters. Registrars are legal officers of the Court who may exercise statutory and
judge-delegated powers pursuant to the FCA Rules and the FCA Act s 35A. The extent
to which registrars were involved in the making of transfer decisions in relation to the
study group matters is examined in Chapter 6.
At the times of the study periods, the FCA saw its main objectives as being to
... decide disputes according to law – promptly, courteously and
effectively; and in so doing to interpret the statutory law and
develop the general law of the Commonwealth, so as to fulfil the
role of a court exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth
under the Constitution; provide an effective registry service to the
community; and manage the resources allotted by Parliament
efficiently.42

2.3.2

An Overview of the FMC

As referred to previously, the FMC was established in 1999 by the FM Act and its
jurisdiction is set out in the Magistrates (Consequential Amendments) Act 1999 (Cth).
Any doubts about various concurrent jurisdictions of the FMC, such as in respect of
administrative law proceedings and certain family law matters, was removed by the
Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2000 (Cth). The constitutional
reach of the provisions of Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution extends to
the FMC,43 and it possesses the powers of a court of equity. Similar to the FCA, it may
exercise accrued or associated jurisdiction.44

41

See FCA AR 2000-01, above n 10, 2; FCA AR 2002-03, above n 10, 4.
See FCA AR 2000-01, above n 10, 1; FCA AR 2002-03, above n 10, 3.
43
See Re Bryant; Ex parte Guarino (2001) 178 ALR 57, referred to in Chapter 1.
44
The associated jurisdiction of the FMC arises pursuant to FM Act s 18. See generally Federal
Magistrate Toni Lucev, 'The Federal Magistrates Court: Jurisdiction, Practice and Procedure and Crossvesting Applications' (Paper presented at the Western Australian Bar Association Bar Reader Course,
Perth, 21 May 2008).
42
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The first application filed in the (new) court occurred on 23 June 2000 and sittings
commenced on 3 July 2000 in Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Newcastle,
Parramatta and Townsville.45 The FMC saw 16 federal magistrates appointed in its
first financial year of operation (the first study period) and by its third year (the second
study period), that number had risen to 19, including the Chief Federal Magistrate.46
The majority of matters filed with the FMC involve family law matters. For example,
in 2000-01 the FMC had 26 070 divorce filings, compared with 2264 general federal
law filings (primarily in the area of bankruptcy law, and also in the areas of human
rights and trade practices).47 During the study periods, the FMC had no exclusive area
of original federal general law jurisdiction in its own right.48 An exception is its
exclusive jurisdiction over associated matters; that is, a matter 'associated' with another
matter before the FMC must be heard by that court if it has jurisdiction over the
matter.49 The FMC does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and appeals from
decisions of single federal magistrates proceed to the FCA.
In relation to the provision of client and various administrative services to the public
(including the acceptance and processing of applications and other documents and file
management), the FMC relies upon arrangements made with the FCA for use of
registries of the latter court pursuant to a memorandum of understanding.50 The
registrars of the FCA also hold appointment as registrars of the FMC. In addition to
sharing the registry resources of the FCA in the major capital cities, the FMC has sat in
other places (such as Newcastle), consistent with its approach of enhancing
accessibility to justice for people in rural and regional areas.
The rules of practice and procedure of the FMC are set out in the Federal Magistrates
Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FMC Rules) and in various practice directions.51 During the
initial phase of the establishment of the FMC, and to the extent its own rules were
45

See Federal Magistrates Service, above n 8, 6.
See ibid 7; FMC, Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) 6-7 ('FMC AR 2002-03').
47
See Federal Magistrates Service, above n 8, 36. It would appear the FMC regards 'filings' to include
matters transferred to it by the superior courts, as well as those filed directly by applicants.
48
Since late 2005, the FMC has exclusive jurisdiction in most types of migration law matters.
49
This is the case in accordance with FCA Act s 32AA.
50
Such memorandum is made pursuant to FM Act s 90. The registries of the FMC are named after
Australian capital (and other) cities, rather than the states and territories as occurs with the FCA. For the
sake of simplification, this thesis adopts the FCA registry names when referring to either the FCA or the
FMC.
51
The practice directions are available on the website of the FMC at
<http://www.fmc.gov.au/practice/index.html>.
46
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silent on a question of practice and procedure, the Court relied upon the provisions of
the respective rules of the Family Court and FCA, as applicable. Chapter 7 has more to
say on the topic of the FMC rules of practice and procedure, when the question of
whether the FMC was a simpler court than the FCA for the study group matters is
examined.
Consistent with the original political rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the
Court, the FMC stated its main objective during the study periods as being to
[p]rovide a simple and accessible alternative to litigation in the
established federal courts and to relieve the workload of those courts.
The [FMC] has one outcome: to provide a cheaper, simpler and faster
method of dealing with less complex Family Court and Federal Court
matters.52

2.3.3

Concurrent Jurisdiction

The FMC has concurrent jurisdiction with the FCA both generally, pursuant to s 39B
of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and under various specific federal statutes. In most
instances, the two courts may exercise identical jurisdiction, but in a handful of areas
the jurisdiction of the FMC is restricted to particular aspects of the governing
legislation or the nature of the relief it may grant to a party (including the quantum of
damages) is capped. In certain areas, such as trade practices, the scope of jurisdiction
of the FCA is more extensive than that of the FMC. During the study periods (and in
respect of the study matters transferred to it), the FMC shared jurisdiction and
workloads with the FCA in the areas of statutory law set out below (and excluding
migration law for present purposes). At the time of writing this thesis, the FMC also
now shares jurisdiction with the FCA in respect of industrial law and admiralty law
matters.

52

Federal Magistrates Service, above n 8, 6; FMC AR 2002-03, above n 46, 5.
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(a)

Trade Practices

The FMC had jurisdiction during the study periods under the (then) Trade Practice Act
1974 (Cth)53 (TPA). It could hear and determine matters arising under the unfair trade
practices provisions of pt V div 1 of the TPA (including misleading or deceptive
conduct) and product safety provisions under pt V div 1A brought by an applicant
(other than the relevant Minister or Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission) pursuant to s 86(1A). Under s 86AA, the maximum award of damages
for proceedings under pt VA or s 82 (actions for damages) was $200 000.54 There
existed a potential argument this cap could apply only in respect of proceedings
actually commenced in the FMC, rather than those merely transferred to it, by reason
of the reference in the relevant provision to proceedings that are 'instituted' in the
FMC. The issue would appear to have been resolved55 and to have not caused any
long-term jurisdictional issues. The jurisdiction of the FMC was increased in 2006 to
cover an award of damages up to an amount of $750 000 for claims in respect of
unconscionable conduct, industry codes, consumer protection and product liability
under the trade practices legislation.56
There was a marked, yet unexplained, increase in the number of trade practices
applications filed in 2002-03 (total of 132 matters) compared with 2000-01 (total of 64
matters).57 The FMC, nonetheless, at the time regarded the number of trade practices
filings to be limited due to the $200 000 cap on the award of damages.58

53

Since 1 January 2011, the FMC has jurisdiction in relation to trade practices matters under the
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The Court may hear and determine misuse of market power
matters (under s 46 of that Act). It also shares jurisdiction with the FCA in relation to consumer credit
matters under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth). These specific statutes are not
discussed directly because they fall outside the study periods.
54
See Darmody v National Centre Automotive [2003] FMCA 358 (23 December 2003).
55
The scope of TPA s 86AA was expanded in 2006 to refer to proceedings instituted in, or transferred
to, the FMC. See Jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth)
sch 1 item 5.
56
TPA s 86AA , as amended by Jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court Legislation Amendment
Act 2006 (Cth) sch 1 item 4.
57
See FMC, Annual Report 2003-2004 (2004) 21 ('FMC AR 2003-04').
58
FMC AR 2002-03, above n 46, 30.
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(b)

Bankruptcy

The FMC shares jurisdiction with the FCA in matters arising under the Bankruptcy Act
1966 (Cth), with the minor exception of jury trials (under s 30(3)). Bankruptcy matters
most commonly involve creditors’ petitions (that is, applications for a sequestration
order against the estate of a bankrupt debtor) and applications to set aside bankruptcy
notices. The greatest volume of FMC general federal law workload is in the area of
bankruptcy, principally involving matters originally commenced in the FMC. During
the first study period, there were almost 2100 bankruptcy filings in the Court and this
number almost doubled to just below 4000 filings during the second study period.59 By
far the bulk of the bankruptcy workload is performed by registrars, with matters
usually only being heard and determined by a federal magistrate if the decision of the
registrar is reviewed, or where the matter is otherwise regarded as complex or outside
the scope of the powers of a registrar to determine. A similar situation prevails in the
FCA.

(c)

Human Rights

Like the FCA, the FMC has complete jurisdiction in relation to matters arising from
complaints terminated by the President of the (then called) Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission60 pursuant to ss 46PE and 46PH of the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth).61 The High Court held in Brandy v
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission62 that certain provisions of the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which had sought to make a decision of the
Commission binding and enforceable as though the Commission exercised judicial
power, were constitutionally invalid. Consequently, the Commission may make
determinations in respect of a human rights matter before it, but only the FCA and
FMC may proceed to make enforceable, authoritative and binding orders and decisions
in respect of proceedings brought under the above provisions following the making of
a determination by the Commission.

59

See Federal Magistrates Service, above n 8, 27; FMC AR 2002-03, above n 46, 24.
Known nowadays as the Australian Human Rights Commission.
61
Subsequent to the study periods, known as the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth).
62
(1995) 183 CLR 245.
60
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The human rights jurisdiction encompasses complaints brought under various unlawful
discrimination federal statutes: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act
1986 (Cth),63 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Age Discrimination Act 2004
(Cth).
By the time of the second study period, 65% of all human rights matters were either
filed in, or transferred by the FCA to, the FMC.64 Along with bankruptcy matters,
human rights matters constitute one of the largest areas of concurrent jurisdiction for
the purposes of this research.65

(d)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)

The FMC may hear and determine applications for judicial review of administrative
decisions under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
(AD(JR) Act) and, in that regard, has powers identical to those of the FCA, save in
relation to an aspect pertaining to competition notices under pt XIB div 3 of the (then)
TPA.66 Initially, the AD(JR) Act prevented (such as under ss 5(4) and 7(3)) the making
of an application to the FMC for an order of review in respect of a decision made
under immigration, citizenship or migration legislation. The limitation has been lifted
since the FMC was granted concurrent jurisdiction in migration law matters with the
High Court following the enactment of s 476 of the Migration Litigation Reform Act
2005 (Cth). In the first year of the establishment of the FMC, the Court had merely 11
AD(JR) Act matters filed. That total number almost tripled by 2002-03.67

(e)

AAT Appeals

Appeals on questions of law from decisions of the federal AAT may lie to the FCA
pursuant to s 44 of the AAT Act. Although called 'appeals', they are in fact heard and
63

See above n 61.
See FMC AR 2002-03, above n 46, 29.
65
As alluded to previously, migration matters have constituted a substantial number of the transfers by
the FCA to the FMC.
66
For a more detailed discussion, see Norberry, above n 25.
67
FMC AR 2002-03, above n 46, 25.
64
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determined within the original jurisdiction of the FCA.68 Such AAT matters can be
transferred by the FCA to the FMC pursuant to s 44AA of the AAT Act, with the
exception of immigration portfolio legislation matters (applicable during the study
periods) and decisions of Presidential Members of the AAT.69 The matters cannot be
commenced directly in the FMC but, once transferred by the FCA, the former may
exercise jurisdiction in respect of the hearing and determination of the matters pursuant
to s 44AA(8). A consistent, albeit small, number of matters in this jurisdiction were
litigated in the FMC during the study periods: 15 matters in 2000-01 and 14 matters in
2002-03.70

(f)

Privacy Law

The FMC and FCA may enforce determinations of the Privacy Commission and
private sector adjudicators in accordance with the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). This
particular jurisdiction of the FMC commenced on 22 December 2001. Privacy law
matters barely contribute to the workload of the FMC and, apart from some
information provided on the website of the Court,71 there is often scant (if any)
mention of this particular jurisdiction by the Court publicly, including in its annual
reports. There was no transfer of a privacy matter during the study periods.

(g)

Copyright Law

On 13 May 2003, the FMC commenced exercising jurisdiction in civil copyright
matters under pts V (remedies and defences), VAA (broadcast decoding devices), IX
(moral rights of authors of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works in films) and
XIA (performance protection) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This jurisdiction was
in existence for less than two months towards the end of the second study period, but it
is interesting (as will be explored in Chapter 7) there was a transfer of a copyright
matter to the FMC during the first study period.

68

FCA Act s 20.
Ibid s 20(2); AAT Act s 44AA.
70
FMC AR 2003-04, above n 57, 22.
71
See <http://www.fmc.gov.au/services/html/privacy.html>.
69
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2.4

Case Transfer Track

Prior to examining the statutory provisions governing transfer decision-making under
the FCJS, it is useful to take a general overview of the case management processes
adopted by the FCA from the time a litigant commences a new proceeding to when the
transfer order is made. The steps outlined below are based upon the professional
experiences and observations of the researcher as a registrar of the FCA and FMC.72
The processes are reflective of the operations of a typical FCA district registry,
although different registries may adopt slightly different practices because of internal
policies or the nature of the registry (for example, based on being large or small in its
scale of operations). In any event, any discrepancies in practice between registries do
not affect the outcomes of this research. The overall case management process, as
relevant to the study group matters, is illustrated below at Figure 2.1.

2.4.1

Step One – Filing

The applicant, either in person (if self-represented) or through a legal representative,
seeks to commence proceedings in the FCA by presenting an originating application
(or similar document) at a registry of the FCA. Subject to any relevant rules of court,
either a supporting affidavit or a statement of claim should usually accompany the
originating process.73 At the time of the commencement of the study group matters,
filing could occur in person at a registry counter or by facsimile transmission
(nowadays, electronic filing is available as well). A registrar or counter-officer checks
the documents to the extent of determining whether the correct forms have been used,
the jurisdiction of the FCA appears to be invoked by the prospective matter, the
documents have been signed, and the like. If the documents appear ‘defective’, they
may be rejected for filing or referred to a judge for certain directions about acceptance
or rejection for filing (for example, during the study periods under O 46 r 7A of the

72

Further information about practice and procedure is available on the website of the FCA at
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au>.
73
Under r 8.02 of the new Rules, there is nowadays also a requirement to file a 'genuine steps statement'
regarding attempts to settle the dispute. This arises as a consequence of the Civil Dispute Resolution Act
2011 (Cth).
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FCA Rules in relation to documents that appear on the face to be an abuse of process,
embarrassing or vexatious).
Payment of the appropriate filing fee is required at the time of filing, as prescribed
under the (former) 1978 or (current) 2004 Federal Court of Australia Regulations
(Cth) (FCA Regulations). This is so unless the applicant is entitled to a waiver or
exemption of such fees in accordance with those regulations (for example, if the
applicant is the holder of a health concession card). If the documents appear to be in
order and payment has been addressed satisfactorily, the registry will usually accept
the documents for filing by file stamping them, affixing the Court seal (as appropriate),
inserting a court matter number and allocating a first directions date (a date at least
five clear days after the date of filing).
The final main step undertaken within the registry is the creation of a physical file for
containing present and future documents filed in the proceedings. The matter is at this
time ‘put on the system’ (that is, details of the matter typed into fields within the (then)
FEDCAMS, or nowadays Casetrack, computer records management system). A docket
judge is allocated and a listing created on the system for the matter to be in a particular
courtroom (or occasionally in chambers for certain ex parte matters) on a given date
and time.
Since 1997, the FCA has adopted and applied a very proactive approach to the
management of each individual matter within the Court as part of the individual docket
system (IDS). Each matter commenced in the original jurisdiction of the FCA is
allocated to a single docket judge (or, in the case of most bankruptcy and some types
of corporations matters, a registrar), who will usually deal with the matter from
beginning to end. Registries based in the larger cities (such as New South Wales,
Queensland and Victoria) have panels of judges that sit on particular types of cases
(including competition law/trade practices, admiralty, corporation law, industrial law,
human rights, taxation and intellectual property). The allocation of matters to those
judges occurs on a rotational basis. By contrast, the small registries (the Australian
Capital Territory, Tasmania and Northern Territory) have either a single resident judge
or a List Judge based interstate to whom all registry matters are allocated
automatically. A single judge (or a couple or so judges, should the original docket
judge be unable to continue in the role), presiding over a matter from commencement
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to finalisation, means there is an increased judicial involvement and management of
the progress of the proceedings. The operation of the IDS is considered more closely
later in the thesis.

2.4.2

Step Two - Chambers

Once the registry has performed its role, the file goes to the chambers of the relevant
docket judge or registrar. Upon receipt of the new file by chambers, the judge will
ordinarily consider the brief summary of the salient legal and factual aspects of the
matter prepared by the associate (legal assistant to the judge). A decision can be made
at this point for the matter to be transferred to the FMC, without it first proceeding to
an open court directions hearing before the judge (the relationship of this practice in
relation to the principle of open justice is examined in Chapter 6). Alternatively, the
matter may proceed to a first directions hearing.

2.4.3

Step Three - Directions Hearing

The first time the new matter is listed before a judge in open court for brief mention is
ordinarily known as the first directions hearing. It may be the only matter before the
judge at that time or, more commonly, it may form part of several matters listed at the
same time. One or all of the parties are in attendance. There may be one or, more
commonly, several directions hearings conducted over the duration of a proceeding.
A directions hearing, whilst typically brief, is an integral part of the case management
system of the FCA and is the primary means by which the judge and parties address
the most appropriate timetable for the conduct of the matter.74 The judge may make
oral orders or directions requiring the parties to file and serve specific types of
documentation, and undergo other processes (including mediation), in the timely and
efficient preparation for hearing or resolution of the matter. The orders and directions
are recorded manually during the directions hearing by the associate sitting in court
with the judge, and subsequently recorded on the computer records system of the Court
by registry or chambers staff. As explained in Chapter 4, these 'reports of listing' and
74

See generally Law Council (Federal Litigation Section), Federal Court of Australia Case
Management Handbook, (13 October 2011) 14 [4.1].
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computer records completed by FCA staff serve as key tools in the methodology
adopted in this research. The oral orders/directions may be typed up ultimately as a
document styled ‘Order’, which is formally signed and sealed by a registrar.
It is at a directions hearing that a judge may indicate a position on whether the matter
should be transferred to the FMC immediately or at some future time. In this regard,
the judge typically may make an order (or directions) to achieve of one or more of the
following:


Set out a timetable for the filing of particular documents by the parties
and list the matter for either a further directions hearing or, if the matter
is already close to being ready for hearing, list the matter for actual
hearing before the docket judge (or another available judge if the docket
judge is unavailable);



Provide the parties with the opportunity to make submissions at some
future time on the question of a potential transfer of the matter to the
FMC (either orally at a future directions hearing or in writing for
consideration by the judge in chambers in the absence of the parties); or



Make a decision (order) to transfer the matter to the FMC immediately,
either with75 or without a timetable in place for the filing of further
documents in preparation for hearing to facilitate the progression of the
matter.

Even if a judge decides not to transfer the matter at the time of the first directions
hearing, there remains the possibility a decision being made to do so at a subsequent
directions hearing or even conceivably at the time of the hearing itself. One would
assume the latter would be an exceptional situation if the matter had reached such an
advanced stage in its case management and progression through the FCA. There were
no examples of 'last minute' transfers in relation to the study group matters.
Finally, in the event of a party seeking the transfer of the matter to the FMC, a judge
may deal with that application, by way of a filed notice of motion, at a directions
hearing or usually at a separate hearing of that interlocutory application.
75

See FCA Act s 32AB(7).
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2.4.4

Final Step - FMC

Once a judges makes a transfer order, the relevant FCA registry, in its capacity as the
registry for the FMC, creates a new FMC file (including the allocations of a new FMC
matter number and docket federal magistrate). It performs a similar function with the
recording of the matter on the relevant computer records system for the FMC
(MAGCAMS or, more recently, Casetrack) as it had done originally for the FCA
matter. The new file is forwarded to the chambers of the docket federal magistrate. The
parties are notified in writing (by either the registry or new chambers) of the transfer of
the matter to the FMC, of the new FMC matter number and of the listing details of the
first directions hearing before the federal magistrate. A copy of the Order may be
provided to the parties at such time for their records.
This entire case transfer process is illustrated in the following diagram:

35

Figure 2.1: FCA-to-FMC case transfer process.

REGISTRY: New matter commenced by filing an originating process
with a FCA registry and payment of appropriate filing fee. First
directions hearing date is allocated. Registry creates a file and puts
new matter on Court computer records system.

CHAMBERS: File for new matter is forwarded to
allocated docket judge’s chambers (or to a docket
registrar). Associate prepares brief summary of
matter for judge.

COURT: Matter
listed in court for
first directions
hearing.

Matter listed for
further directions
hearing(s).
AND/OR
Matter goes to
hearing before
judge/registrar.

2.5

TRANSFER
ORDER MADE BY
JUDGE (or
Registrar)

FMC: Matter
goes to FMC.
Registry staff
creates new file
and computer
record on
system. Matter
allocated to
docket of federal
magistrate and
directions
hearing listed.
Parties are
notified in
writing.

The Transfer Provisions

The next issue considered is the nature of any policies and the statutory rules
governing the decision-making process in the FCA in the making of transfer orders
under the FCJS applicable at the time of the study periods (or currently). There exist
some extra-curial comments of the FCA of a general nature about the potential transfer
of less complex matters upon the creation of the FCJS.76 There does not appear,

76

See, eg, Chief Justice Michael Black, 'Bring on the Change' (2000) April Queensland Bar News 11.
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however, to have been formulated or articulated any formal public policy of the FCA
in relation to case transfers to the FMC (including regarding the appropriate
interpretation and implementation of the transfer provisions). It is possible the Court
has an informal policy that exists, and is altered from time-to-time, at the direction of
the Chief Justice and for the instruction of the judges. If such policy does exist (or did
exist at the time of the study periods), it is not referred to in any of the practice notes or
other guidelines provided by the Court for the benefit of court users, including on its
website. To the extent there seems to be expressed a policy position by the FCA in its
annual reports, as to the benefits of the FMC in reducing the workload of the FCA, this
is considered in later chapters of this thesis.
The primary transfer provisions are contained in s 32AB of the FCA Act and, relevant
to the study, in (the former) O 82 of the FCA Rules (collectively referred to as the
'transfer provisions' and reproduced, with several other relevant provisions, in
Appendix A at the end of this thesis). Similar wording is found in s 44AA of the AAT
Act and in the relevant trade practices legislation (under s 86A). These separate pieces
of legislation are not addressed here individually because of that similarity.
A theme developed further in Chapter 10 is that, although the FCJS has been in
operation for over a decade, there seems to remain an absence of public material
addressing the substance and application of the transfer provisions. This remains the
case notwithstanding the wording of O 82 is amended significantly by the new Rules
under div 27.2. Knowledge of the intricacies of the transfer provisions, including their
salient features and potential shortcomings, facilitates an understanding of how the
judges associated with the study group matters did (or were to) approach transfer
decision-making.

2.5.1

Section 32AB

The statutory power of the FCA to order the transfer of a matter before it to the FMC is
contained in s 32AB of its own governing statute - the FCA Act. At the time of the
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study periods, the section was comprised of 10 sub-sections.77 Its key features, for
present purposes, include the following:
 The Court may order the transfer of a pending matter to the FMC (s 32AB(1));
 Such a transfer may be on the application of a party to the proceeding
(s 32AB(2)(a)) or on the initiative of the Court (s 32AB(2)(b));
 The factors the Court may take into account in deciding whether to transfer a
proceeding to the FMC are those that may be set out in the Rules of Court
made after consultation with the FMC (ss 32AB(3)-(5));


In deciding whether to transfer a matter, the Court under ss 32AB(6)(a)-(d)
must have regard to:
(a)

any relevant Rules of Court;

(b)

whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter (covered by
s 32AA) are pending in the FMC;

(c)

whether FMC resources are sufficient to hear and determine the
proceeding; and

(d)

the interests of the administration of justice; and, finally,

 No appeal may lie from a transfer decision (s 32AB(8)).

In summary, s 32AB provides the FCA may transfer a matter to the FMC by
application from a party or of its own motion after potentially taking into account
factors set out in its applicable rules of court, but in doing so is required to take into
account the four prescribed factors in ss 32AB(6)(a)-(d). The section is otherwise
mostly uninformative as to how the discretion is to be exercised, which arguably is to
be expected if the judges are to have the flexibility to tailor justice for the specific
needs of an individual matter. Nonetheless, scrutiny of s 32AB raises issues, and in
places concerns, about the interpretation and application of the law for the reasons
canvassed next.

77

Sections 32AB( 8A) (confirmation of jurisdiction of the FMC in relation to a transferred matter) and
(9A) (criminal proceedings) were inserted after the study periods.
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(a)

Timing of Transfers

The reference to a matter being pending in the Court in sub-s (1) implies the FCA has
no ability to transfer a matter to the FMC unless or until it commences in the FCA. The
Court does not have any control over a proposed proceeding, and cannot transfer it to
the FMC as the more appropriate court, until the parties have gone to the expense and
effort of litigating in the FCA for at least a short period. This argument may be
countered by the fact the jurisdiction of the FCA is usually only invoked upon the
filing of a proper originating process, and not sooner.

(b)

The Resources of the FMC

A requirement is imposed upon the FCA in s 32AB(6)(c) for it to have regard to the
resources of the FMC to hear and determine a proceeding in the event it were
transferred. This information is gleaned ordinarily from the FMC Registrar based in
Victoria or directly from the chambers of a specific federal magistrate in the case of
smaller registries. Such a statutory requirement is not imposed, however, in relation to
transfers from the FCA to other courts, such as to state or territory supreme courts.78
The pre-gathering of information on, or judges having regard to, the ability of the FMC
to hear a proposed transfer matter has the advantage of ensuring the matter will be
capable of determination by the FMC if transferred. One cannot help but wonder
whether this is a reasonable requirement for busy judges to fulfill consistently. Would
it have served any practical purpose in the very early days of the establishment of the
FMC, including the first year of the study period, when the new court had a relatively
limited workload? The requirement raises the question of whether it is implicit in the
provision that the legislature contemplated the potential for the resources of the FMC
to be stretched to the point of it being unable to deal with transferred matters from
time-to-time. In other words, that the court may someday become ill-equipped to
handle matters the FCA would regard as requiring determination by the lower court in
the interests of the administration of justice. The issue of the pressures imposed upon
the FMC by an increasing workload, including from transferred matters, is discussed in
Chapter 10.
78

See Cross-vesting Act s 5.
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(c)

The Interests of the Administration of Justice

On the one hand, the criterion in s 32AB(6)(d) pertaining to transfers 'in the interests of
the administration of justice' provides necessary flexibility to the FCA in considering
the individual circumstances of a matter before it and to order a transfer where justice
so requires. It is not uncommon for courts to have regard to the interests of justice
when determining other types of transfers, such as those made under the cross-vesting
legislation or applications for a stay of proceedings on the ground of forum non
conveniens, as considered by the High Court in BHP Billiton Limited v Shultz.79 On the
other hand, it is a potentially broad and vague criterion and renders it difficult to
predict confidently what circumstances a judge would regard as satisfying such a
criterion. It is also unclear whether anything turns in practice on the choice by the
legislature of the phrase 'in the interests of the administration of justice' in the transfer
provision under the FCA Act, whereas the phrase 'in the interests of justice' was
adopted for the purposes of transfers under the cross-vesting legislation.80

(d)

No Right of Appeal

The legislature has determined a transfer decision may not be appealed (s 32AB(8)). It
has done so consistently with the approach adopted under the cross-vesting
legislation,81 and so as 'to prevent time-wasting appeals on minor procedural matters
which do not affect the substantive rights of the parties'.82 The implications for access
to justice, due to the non-appealable nature of the transfer decision, are addressed more
fully in Chapter 10.

79

(2004) 221 CLR 400.
See Cross-Vesting Act s 5.
81
Ibid s 13.
82
Explanatory Memorandum, Federal Magistrates Bill 1999 (Cth) [61]. The transfer decision may
potentially be the subject of an application for judicial review.
80
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(e)

Requests from the FMC for Transfer and Other Issues

There is no statutory mechanism by which the FMC may formally request a transfer to
it of a FCA matter, not even where a proposed transfer would promote the interests of
justice. In cases where the FMC has a matter pending before it that is associated with a
proceeding before the FCA, the FCA may transfer its own proceeding to the FMC, in
accordance with ss 32AA and 32AB of the FCA Act. The existence of an associated
matter in the FMC is a factor to which the FCA must have regarded in deciding
whether to transfer a matter (under s 32AB(6)(b)), but there does not appear otherwise
to be any requirement the FCA consider the question of transfer in the first place in
such instances. Indeed, there would not even seem to be in place any formal practice
implemented by the FCA to make enquiries of the FMC as to whether there are
associated matters before the latter court, and this research has not uncovered any such
transferred matters. There is also the absence of any statutory mechanism by which the
FCA may transfer to the FMC part of a proceeding only, as is arguably possible with
transfers to the state and territory supreme courts under the cross-vesting legislation83
and in relation to Family Court proceeding transfers to the FMC.84
The transfer provisions are largely silent on the powers of the FCA to impose
conditions upon transfer to the FMC, save the possible exception of the FCA to make
'such orders as it considers necessary pending the disposal of the proceeding by the
[FMC]' pursuant to s 32AB(7). It is no doubt undesirable for the FCA to impose
conditions upon the FMC and thereby give an appearance of interference in the case
management of proceedings by another court. An observation made during this
research was the common practice for a transferring judge to provide directions for the
short-term conduct of a matter whilst it is in the process of transfer to the FMC. This
does not appear to offend the principle of non-interference and facilitates the timely
conduct and resolution of the matter.

83

See Jackson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1988) 96 FLR 145, but see Marks v Helliar (1990) 14 Fam
LR 276.
84
This is possible by reason of the meaning of 'proceedings' under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
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(f)

Jurisdictional Limits

It is noteworthy the relevant legislation does not impose a positive duty upon the FCA
to transfer a matter if it is below a particular monetary threshold, such as in the case of
a trade practices matter whose quantum is less than the statutorily prescribed amount
(originally $200 000), as discussed above. This is consistent with the practices of other
Australian courts exercising jurisdiction in matters below a statutory monetary
threshold, and which would have potential costs consequences for the applicant in
recognition that the proceedings were brought in a less appropriate forum than they
may have been otherwise commenced. Any costs implications for the applicant in the
FCA in similar circumstances would arise if they did not recover damages in excess of
$100 000 (the details of this point are explained later in this thesis). Arguably, the
legislature intended the FCA to be able to determine the level of complexity of a given
matter, irrespective of its quantum. Does this send a message, however, that the
legislature did not intend the question of complexity to be determined by the quantum
of the dispute? If so, one may query why it chose to impose a monetary restriction in
relation to the trade practices jurisdiction of the FMC.
Finally, the exemption in s 32AB(10), to the effect s 32AB does not apply to
proceedings of a kind specified in the phrase 'the regulations', is somewhat ambiguous
and unhelpful. This phrase is undefined. Ordinarily, reference to such wording within a
FCA context is to the FCA Regulations, but this does not appear to be relevant to this
particular aspect of case transfers.

2.5.2

Rules of Court

It was seen above that s 32AB(6)(a) requires the FCA to have regard to 'any relevant
Rules of Court' when deciding whether to transfer a matter to the FMC under
s 32AB(1). The relevant rules of the FCA for the purposes of this study were, as
mentioned previously, contained in the now repealed O 82 of the FCA Rules (today,
they are found within div 27.2 of the new Rules). Order 82 dealt with the rules on both
the transfer of 'proceedings' from the FMC to the FCA (div 1) and from the FCA to the
FMC (div 2).
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A 'proceeding' is defined in s 4 of the FCA Act to mean 'a proceeding in court, whether
between parties or not, and includes an incidental proceeding in the course of, or in
connexion with, a proceeding, and also includes an appeal'. The word 'appeal' is not
defined in s 4, however, for the purposes of references to appeal within O 82, it was
defined in r 4 of that provision to mean 'an appeal under [s] 44 of the [AAT Act]'. The
study group matters are covered, therefore, by the transfer provisions.
Although the transfer provisions under the new Rules have been significantly revised
(for one thing, they have been shortened significantly), the transfer procedures and
criteria of the original provisions remain essentially unaltered. The salient
characteristics of O 82 are considered next, including the potential ambiguities and
limitations. The recent reformulation of the transfer rules resolves only some of these
issues, and other new issues seem to emerge.

(a)

Applications for Transfer

During the study periods, a party could apply for the transfer of a proceeding from the
FCA to the FMC under O 82 r 5 (and consistent with s 32AB(2)(a)). Such motion had
to be heard and determined by a single judge under O 82 r 5(3), and consequently a
Full Court of the FCA was unable to entertain such a motion (which is sensible
considering it sits within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court). It would seem r 5
imposed a formal requirement any such application for transfer be made by motion on
notice, and so the moving party was technically required to incur the expense of filing
and serving a notice of motion (interlocutory application) prior to an oral hearing
before a judge. The researcher has, nonetheless, observed (mainly non-study group)
parties to make successful applications for transfer either orally in open court or in
chambers by way of written correspondence (no doubt as a consequence of judges
exercising their discretionary power to dispense with formal compliance with the FCA
Rules).
The wording of the corresponding provision in the new Rules (r 27.11) provides
simply that '[a] party may apply to the Court to transfer to the [FMC]: (a) a proceeding
other than an appeal; or (b) an appeal under the AAT Act'. Somewhat confusingly,
r 1.40 refers generally to the ability of a party or a 'person who has a sufficient interest
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in the proceeding' to make an application for the Court to exercise a power mentioned
in the new Rules. The reference to interested persons in r 1.40 arguably is not intended
to extend to transfer orders made under r 27.11 in light of the reference in the latter to
such an application being made by a 'party' to the proceeding. In either event, there
remains a requirement any interlocutory application for transfer (if made prior to a
hearing) be made formally in writing, pursuant to r 17.01. A single judge sitting as 'the
Court' would entertain any such application presumably, but this is no longer spelt out
in the new relevant rule as it had been in O 82 r 5(3).

(b)

The Motion of the Court or a Judge

Section 32AB(2)(b) refers to the power of 'the Court' to transfer a proceeding on its
own initiative (that is, motion). The term 'Court' is defined in s 4 of the FCA Act to
mean the FCA. By contrast, O 82 r 6(1) referred to the ability of 'the Court or a Judge'
at any time to instigate a transfer. This phrase was not defined in O 82, however, it is
clear from s 4 and O 1 r 4 that the word 'Judge' in the phrase means (unless the
contrary intention appears) 'a Judge sitting in Chambers'. There is now consistency in
language between the wording in the FCA Act and rules of court. Under the new Rules,
r 27.11 provides in a note that 'the Court' may make an order of its own motion
pursuant to r 1.40. Similarly, it may make any order that it considers 'appropriate in the
interests of justice', under r 1.32.

(c)

Chambers

Regarding the question of where a judge was able to make a transfer decision during
the study periods, the above difference in language, between 'the Court' in the FCA Act
and 'the Court or a Judge' in the FCA Rules, presents some uncertainty. It is unclear
whether the Act is confined to the Court sitting in open court, whereas the FCA Rules
permitted the making of a transfer order in either open court by the Court (sitting as a
single judge) or by a judge sitting in chambers. It is not readily apparent what, if
anything, turns on this distinction between the legislation and rules, and it may have
posed no difficulties in practice as the FCA Act itself refers in s 32AB(3) to the 'Rules
of Court' making provision in relation to transfers of proceedings to the FMC.
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A related question still arises, however, in relation to the nature of the power to be
exercised by a judge sitting in chambers, due to the different language adopted in O 82
and s 17 of the FCA Act. Section 17 refers to the ability of a judge to exercise the
jurisdiction of the FCA whilst sitting in chambers in circumstances where there is 'a
proceeding on an application' in various scenarios outlined in sub-s (2), including in
para (c) an 'application authorised by the Rules of Court to be made to a Judge sitting
in Chambers'. Otherwise, a judge sitting in open court should exercise the jurisdiction.
There appears to be an inherent tension between s 17 and O 82. The wording in the
former seems to imply the transfer jurisdiction may be exercised in chambers under
that provision only where (for relevant purposes) a party has made a transfer
application to the judge sitting in chambers and not where the judge has made the
transfer on his or her own initiative. By contrast, O 82 r 6 (transfer on the motion of
'the Court or a Judge') and O 82 r 7 (factors to be considered during a transfer decision)
both used the expression 'the Court or a Judge' which, as was seen above, may extend
to a judge sitting in open court or in chambers. Despite the confusion, this study has
proceeded on the basis judges had the power to make a transfer decision on their own
motion and regardless of whether their Honours were sitting in open court or in
chambers.
Whatever issues may have arisen from the distinction between 'the Court' and 'the
Court or a Judge' in ss 17, 32AB and in O 82 in the past, they appear to have been
removed in the new transfer rule (r 27.11) insofar as the former phrase is now used.
Rule 1.36 provides further clarification of the ability of a judge to make a transfer
decision in chambers by providing 'the Court may make orders other than in open
court'. The new s 20A of the FCA Act (inserted in 2009) provides the Court with the
power to deal with civil matters without an oral hearing in certain specified
circumstances.

(d)

Powers of Registrars

The findings of this research (in Chapter 6) reveal a number of study group transfer
orders were made by various registrars. An issue arises as to whether and, if so, on
what basis, such officers can make transfer orders. It was noted previously the FCA
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Rules provided a transfer motion must be heard and determined by a single judge
(O 82 r 5(3)), and it is not obvious whether the references to 'Court' or ‘Court or a
Judge’ in the (old or new) transfer provisions were intended by the legislature to
extend to registrars.
In general terms, registrars of the FCA may exercise certain powers and functions of a
judge provided in a proper instrument of delegation pursuant to s 35A of the FCA Act.
In the experience of the researcher, that instrument does not ordinarily extend to FCAto-FMC transfer powers, however, it is possible the delegation of transfer power
occurs under s 35A(1)(h) within the context of 'a power of the Court prescribed by
Rules of Court'. This research has proceeded on the basis that the power of registrars to
transfer proceedings derives from this provision, the registrars concerned in the study
did hold the appropriate delegation of power and their transfer decisions were
accordingly legally valid.

(e)

The Criteria

Order 82 r 7 supplemented the FCA Act in relation to the transfer criteria a judge could
take into consideration when deciding whether to transfer a matter to the FMC. This is
reflected in two sections (ss 32AB(6)(a), 32AB(4)). In addition to the factors to which
the Court was required to have regard under s 32AB(6) (or similarly under s 44AA(7)
of the AAT Act), the factors 'the Court or a Judge' may (as distinct from must) have
taken into account under O 82 rr 7(a)(d) include:
(a)

whether the proceeding or [AAT] appeal is likely to involve
questions of general importance, such that it would be desirable
for there to be a decision of the [FCA] on one or more of the
points in issue;

(b)

whether, if the proceeding or appeal is transferred, it is, in the
opinion of the Court or the judge, likely to be heard and
determined at less cost and more convenience to the parties than
if the proceeding or appeal is not transferred;
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(c)

whether the proceeding or appeal is, in the opinion of the Court
or the judge, likely to be heard and determined earlier in the
[FMC]; and

(d)

the wishes of the parties.

There have been changes to the wording of these transfer criteria in r 27.14 of the new
Rules, but they are more of style than substance. The main change of substance whether the judge must consider the criteria - is addressed below when considering the
nature of the exercise of judicial discretion.
The list of transfer factors is not exhaustive. Each factor presumably is intended to
carry either equal weight or such weight the judicial decision-maker deems appropriate
in the circumstances of each individual matter. By being an inclusive list, the decisionmaker may call upon his or her own expertise and knowledge in determining the
existence and nature of any other factors pertinent to a given matter.
Compared with the FCA Act, the old and new rules of court reflect more of the original
political rhetoric espoused by the legislature and rationale for the establishment of the
FCJS. Arguably, O 82 r 7(b) relates to the FMC being a cheaper court (the reference to
'at less cost' to the parties) and a simpler court ('more convenience to the parties').85
Paragraph (c) of that rule is predicated on it being quicker than the FCA in the
disposition of proceedings ('likely to be heard and determined earlier').86 Aside from
the factor espoused in para (a), the factors outlined in the rules of court appear litigantfocused and seek to promote the best interests of the parties.
By contrast, and putting aside the reference to the 'the Rules of Court' in s 32AB(6)(a)
as a transfer criterion to which the Court must have regard, the factors outlined in the
FCA Act appear to focus on the potential effects of a transfer on the overall
administration of justice. Of course, the two concepts of the interests of the parties and
the administration of justice are not mutually exclusive, having regard to the fact the
latter benefits the individual parties as well as broader justice considerations. The
marriage between the legislation and rules of court is interesting, nonetheless. The
85

The corresponding wording used in r 27.12(3)(b) of the new Rules is 'less expensive' and 'more
convenient'.
86
The wording 'more quickly' is used in the new r 27.12(3)(c).
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FCA Act speaks of the interests of the FCA and FMC (the criteria of 'resources of the
FMC' and the 'interests of the administration of justice' in ss 32AB(6)(c)(d)), whilst the
FCA Rules consider the interests of the parties to the proceedings (the 'wishes of the
parties' criterion in O 82 r 7(d)). The relationship between the two-fold rationale for
the establishment of the FCJS and the delivery of access to justice is addressed in
Chapters 9 and 10.
Having regard to all the transfer provisions applicable to the study group matters
outlined in this chapter, the questions of: how, where, when, by whom and upon whose
motion the transfer decision-making occurred in respect of those matters may be
illustrated for convenience as follows:

Figure 2.2: Overview of statutory transfer mechanisms during study periods.

WHO?
The 'Court'
(Judge/Registrar).

WHEN?
At any time
after proceeding
commenced.

HOW?
By making transfer
order after
considering factors in
s 32AB and O 82.

BY WHOSE
MOTION?
Court or parties.

WHERE?
Chambers or
open court.
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2.5.3

Complexity as a Criterion

As touched upon previously, at the time of the establishment of the proposed FCJS and
new federal court the (then) Attorney-General envisaged a specific forum for complex
general federal law litigation, as distinct from that which was less complex in nature:
Where more complex matters are filed in the Federal Magistrates
Service, there will be provisions for enabling them to be transferred to
either the Federal or Family Court, whichever has jurisdiction.
Similarly, there will be provisions for transfer from the superior courts
to the Federal Magistrates Service of less complex matters within the
Federal Magistrates Service’s jurisdiction.87
The above statement signifies the notion of complexity of a proceeding is to be a key,
if not the main, criterion for determining transfers under the FCJS. Conspicuous by its
absence from the political debates or Explanatory Memorandum for the FMC Bills,
however, is the definition of 'complexity'. The FCA heralded the establishment of the
FCJS by stating it was 'appropriate and necessary' to have the FMC with its ability to
deal with less complex cases,88 but otherwise shed no light publicly on what is likely to
be regarded by it as less complex litigation inappropriate for the use of FCA judicial
resources. To what extent, then, did the criterion of complexity actually translate from
political rhetoric to the transfer provisions once the FCJS came into operation?
It was just seen in the discussion on the salient aspects of the transfer provisions that a
number of transfer factors were prescribed for a judge to consider when deciding
whether to transfer a given proceeding to the FMC. It is noted that complexity is not an
express or direct factor to which the decision-maker is to have regard, although it may
be argued the references to 'less cost and more convenience' and 'heard and determined
earlier' set out in O 82 rr 7(b)-(c) (respectively) reflect the objectives of the FMC (a
cheaper, simpler and quicker court). At best, the notion of complexity is reflected in
these provisions to the extent it may be argued any proceeding transferred to the FMC
implies the matter is not particularly complex and so may be capable of relatively
inexpensive and prompt resolution by the FMC. Drawing such inferences, however, is
87

Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 June 1999, 7367 (Daryl
Williams, Attorney-General) (emphasis added).
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Black, above n 76, 11.
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not as satisfactory as having an express provision referring openly to complexity as a
criterion.
Even if the level of complexity of a matter were a statutory transfer criterion,
complexity itself is a highly subjective concept. As observed by Justice James Allsop,
complex litigation is 'not just "big" litigation' and society itself has become more
complex'.89 The researcher observed as a registrar that some of the complex, as in
protracted and convoluted, proceedings in the FCA did not involve vast sums of
money or commercial disputes. The complexity of a matter may be assessable by
reference to the level of sophistication of the legal principles and arguments involved
or the length of the hearing (taking into account the number of witnesses and the
existence of voluminous documentary and/or extensive oral evidence). A less complex
matter might be one that is estimated to take a brief period to hear (say, one or two
days) and not involve voluminous evidence or contested principles of law; it is a
matter that will essentially succeed or fail on the basis of its facts and evidence.
The Law Council in 1999 expressed concerns over what it regarded as the inaccuracy
of the then Attorney-General to describe the FMC as dealing with less complex
matters.90 In particular, it observed trade practices disputes (especially those pertaining
to misleading or deceptive conduct) may be legally complex, notwithstanding the
quantum involved does not exceed the (then) monetary cap of $200 000. It also
suggested workplace relations matters (an area of jurisdiction conferred upon the FMC
after the study period) could potentially encompass a matter as complex as one of the
largest such disputes in Australian legal history - the 'Waterfront Dispute' in 1998 - and
where the compensation involved could exceed $100 million.91
It is possible the FCA is, notwithstanding the absence of express statutory provision,
applying complexity as a primary criterion in practice, which requires empirical
investigation in Chapter 8 when examining the published written reasons for transfer
decisions provided in the study group matters. For now, it is noted the legislation itself
does not refer overtly to the very criterion expressed politically as the fundamental
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Justice James Allsop, 'Complex Litigation' (Speech delivered at the National Judicial College of
Australia Conference on the Australian Justice System in 2020, Sydney, 25 October 2008) 1.
90
Law Council, above n 20, 20.
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basis for FCA transfers to the FMC. Unlike the Family Court,92 the FCA has not shed
much (if any) light in public on the circumstances in which a transfer to the FMC is
most likely to occur.

2.5.4

Transfers by the FMC

Transfers are also possible by the FMC to the FCA under the FM Act pt 5 and the
FMC Rules pt 8.93 The ability of a federal magistrate to transfer a matter to the FCA is
important in relation to the study group matters re-transferred to the FCA and is
examined closely in Chapter 7 within the context of the principle of fairness. Under
ss 39 and 40 of the FM Act, similar discretionary transfer mechanisms operate as under
the FCA transfer provisions examined above. Section 41(1) provides for the mandatory
transfer of certain types of proceedings to the FCA (or Family Court). Such
proceedings are of a kind specified in regulations made for the purposes of the section,
however, as seen with the FCA Act, it is not totally apparent to what those regulations
or proceedings refer. Proceedings in the FMC are regulated by the Federal Magistrates
Court Regulations 2000 (Cth) (FMC Regulations). No appeal lies from a decision of a
federal magistrate to transfer a matter to the FCA or Family Court, in accordance with
s 41(5).
The FMC Rules essentially mirror the criteria for transfer found in the FCA Rules, with
the main exception of the factor set out in r 8.02(4)(d) - consideration by the federal
magistrate as to 'the availability of particular procedures appropriate for the class of
proceeding'. The timing of the transfer application is prescribed, unlike under the FCA
Rules, to occur on or before the first court date unless ordered otherwise (r 8.02(2)).
The level of complexity of a proceeding is not set down as an express criterion in those
transfer mechanisms, similar to the situation canvassed above in relation to the FCA.
The closest reference to complexity is seen only in relation to family law proceedings,
where the complexity of a matter is sought to be measured by reference to its expected
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See, eg, Principal Registrar of the Family Court, 'When to Transfer Proceedings from the Family
Court to the Federal Magistrates Service' (2002) 15(4) Australian Family Lawyer 23.
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The provisions are set out in Appendix A. The meaning of the words contained in the provisions was
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duration of hearing. Matters running for longer than two days by definition would be
complex. The FMC explains the ‘two day rule’ in the following terms:
It has been determined that an objective criterion of two days hearing
time will ensure that the court is hearing the range of matters that was
intended by Parliament, including relatively simple contested residence
and property proceedings. The court can also have regard to more
subjective considerations, such as the court’s opinion as to the
complexity of the legal issues raised in the proceedings, although it is
not obliged to do so.94

2.6

A Discretionary Power?

This research is interested in the concept of the substitution by a judge of their choice
of forum for that of an applicant during the operation of the FCJS, and the implications
this may have for the attainment of procedural justice. At the core of this issue is the
possible exercise of discretion and this thesis has so far alluded to there being a
judicial discretion when deciding whether to transfer a matter to the FMC. It is
appropriate that this suggestion of the existence of transfer discretion is explained.
The question of whether judges have any discretion to exercise when deciding cases
has been the subject of theoretical debate. The positivist theory of H L A Hart
propounds the notion of judges having discretion in judicial decision-making to the
extent they have no obligation to arrive at a particular decision; their only obligation is
to apply legal rules.95 By contrast, Professor Ronald Dworkin has argued a distinction
exists between weak and strong discretion - a judge with the latter is able to make a
decision without being bound by any standards set by an authority, whereas a weak
discretion involves the making of a judgment call.96 The judge reaches a decision
based on, and justified by, an assessment of the importance of principles such as
94
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fairness or justice and so has no real discretion.97 Any discretion conferred by
legislation still requires the judge to act according to principles and procedures.
Without engaging in an assessment of the above theories, but recognising a debate
does exist in legal literature as to the nature or extent of judicial discretion, this thesis
proceeds on the basis a FCA judge has, and is exercising, a discretion in deciding
whether to transfer a case to the FMC (or indeed to any other forum or venue). The
discretion exists because, as seen in the transfer provisions evaluated above, the judge
has a choice as to whether they consider a transfer under s 32AB of the FCA Act and
O 82 of the FCA Rules (or under the new Rules). It was seen that there is no
prescriptive rule in either instrument (or apparent public policy of the FCA)
compelling a judge to consider generally whether any case within their docket should
be transferred to the FMC. Rather, it is only if, and when, a judge chooses to turn their
mind to the question of potential transfer, or is required to do so because a party has
made an application for transfer, that the need to address the issue of transfer arises
and the transfer provisions are invoked. The heading of s 32 AB itself refers to the
'[d]iscretionary transfer of civil proceedings to the FMC'.
This ability to exercise choice as to whether the issue of transfer is entertained - to
even apparently randomly select a particular case to transfer when other cases in the
docket of the judge are not so selected - is what arguably confers upon the judge a
significant discretionary power. This view is consistent with views espoused by one
FCA judge on the nature of judging and judicial decision-making within the FCA:
'Judging' clearly describes the making of decisions ... The word
'judgment', however, implies a degree of discretion or discernment,
perhaps involving consideration of whether one should decide at all.
Judgment also involves assessment of how one will approach the
decision-making approach, and how one will assess relevant
considerations. Thus judging, in the curial sense, involves both

97

Patricia Loughlan, 'No Right to the Remedy? An Analysis of Judicial Discretion in the Imposition of
Equitable Remedies' (1989) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 132, 136-137.

53

decision-making and exercising judgment about how decisions are
made.98
It may be countered to the suggestion that judges may randomly select matters for
transfer that they have the notion of potential transfer at the back of their mind in
relation to each matter, but that some matters, by virtue of their nature, more readily
invoke the discretion to address transfer directly and openly with the parties. For
present purposes, the apparent absence of any strict or formal requirement for a judge
to do so as a mandated duty is noted.
The only proviso to the judge not being legally required to consider whether a transfer
should occur is in a situation where a party applies by notice of motion for a transfer
order; then the judge must turn to the statutory provisions. Once, and only if, the judge
is entertaining the question of a case transfer, has the legislature apparently conferred
upon the judge the need to have regard to certain factors, namely those outlined in
s 32AB(6) and the corresponding factors set out in O 82. Yet, even in those
circumstances, many of the transfer criteria are entirely discretionary by the reference
to the judge 'may' transfer a proceeding and 'may' take into account the factors
specified in O 82 (as seen earlier in this chapter). The significant exception is the
reference to 'must' contained in s 32AB(6), in which the judge 'must' have regard to the
four specified factors.
Something may be said at this point on the subject of the relationship between
s 32AB(6) and O 82 r 7. The wording of the two provisions would seem somewhat
circular in nature. Subsection 6 states the Court 'must have regard to' the specified four
factors, including factor (a) - 'the Rules of Court'. In turn, the wording of O 82 r 7 of
the FCA Rules provides 'the Court or a Judge may take into account' the factors
outlined in that rule, in addition to the factors in s 32AB(6), to which regard must be
had by the decision-maker. Thus, the legislation requires the Court to have regard to
the FCA Rules, however, the latter provides certain factors the Court may take into
account, whilst also having to have regard to the factor in the former relating to a
requirement to have regard to the latter. Consequently, the nature of any discretion in
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relation to the application of the transfer criteria becomes somewhat blurred in this
circular process.
With the changes to the new Rules, some of this confusion is resolved, but an odd
development arises. Rule 27.12 refers to the factors to be taken into account in respect
of a potential transfer of a FCA matter to the FMC, however, the onus has now been
placed upon the parties to the proceeding to address the matters in s 32AB(6) and
(essentially) the four factors outlined in O 82 r 7. Presumably, the judge is still
required to have regard to such factors by virtue of the requirement in s 32AB(6)(a)
that the Court must have regard to the transfer factors set out in the Rules of Court.
In relation to the factor in s 32AB(6)(d) - the interests of the administration of justice this factor in itself involves the potential further exercise of discretion. What does it
mean to pursue or further the interests of the administration of justice within the
context of transfers to the FMC? Putting aside any precedents on the subject, that a
judge is bound to follow pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis (precedent), a judge
will determine the phrase within the context of the individual case before them. As
alluded to previously, the discretionary nature of this criterion is particularly important
in enabling the judge to determine a fair disposition of the perceived needs of the
parties. As recognised by Professor Kenneth Davis,
[r]ules without discretion cannot fully take into account the need for
tailoring results to unique facts and circumstances of particular cases.
The justification for discretion is often the need for individualised
justice.99
This thesis considers the extent to which there exists a tension in practice (as seen by
the results of this study) between the pursuit of the interests of the parties, on the one
hand, and the interests of other litigants in the FCA, on the other.
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2.7

Assessment of the Statutory Framework

An examination of the relevant statutory provisions governing the transfer of matters
by the FCA to the FMC has indicated ambiguities in a number of respects. Most
surprisingly, these provisions reveal the legislature did not ultimately address the level
of complexity of a matter as a formal and express transfer criterion, despite the original
policy formulation that less complex matters most appropriately belong within the
realm of the FMC.
To say in this thesis that a judge has discretion in transferring a matter to the FMC, is
to say he or she is not bound to decide the issue of transfer a particular way and that
there is a choice of whether to transfer a matter to the FMC in the exercise of
discretion and legal authority. A judge is seemingly not obliged to consider the
question of transfer in the absence of a formal application, however, if he or she does,
then there should be regard to the factors outlined in the transfer provisions. As there
exist deficiencies in the statutory framework for transfers and judges possess
significant discretion in relation to the destiny of a proceeding, any over-arching
principles of justice are essential in ensuring, and providing theoretical guidance on
how, due process is to be achieved during the operation of the FCJS. It is to these
principles that we turn in the next chapter.

56

CHAPTER 3: THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
The importance of due process.

3.1

Justice and Case Transfers

It was seen in the preceding chapter that judges exercise discretion in relation to
whether any given FCA proceeding is transferred to the FMC in accordance with the
statutory transfer provisions. This chapter considers the broader over-arching
principles of procedural justice governing the exercise of judicial discretion, be it in
relation specifically to case transfers under the FCJS or generally in the management
of any case litigated in the FCA. These principles exist and operate as safeguards
against an abuse of the arbitrary exercise of judicial discretionary power. In evaluating
whether the operation of the FCJS creates any impediment to access to justice for
litigants whose matters are transferred under it, such principles are central to
determining the impact of the transfer decision-making and the extent to which access
to justice was seemingly attained in the study group matters.
It is argued in this thesis that access to justice is undermined if, during the operation of
the FCJS, the transfer decision-making process occurs contrary to the principles of
equality, fairness, openness and the provision of adequate reasons for decision
(collectively referred to in this thesis as 'the principles of procedural justice'). Actual or
perceived adherence to these principles, apart from benefiting litigants, benefits the
FCA because it fosters judicial accountability and thereby the confidence of the public
in the Court as an integral part of the federal judiciary. The converse is a potential
threat to the legitimacy of the Court as an administrator of federal civil justice.
The nature of justice and the basis for the model of procedural justice adopted in this
thesis are addressed first, followed by an examination of the principles of procedural
justice (including working definitions of each principle used for answering the main
research question). The chapter concludes by touching upon the importance of judicial
accountability and public confidence for the FCA brought about by the promotion of
access to justice for litigants within the FCJS. The final chapter develops this
discussion more fully.
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3.2

Deciding Which Concept of Justice to Adopt

A somewhat trite proposition, but one worth acknowledging, is that when judges
exercise discretion in the course of the performance of their judicial functions, they
should seek to ensure it occurs in a manner most compatible with the attainment of
justice for the parties directly affected by the decision-making. It has been remarked
that judicial officers administering the law in a democratic 21st century society must
perform a balancing act of applying correctly legal principles, whilst recognising a
growing 'expectation that any exercise of public power can be justified as rational and
fair'.100 Therefore, if justice is to be served in practice, the relevant judicial officer
must be perceived to have been promoting the interests of justice, but what exactly
does ‘justice’ entail?
The concept of justice has intrigued legal theorists and philosophers over the centuries,
stemming back to ancient times and the works of Plato and Aristotle.101 A multitude of
labels and conceptions concerning justice have been advanced, including those of:
substantive, distributive, contributive, procedural,102 divine, instrumental, criminal,
restorative, retributive, natural, spatial, organisational, social and commutative justice.
Given this myriad of approaches to conceptualising justice, what conception(s) of
justice should apply in the realm of dealing with the process of transferring matters
from the FCA to the FMC during civil proceedings?
In its simplest terms, the attainment of justice for the study group matters may be
regarded as being focused upon either the journey within the FCA (that is, the
processes and procedures employed by the FCA during the proceedings and transfer
decision-making) or the destination of the litigation (namely, the final outcome of the
case before the FMC).103 In this thesis, the former is referred to as procedural justice
and the latter as substantive justice.104 This thesis concentrates upon the existence or
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absence of procedural justice associated with the transfer decision-making process, as
distinct from seeking to evaluate the substantive legal merits, or correctness, of the
transfer decision of the judges or the final determination made by the federal
magistrates. To the extent the appropriateness of any transfer decision is questioned,
this is done with the principle of fairness in mind and in consideration of whether the
FMC was possessed of necessary jurisdiction and was a cheaper, quicker and simpler
forum for the study group matters.
There is also a practical reason for not seeking to evaluate the substantive merits or
correctness of each transfer decision in this study. There are too many unknown
variables as to whether any given study group matter should have been transferred. For
example, it would need to be established whether each matter would have actually
benefited by remaining with the docket judge (including whether the matter would
have been heard sooner by the judge, compared with a federal magistrate, depending
upon such factors as the workload and periods of leave of absence of the respective
judicial officers). There is also the problem of seeking to understand the full nature of
each matter transferred, compared with all matters not transferred, in making an
independent judgment as to whether the former should have been the subject of a
transfer order.

3.2.1

What is Procedural Justice?

Procedural justice focuses upon the level of justice attained through the existence and
implementation of fair and transparent practices and processes in the course of
management of litigation by a court. It helps assure the litigant that his or her best
interests are considered at all stages of the proceeding and, by the same token, of the
neutrality and good faith of the judge in the process.105 With procedural justice being
accorded to all parties involved in a legal proceeding, satisfaction with the dispute
resolution process within the court may be achieved on the part of all the parties (and
the general observer), even though there is usually an overall jubilant winner and
disappointed loser when the final important ruling has been made. In the absence of
procedural fairness, arguably even the spoils of victory in the end are diminished for
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the victor if the process by which such victory was achieved was tainted by a lack of
due process or fairness along the way.
In this country, no single legal instrument prescribes procedural justice, but the notion
pervades many facets of the law, ranging from criminal trials to administrative law.
Unlike the United States with a due process provision within its Bill of Rights,
Australia lacks a national bill of rights encapsulating and guaranteeing various
inalienable human rights in the area of a right to a fair hearing.106 Nonetheless, High
Court authorities in respect of civil law provide that, for example, citizens are to be
regarded as equal before the law,107 judicial decisions are to be made according to legal
standards rather than undirected considerations of fairness,108 and that the content of
the law should be accessible to the public.109 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant),110 to which Australia is a signatory, further arguably
provides some legal basis for a requirement for procedural justice to be accorded
litigants in respect of fairness and equality before the FCA (as addressed in more detail
below).
What exactly does, or does not, constitute procedural justice in any given legal
proceeding is potentially uncertain. To speak of procedural justice is to ponder such
question as what is fair when considering processes and procedures. Fairness, like
justice, is a highly subjective concept and susceptible to various interpretations. What
is fair and just for one person may not hold true for another.111 It is essential for this
research that the nature of procedural justice be identified and defined overtly at the
outset.
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3.2.2

Using the Participation Model

In determining what is fair and just in relation to procedural justice, John Rawls in A
Theory on Justice112 constructed three primary models: the accuracy model (the
ultimate aim of the procedure is to arrive at the truth - that is, a 'perfect procedural
justice'), the balancing model (the costs and benefits of a given procedure must be
weighed - this is an 'imperfect procedural justice') and the participation model. This
research most closely accords with the participation model of procedural justice, which
provides it is the degree of participation (of the parties) in the process, rather than the
outcome, that defines the presence of procedural justice. This particular model,
considered Rawls, is linked to the notion of 'pure procedural justice'. In other words,
correct or fair procedure (including the ability to be heard in court) leads to a correct or
fair outcome, whatever that outcome may be.
As recognised by Professor Lawrence Solum, the participation model does have its
staunch critics, particularly amongst proponents of the balancing model, who would
dispute the independent value of perceptions of participation.113 It is contended a
'participation' perspective of procedural justice is the most appropriate construct for
assessing whether justice was attained for the study group matters. The main reason is
that, most fundamentally, this research is concerned with examining the processes and
procedures adopted by the FCA when transferring the matters to the FMC and the level
and nature of involvement of the litigants during this process. As seen previously, this
is a statutory system that enables an applicant litigant to choose the FCA as the
preferred forum for the resolution of a legal dispute (assuming jurisdictional issues are
otherwise satisfied), whilst simultaneously enabling a judicial officer to substitute their
own choice of forum for that of the litigant.
Granted, this is not a new phenomenon. Courts, including the FCA, for many years
have imposed their own perceptions of what is the most appropriate forum for the
resolution of a legal dispute, as seen with matters pertaining to forum non conveniens
under private international law or transfers to other Australian courts under the cross112
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vesting legislation, to name a couple of instances. Nonetheless, this discretionary
power of the FCA necessitates the ability of litigants to participate directly in the
decision-making process.
The ability to participate is also important because of the absence of any statutory right
of appeal of the transfer decision. If litigants are to be denied an ability to articulate to
a higher authority (such as an appeal court) their disapproval of, and concerns about,
the change of forum, then they must be accorded the opportunity to express such views
and seek to provide input whilst the decision is in the process of being formulated and
pronounced. Furthermore, when a transfer decision arises, it becomes imperative that
the litigants are placed in an appropriate position to be informed fully and frankly of
the making of the decision and its basis. This is so these individuals may perhaps more
readily understand, and therefore accept, the transfer of their proceedings.

3.3

The Four Principles

If this research is to evaluate whether procedural justice (using the participation
model), was attained in respect of the study group matters, then it needs to be stated
clearly by what criteria the existence or absence of procedural justice is assessed. Not
all litigants will be satisfied at all times with each transfer decision made by a judge,
and in other cases one or all of the parties will be totally agreeable to the transfer of the
proceeding. What factors need to be present to make the transfer of a matter
procedurally just when viewed objectively? When a matter is transferred, either with
or without the consent of all the parties, the transfer decision-making process must
reveal the principles of procedural justice. The phrase 'transfer decision-making
processes' refers to the implementation of the transfer provisions outlined in Chapter 2
and in the manner revealed by the empirical findings in Chapters 5 to 8. Decisionmaking processes may be evolutionary; that is, a decision may originate, develop and
be made at varying stages in the course of the management of a case by the FCA.
The next part of this chapter considers each on these principles in turn; first, by
considering the theoretical and legal context in which the principle subsists; and
secondly, by providing a working definition of the principle in relation to the transfer
of the study group matters.
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3.3.1

Equality

The notion of equality before the law is addressed often by law reform bodies in
Australia within the context of the enhancement of physical access to justice in the
criminal and civil courts, including the federal justice system.114 They advocate
equality of access in relation to the courts and legal resources (including funding) for
all people, regardless of gender (women), socio-economic background (financially
disadvantaged), race (ethnic and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples),
English language proficiency (people from non-English-speaking backgrounds) and
locality (rural access to legal services and the courts). Federal governments have also
sought to be a significant driver of reforms to reduce barriers that impede access to the
courts.115 Equality in access to federal civil justice, however, is dealt with differently in
this thesis to the concepts outlined above. The focus here is more on the notion of the
equality of treatment of litigants once they are already participating within the FCA
and FCJS, and a judge is exercising discretion whether to transfer the matter.
The discussion about equality is approached as follows. First, the notion is considered
as arguably representing a fundamental human right. Secondly, the meaning of
equality for the purposes of this thesis is established. Finally, various issues underlying
this aspect of the research are stated and the basis for their being tested by this thesis is
explained. These issues, in particular that relating to self-represented litigants possibly
being singled out for transfer orders, are integral to evaluating whether the principle of
equality was promoted in the case of the study group matters.

(a)

A Fundamental Right?

One of the primary reasons for selecting the notion of equality before the law as a
principle of procedural justice in this thesis is because it arguably possesses the
standing of being a human right recognised in Australia (to varying extents) under
international law, by statute and under the common law. In the Australian Capital
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Territory, the only Australian jurisdiction to have a bill of rights, the Human Rights Act
2004 (ACT) provides in part in s 8 that every person:116
 Has the right to enjoy his or her human rights without distinction or
discrimination of any kind;117 and
 Is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law
without discrimination. In particular, everyone has the right to equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground.118
Discrimination is defined in that section to include 'race, colour, sex, sexual
orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, disability or other status'. For reasons to be made clear below, we
might include in this definition of discrimination: 'status of legal representation',
'choice of place of legal proceedings' and 'choice of area of jurisdiction of legal
proceedings'.
The Covenant forms a foundation for each litigant to be accorded the right to due
process in court proceedings within this country. Article 14(1) of the Covenant
provides in part that '[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals'.
Article 26 goes further in prescribing 'all persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law'.119
Although Australia is a signatory to the Covenant, which is annexed to the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (as the legislation was
known during the study periods),120 it is not made a direct part of Australian statutory
law, but plays a role in the development of the common law.121 In this regard, the High
Court has shown a preparedness to imply a principle of legal equality into the
Commonwealth Constitution. Although a dissenting judgment, Justices Deane and
116
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Toohey held in Leeth v The Commonwealth that theoretically equality of all persons
under the law and before the courts exists as a fundamental doctrine of the common
law and a 'basic prescript of the administration of justice'.122 In the opinion of their
Honours, however, discriminatory treatment of persons may be excused in cases with a
reasonable rationale for the basis of the discrimination.123 In other words, the common
law may recognise equality before the law cannot always be guaranteed, and a lack of
equality will at times be excused where the underlying rationale for the denial of the
right is of greater importance. One might argue, however, such denial of a human right
must occur only in clear cases, for as T R S Allan has observed
[t]here must be adequate investigation of the circumstances of particular
cases, so that all coercive action against specific individuals is truly
justified by a defensible view of the public good.124
The existence of a tug-of-war between the principle of equality and the greater public
good within the context of the FCJS is examined later in this thesis.

(b)

Approaching Equality

When considering procedural justice under the FCJS, the notion of equality may be
perceived as giving rise to a judicial need to seek to ensure all litigants (and their
matters) are treated equally during transfer decision-making and in their ability to
participate in that process or within the FCA. In other words, no one group or category
of litigants - based on factors of their status of legal representation, choice of filing
registry (place) or choice of cause of action (jurisdiction of law)125 - should be
discriminated against in the sense of being blatantly over-represented or underrepresented in respect of the transfer statistics. This approach is consistent with the
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notion of judicial impartiality; that is, judges should be devoid of bias when making
judicial decisions.126
Ideally, there ought to be revealed in the empirical findings for the study group matters
an overall sense of equal treatment in relation to those litigants and their matters whilst
being transferred to the FMC. Accordingly, self-represented litigants should not be
significantly more likely to be transferred to the FMC (in the absence of some strong
factor supporting the appropriateness of the matters to be transferred to the FMC) due
to any perception they have either less meritorious or more time-consuming matters
than legally represented applicants. The reverse side of the same coin is that legally
represented litigants should not be denied the opportunity of having their matters
transferred to the FMC, which may have been a better forum for the resolution of those
proceedings.
Similarly, if the legislature has prescribed a number of general federal law areas are
potentially capable of transfer under the operation of the FCJS, then no single area of
law should dominate substantially the number of transfers that occur. Finally, and
taking into account the objective of the FCJS of reducing FCA workload, there might
be seen to exist less equality if the transfers were to occur only in the largest (and
therefore busiest) registry and litigants from that one place were significantly overrepresented in the statistical findings. In a similar vein, it could be argued that it is
unfair if litigants within the smaller or less busy registries could not avail themselves
of the mechanism of transfer to the FMC to the same extent as the largest registry.
Taking into account the above approach to considering equality in practice, this
research reflects that the notion of equality is not absolute, but rather a relative
concept.127 Comparisons are made statistically in Chapter 5 between the study group
matters to seek to evaluate the level to which any one or more groups of litigants were
seemingly singled out compared with the other study group litigants. What this
research does not consider, however, is whether like cases in the FCA as a whole were
treated similarly or equally vis-à-vis the study group matters. As interesting as such a
task would be, it is one difficult to assess and would require a comparative study to be
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performed of the study group matters with all the hundreds or thousands of FCA
matters within the same jurisdictional areas that during the study periods were not
transferred to the FMC. Such a task would be on an immense scale and well beyond
the scope of this research project.
The question of gender equality - the extent to which female or male applicants were
most likely to be transferred - is also not examined in this thesis, as the researcher at no
time during her time with the FCA observed gender to be an issue in respect of case
management or transfers under the FCJS in that forum.

(c)

Testing Equality

Prior to commencing this research, the researcher had three main preconceptions about
what was seemingly occurring with the transfer of matters by the FCA to the FMC
during the study periods. Those preconceptions were that during the study periods:
(i)

matters filed in the New South Wales District Registry of the
FCA were more likely to be transferred than matters filed in any
other registry;

(ii)

human rights proceedings were more likely than any other
jurisdiction (area of law) to be transferred to the FMC; and

(iii)

self-represented applicant litigants were more likely to be
transferred than applicants with legal representation.

The basis for the three assumptions is explained next and their validity is tested
empirically in Chapter 5.

(i)

The Largest Registry

It is first tested whether the New South Wales District Registry statistically represented
the highest number of transfer orders within the study group findings. If one considers
a main objective of the FCJS is for judges to be able to reduce workload by the making
of transfer orders in less complex matters, it follows logically that such a case
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management mechanism would be utilised fully in the registry with the greatest
workload. The New South Wales District Registry had the highest number of filings
(new matters) during the two study periods: 2555 in 2000-01 and 2072 in 2002-03.128
By comparison, the (small) district registry of Tasmania had filings of 53 and 24
matters (respectively) during this time.129
It is reasonable to assume a registry that has few filings will be less likely to perceive a
need to reduce its workload by transferring matters to the FMC. One proviso should be
noted, however. The largest registries also tend to have the greatest number of judicial
officers (that is, resources), whilst the smaller registries of the Court (the Australian
Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Tasmania) had at the relevant time either no
resident judge or a single one. It is, therefore, all relative, but the original assumption
stands.

(ii)

Human Rights Proceedings

One of the stated objectives of the FCJS is for 'less complex' proceedings in the FCA
to be potentially transferrable to the FMC. As considered in the preceding chapter, it is
neither clear as to what the legislature or FCA regard as satisfying this phrase in
practice, nor is it a concept easy to define. Of all the areas of concurrent jurisdiction
under the FCJS examined in Chapter 2, arguably proceedings brought within the area
of human rights (unlawful discrimination) are, more often than not, likely to involve
determination of questions of fact (as distinct from sophisticated questions of law),
with generally no need for expert witnesses to be called. Put bluntly, either the
applicant was discriminated against, or they were not, and possibly the main reason the
dispute is now before the FCA is because of the limitations placed upon the powers
and functions of the relevant Commission to provide a conclusive and binding
determination in the matter.130 The matters are not necessarily being litigated within
the FCA because they require the expertise of a judge for resolution. This research
commenced, therefore, with the notion that human rights matters within the study
group would be most likely to experience transfer to the FMC.
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It could be argued that bankruptcy proceedings should be viewed as the least complex
of the jurisdictions under the FCJS because most such proceedings are listed before a
registrar. The very fact such matters have found their way before a judge suggests to
the researcher they may have involved a greater degree of legal complexity than
regular bankruptcy proceedings ordinarily heard and determined by a registrar of the
FCA.

(iii)

Self-represented Litigants

The researcher was initially firmly of the view the FCA was most likely to transfer
study group matters that were commenced by a self-represented applicant. The basis
for this position requires some explanation.
Litigants without representation by an appropriately qualified legal practitioner are
known variously in the literature and courts as self-represented litigants, litigants in
person or unrepresented litigants. In this thesis, they are called self-represented
litigants. The reasons for an individual being a self-represented litigant in the FCA, or
in any court for that matter, vary and in any situation may involve one or more of the
following factors.
 An inability to afford the services of a legal practitioner because of financial
disadvantage, exacerbated by the escalating cost of litigation and of the
provision of legal services, and coupled potentially with an inability to obtain
legal aid funding due to ineligibility.
 The choice of a litigant to be self-represented. This may stem partly from
perceptions of dissatisfaction with the competency of lawyers or a feeling that
the cost of legal services does not represent good value. There may also be a
perception the litigant is highly, if not the most, capable of representing his or
her own best interests. A self-represented litigant may have a perception of
corruption and bias within the legal system and on the part of those individuals
associated with the proceedings (including lawyers).
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Whatever the reason for self-representation before the FCA, a litigant may do so as of
legal right.131 Proceedings may not commence where the litigant is seeking to file
documents that, on their face, appear to be an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious
(under O 46 r 7A of the FCA Rules or r 2.26 of the new Rules) or where, in uncommon
circumstances, the litigant has been formally declared as 'vexatious' by order of the
Court.132 Proceedings may be also dismissed summarily under the rules of court if they
fail to disclose reasonable prospects of success, are an abuse of process, vexatious and
the like.133 It is reasonable to assume the self-represented applicants of the study group
were conducting proceedings because of one or more of the main reasons outlined
above, and that their proceedings were regarded as being commenced legitimately
pursuant to the rules of court. Otherwise, the matters would have been refused
commencement, or dismissed summarily, by the Court.
Despite the above conclusions, the researcher still had a preconception the FCA would
be generally eager to transfer proceedings commenced by such litigants. To understand
the basis for this idea one needs to understand the phenomenon of self-represented
litigants in the FCA. Much has been written around the world134 on the problems of
court congestion and case management brought about by a perceived increase in the
incidence of self-representation before the courts. Self representation was regarded as a
distinct access to justice and case management issue for Australian federal courts
around the time of the study periods,135 including for the Family Court136 and High
131
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Court. A report of the latter court released in November 2002 was highly critical of an
increased number of self-represented litigants seemingly enabled by a lack of financial
disincentive to commence proceedings (85% were subject to a waiver or exemption of
court filing and hearing fees).137 During 2000-01, almost 36% of all the filings for that
year in the FCA involved at least one party to the proceedings being self-represented,
and this number increased to almost 38% during 2002-03.138
Self-represented proceedings (particularly where the applicant is self-represented) are
arguably perceived by the FCA at times to be either frivolous or meritless at worst, or
at best as having some legal merit but nonetheless procedurally difficult to manage
because of the lack of legal knowledge and experience of the self-represented party.139
Self-representation has generally worked well in the small claims jurisdictions of
Australian courts and tribunals,140 however, Powles and Bruce have stressed a
distinction should be drawn between complex and routine matters involving selfrepresented litigants. In 'straightforward or routine proceedings', there should be an
encouragement for self-representation as a way of reducing the cost of justice, but in
'complex matters' the lack of professional legal representation can be 'a serious burden
for all concerned'.141
In particular, the detrimental effects of self-represented litigant case management on
court staff has been noted by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration and
FCA as including:
137
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 The taking up of more time of court staff in explaining procedures and
providing assistance;
 Requiring court staff to 'tread a difficult line between providing procedural
advice and avoiding the provision of legal advice'; and
 Self-represented litigants becoming emotional and abusive.142
So, too, the effects of self represented litigant case management on the conduct of the
actual hearing have been said to include:
 Such litigants are likely to have more difficulty in understanding and
complying with procedural requirements and in preparing their case properly;
 Hearings take longer as a result;
 They tend to have difficulty presenting their case in a way that complies with
the rules of evidence; and
 Overly distraught and abusive self-represented litigants can lead to security
concerns for court staff and other parties involved with the proceedings.143
Finally, this research has considered the findings of Emeritus Professor Helen Gamble
and Dr Richard Mohr arising from a research project on self-represented litigants and
their prevalence and impact on court resources undertaken in the FCA and the AAT
during the mid-1990s.144 The researchers found that self-represented litigants within
the sample category spent less time in the FCA than those legally represented (a
median time of 3.5 months, compared with six months, respectively).145 The research
also found that, of the cases considered, self-represented litigants were less likely to be
successful in the outcome of their litigation: 54% of self-represented litigants had their
matter dismissed, compared with 31 % of represented litigant cases. The former were
also more likely to discontinue their matter than a represented party (24% versus 20%).
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Self-represented litigants were also more likely to have a costs order made against
them (68% versus 38%).146
Having regard to the matters addressed above concerning self-represented litigants,
and the objectives of the FCJS, the researcher accordingly decided to test whether the
mechanism of case transfers to the FMC was utilised by judges as a means of
removing any perceived resource-consuming self-represented (applicant) matters from
the FCA system. If so, the ability of such litigants to participate in the FCA is
curtailed, and any resulting statistical over-representation of this group in the findings
on case transfers under the FCJS could be seen to cause detrimental effects for the
attainment of procedural justice for such litigants. Even if self-represented applicant
proceedings were transferred because the change of forum was appropriate, it
nonetheless remains essential these applicants were able to participate fully in the
transfer decision-making process. This is tested in Chapter 5, and the findings analysed
in Chapter 9.

3.3.2

Open Justice

An essential aspect of procedural justice is the principle of openness in judicial
decision-making. Open justice may be viewed, for the purposes of this thesis, in two
main ways: (a) the judge engaging in transfer decision-making in open court or
otherwise with the full knowledge and participation of the parties to the proceedings;
and (b) the general community having physical access to FCA transfer decisions,
documentation and processes. Openness encourages the judiciary to perform its
functions in an open and transparent way, so that 'justice may be discussed and
criticised in public'147 and so as to avoid or reduce any fear that secrecy in
discretionary decision-making can lead to arbitrariness and misuse of power.148 It has
been said the public facet of justice and judicial decision-making provides a
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therapeutic objective for the community.149 In turn, and as will be explored more fully
towards the end of this chapter and in Chapter 10, accountability and public respect
for, and confidence in, the FCA are promoted through transparency in the way it
conducts its functions.
The next part of Chapter 3 considers whether (and, if so, the extent to which) the
principle of openness should extend to transfer decision-making (including the
question of whether the decision-making should occur in open court, as distinct from
chambers). The ability of parties and the public to access FCA documents pertaining to
case transfers is also explored and, finally, what openness means within the context of
the study group transfers for this research is outlined.

(a)

Openness in Transfer Decision-making for the Parties

Openness in judicial decision-making is to be encouraged for the public benefit
reasons canvassed above. Is there, however, a corresponding legal requirement for
judges to adhere to this principle when transferring matters to the FMC for the benefit
of the parties? This thesis argues there is such a requirement and that it is best satisfied
by the judge dealing with the issue of transfer in open court, rather than in chambers.
The starting point is to establish that there exists a legal foundation for the principle of
openness in relation to legal proceedings, generally. Article 14(1) of the Covenant
provides for the right of each litigant to a 'fair and public hearing' in a 'suit of law'.150
Similarly, the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 21(1) states that '[e]veryone has the
right to have ... rights and obligations recognised by law, decided by a competent,
independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing'. Further,
each judgment in a civil proceeding must be made available to the public.151
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The High Court held in Dickason v Dickason152 that its jurisdiction (and presumably
that of the other Australian federal courts, to the extent they are Chapter III courts and
have jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)) should be exercised in public
pursuant to ss 15 and 16 of the Judiciary Act. Similarly, in Russell v Russell,153 the
High Court found invalid a provision of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that required
state courts exercising powers under that Act to hear proceedings in closed court. The
FCA has declared in judgments over the years that its judicial officers lack the power
to modify the common law rule of open justice in the absence of any statutory power
to do so.154
The legal instruments and authorities outlined above have pointed to a conclusion that
federal civil proceedings should occur openly and in public. Although interlocutory in
nature, transfer decisions form part of civil proceedings in a Chapter III federal court
and so there is no reasonable justification for such decision-making to be excluded
from the operation of the principle of open justice. The question arises whether transfer
decision-making should ever occur other than in open court?
As considered in Chapter 2, the legislature appears to have conferred upon the FCA
the power to make transfer orders in either open court or in chambers. The
complexities of the legal nuances of the FCA Act and FCA Rules on this issue were
examined in detail previously and so will not be repeated here. It might be recalled
briefly that s 17 of the FCA Act does permit the jurisdiction of the FCA to be exercised
by a judge sitting in chambers where authorised by statute, and arguably the transfer
provisions allow for transfer decisions to be made in chambers.
The Commonwealth Constitution is not explicit about openness in civil proceedings.
The Hon J J Spigelman is of the opinion, however, that instrument does include
principles of the common law (except to the extent altered by statute), and that '[i]t
may be difficult to resist the conclusion that a statute which required a federal court to
sit in camera would infringe [Chapter] III of the Constitution'.155 Could such a
152
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conclusion hold true of the transfer provisions that arguably permit the making of
transfer decisions in chambers, and thus away from public scrutiny and potentially
even the actual participation of the parties? Such constitutional law enquiry is beyond
the scope of the present research.
Judges will often formulate the basis for a decision or deliberate in the tranquil
surrounds of their chambers. What is important is that the entire decision-making
processes, from the inception of the idea of a possible case transfer to the actual
making of the transfer order, do not all occur exclusively in the private realm of
chambers and the parties merely notified of the decision as a fait accompli. This links
with the principle of fairness and the ability of parties to participate in the decisionmaking processes and be heard on the issue of transfer (considered later in this
chapter). Historically proponents of the principle of open justice have advocated the
need for judges to hear and determine proceedings in open court wherever possible. Sir
Edward Coke, discussing the principle of open justice in the 17th century, remarked:
These words are of great importance, for all Causes ought to be heard,
ordered, and determined before the Judges of the Kings Courts openly
in the Kings Court, whither all persons may resort; and in no chambers,
or other private places: the Judges are not Judges of chambers, but of
Courts, and therefore in open Court, where the parties Councell and
Attorneys attend, ought orders, rules, awards, and judgements to be
made and given, and not in chambers of other private places…Nay, that
Judge that ordereth or ruleth a Cause in his chamber, though his order
or rule be just, yet offendeth he the law, (as hear it appeareth) because
he doth it not in Court.156
The main sentiment expressed in the above quote is that judges perform their official
role in open court and not in their chambers, which is a private realm from which the
public and usually the parties (including their legal representatives) are excluded. A
judicial officer should only ever make decisions affecting the parties in open court, for
the scrutiny of both the parties involved and the public with an interest in the
156
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proceedings and their subject matter. This situation, however, does not always
accurately reflect modern judicial practices, particularly within the context of case
management. The Hon Michael Kirby has written of the reality that some of the crucial
parts of the judicial function are not performed in public but behind closed doors, and
he includes the assignment of judges to sit on cases (that is, case management
decision-making processes) as such key instances. The now retired High Court Justice
acknowledges, however, that even those processes are these days more open to public
gaze and 'many of the old mysteries have been interred'.157
Even when transfer decisions are made in chambers in accordance with the transfer
provisions, the views of McHugh J in Grollo v Palmer should be noted:
Open justice is….an essential characteristic of the exercise of federal
judicial power. Participation in secret, ex parte administrative
procedures by those who hold federal judicial office contravenes the
spirit of the requirement that justice in the federal courts should be
open…The public perception must be diminished when the judges of
the Federal Court are involved in secret, ex parte administrative
procedures … 158

(b)

Public Access to Transfer Decision-making

If ultimately transfer decision-making is seen in the empirical findings to have
occurred in chambers, then how might any perceived or actual ill effects of an
associated veil of secrecy be ameliorated? The answer lies in the affected parties and
the public having sufficient access to documentation evidencing the making of, and
reasons for, the transfer decision. This documentation includes the transfer order, the
Court internal report of listing regarding when and where the decision was made, the
written reasons for decision (judgment), and any supporting material (such as the
originating process, pleadings and affidavits) relied upon by the judge in the making of
the decision. For grounds outlined later, the reason(s) for any such transfer should not
only be explicit, but should also be adequate in nature and scope.
157
158
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To what extent are parties and the public entitled to access such transfer
documentation?159 Parties to a proceeding will ordinarily be served with any document
another party has filed with the Court, and so will usually gain access to various Court
file documents in that manner. The relevant provision of the rules of court applicable
during the study periods in respect of both party and non-party access to Court file
documents was O 46 r 6 of the FCA Rules (now r 2.32 of the new Rules). It provided
that, unless ordered confidential, a person may search and inspect in a FCA registry a
list of prescribed documents pertaining to any applications, pleadings, notice of
motion, judgment and the like (sub-rr (1)-(2)). A non-party may not inspect all other
file documents (sub-r (4)), but under sub-r (3) may with leave of the Court or a judge
inspect documents of essentially an evidentiary nature (including affidavits). In any
event, written reasons for judgment of the FCA are, unless ordered confidential,
published on the internet.160 Neither a party nor a non-party may inspect internal or
administrative documents of the Court, including the report of listing recording the
outcomes of any given listing in open court or chambers. During the study periods,
searching in a registry and inspecting transcript of proceedings on the court file was
permitted only with the leave of the Court or a judge (sub-rr (6)-(5)).161
The following table summarises the level of access permitted under the FCA Rules in
respect of various transfer-related documentation that may arise within a proceeding
and that has not been ordered confidential (and assuming the leave of the Court or a
judge has not been obtained).162
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Table 3.1: Public access to FCA transfer documentation under rules of court.

ACCESS PERMITTED?

DOCUMENT

Originating process

Yes.

(application) and
statement of claim

Affidavit

Yes, with leave of the Court.

Notice of motion

Yes.

(applying for transfer)

Written submissions (eg in During the first study period, no. Yes, during the second
support of a notice of

study period. No, post-August 2011, except with leave of

motion)

the Court (the new Rules do not appear to include
submissions in the list of documents to which persons
have an automatic right of access - see r 2.32).

Correspondence between

No, these form part of the internal documents of the

Court and parties and

Court.

reports of listing of
proceedings

Order (of transfer)

Yes, hard copy on file and nowadays available on the
internet (but not at the time of the study periods).

Judgment (or written

Yes, hard copy on the Court file and on the internet.

reasons for decision)

Transcript of proceedings

No, except with leave of the Court.
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Finally, there exists an exception to FCA (and other court) proceedings being
conducted in open court or there being full public disclosure of the substance of
proceedings; namely, where issues of party or witness privacy arise, such that trial
fairness may be compromised (for example, through publicity or media
sensationalism), and where security may be in jeopardy. In those circumstances, a
judge is justified in closing the courtroom to the scrutiny of the general public.163
Section 50 of the FCA enables the Court at any stage of a proceeding to make an order
forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence, or the name of a party
or witness in the interests of the administration of justice. None of these exceptions are
relevant to the situation of FCA-to-FMC transfer decision-making, which is not likely
to involve witnesses or otherwise sensitive evidence. Such decision-making should
occur ideally in open court as case management best practice.

(c)

Openness and this Study

Where does all of this leave the principle of openness in relation to this research? At a
fundamental level, it is contended the principle extends to transfer decision-making
and that most ideally that process should occur in open court, but with the recognition
that there is arguably a statutory ability on the part of a judge to make the decision in
chambers. Accordingly, this research looks in Chapter 6 at the extent to which the
FCA preferred during the study periods to make transfer decisions in open court, as
distinct from in chambers. Where the relevant transfer decision has been made by
someone other than a judge (specifically, a registrar), this is also examined in that
chapter to the extent it raises questions about what actually transpired in those matters.
In lifting any veil of secrecy resulting from transfer decisions being made in chambers,
or even swiftly in open court, there would at least theoretically appear to be sufficient
access for both parties and non-parties to transfer-related documentation on the Court
file. The possible exceptions relate to affidavit material and (at times) written
submissions in the case of non-parties during the study periods (assuming these latter
163
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documents exist and relate to the potential transfer of the matter). Such accessibility to
documentation goes some way towards persons attaining an understanding of the
existence of, and basis for, a transfer decision, and in providing a fundamental
understanding of the processes involved in FCA-to-FMC transfer decision-making.
Whether the transfer decisions were made in open court or in chambers, the parties
ought to have had some input in the processes as a matter of fairness and the judges
should have provided adequate reasons for transfer decision. Without this, the
openness of any decision-making or content of any document evidencing the transfer
decision will be limited. The principles of openness, fairness and the provision of
adequate reasons for decision are therefore interrelated concepts within this research.
All three principles facilitate transparency and, in the process, the attainment of access
to procedural justice for litigants.

3.3.3

Fairness

Fairness is a concept underlying many procedural rules for the management of cases
within the courts.164 The literature does not appear to present a single definition of
fairness as, like justice, it is open to multiple interpretations depending upon the
context in which it is used.165 Nonetheless, the notion of fairness in the conduct of
public hearings permeates international and Australian legal instruments.166
Regardless of the final outcome of the proceedings once transferred to the FMC, the
appropriate role of the judge is to seek to secure a fair transfer process and to be seen
to be doing so in the course of the exercise of statutory discretionary power. As said by
Brennan J in Kioa v West:
As the obligation to observe the principles of natural justice is not
correlative to a common law right, but is a condition governing the
exercise of a statutory power, the repository satisfies the condition by
164
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adopting a procedure which conforms to the procedure which a
reasonable and fair repository of the power would adopt in the
circumstances when the power is exercised.167
A working definition of what is ‘fair’ within the context of FCA-to-FMC case transfers
is therefore required. To this end, the various descriptions of fairness outlined by the
ALRC in its 1997 paper regarding a review of the adversarial system of federal civil
litigation were considered. The following connotations of the concept are adopted in
this thesis when evaluating the extent to which there appears to have been fairness in
the study group matters transfer processes:
(a)

Party control over the litigation process and providing parties with an
opportunity to be heard; and

(b)

(a)

Reasonable levels of cost and delay.168

The Right to be Heard

The right of a litigant to control proceedings in the FCA (or any court) should not be
perceived as a right to a particular favourable outcome before the Court for the litigant
(substantive justice), but rather as a right to put forward their case in a manner most
conducive to an outcome to the proceedings that is fair in all the circumstances
(procedural justice). In other words, the parties ought to be able to participate in the
transfer decision-making process, if not actually determine the outcome of whether the
matter is transferred to the FMC. It is essential for the parties to feel they are being
listened to by the judge and for the latter to be sufficiently apprised of the nature of the
proceedings being considered for transfer to the FMC.
The right to appear in federal proceedings is guaranteed by s 78 of the Judiciary Act
1903 (Cth), so the question is not so much one of whether there exists a right to appear
before the FCA, but rather the extent to which there exists a right to be heard in
practice. It should be borne in mind that a litigant does not have the unqualified right
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to take up copious quantities of Court time and resources at the expense of the efficient
and expeditious management of both that case and others in the system.169 There
should be, however, an entitlement to present the salient features of the case in the
most timely and cost-effective manner possible. The position adopted in this thesis is
that the notion of a right to be heard should extend to all stages prior to the final
hearing of the matter, from the date of filing the originating process in the FCA, and
leading to the making of the transfer order by the judge. When speaking of access to
procedural justice all facets of the litigation process within the Court are important,
and not just the final hearing.
Various judges have commented publicly on the role of the judge in seeking to be
perceived to be properly adhering to the 'hearing right' in the conduct of proceedings
before the FCA. Justice Susan Kenny, for example, has remarked that the basic
requirement of due process is that 'each party be accorded a fair opportunity to advance
its case before the judge and that the judge must listen attentively to it'.170 A restriction,
on the ability of a judge to adhere to the above principle in practice, is flagged by
another FCA judge. Justice Arthur Emmett observes the erosion of the adversary and
orality principles caused by the increased intervention of judges in relation to
interlocutory processes during litigation.171 This restriction is explored further in
Chapter 9 when considering the role of 'managerial judging' in FCA case management.
Since this research is interested in the position of self-represented litigants in relation
to the principle of equality, it is worthwhile mentioning briefly the nature of the right
of a self-represented litigant to be heard before the Court, which is distinct from the
right of appearance before the Court considered earlier in this chapter. The FCA has
acknowledged the right to be heard in the FCA extends to the self-represented litigant,
and even in cases that do not appear to be brought validly before it. In Piepkorn v State
of South Australia, von Doussa J held:
The application and the supporting affidavit on any reading do not
disclose any meaningful cause for complaint by the appellant, let alone

169

See Rogers v Law Coast Mortgages Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 181 (5 March 2002) [24].
Justice Susan Kenny, 'Maintaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary: a Precarious Equilibrium'
(1999) 25(2) Monash University Law Review 209, 216.
171
Justice Arthur R Emmett, 'Towards the Civil Law? The Loss of "Orality" in Civil Litigation in
Australia' (2003) 26(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 447.
170

83

a cause of action. However, where a litigant is unrepresented, and has
difficulty in expressing himself or herself in a coherent way, I think it is
important that a court hear the litigant and endeavour to ascertain
whether, behind the confusion of language and thought evidenced by a
litigant’s written documents, there lies a possible basis for a claim or
defence, as the case may be. If the problem is one of articulation rather
than substance, it may be appropriate for the court to offer some
guidance to an unrepresented litigant to enable a real issue, if one exists,
to be properly aired.172
In the situation of a self-represented litigant, who may have poorly articulated claims
in written form, a judge may encounter some difficulty in appreciating fully the exact
nature of a case or its level of complexity without the benefit of at least some oral
elucidation of the claim. Such elucidation is often provided best with the assistance of
the legal representative of the other party in open court, who is able to articulate
concisely and non-emotively the nature and history of the matter.
This thesis applies the 'opportunity to be heard' concept in relation to both represented
and unrepresented parties in the study group matters. When it comes to the transfer of
proceedings to the FMC, all parties to the litigation have an interest in the making of
that decision and so should be accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the
appropriateness of any transfer order being made. This includes the parties addressing
the judge on the issues of the application of the transfer criteria, the exact nature and
quantum of the claim, the likely duration of hearing and any other relevant factors.
There is also the need for the legal representatives of the parties to be afforded a
reasonable chance to seek instructions from their respective clients or to prepare
submissions (or a position) in relation to the question of transfer before the transfer
order is made.173 There should be avoided a sense the parties were ambushed by the
transfer decision of the judge or that the decision-making occurred in secrecy.
It is argued that study group matter parties would be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to be heard where one or more of the following indicia are seen to be present:
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 The matters were transferred after there had been at least one return date of the
matter in open court at which the topic of potential transfer could be addressed
by the Court and parties;
 Where the matters had been transferred at (or shortly after) a first directions
hearing, the time spent in open court afforded the parties a reasonable period of
time in which to articulate the nature of the cases and their position on any
prospective transfer of the matters to the FMC;
 Evidence exists of correspondence between the parties and the docket judges
on the subject of transfer prior to the making of the transfer decisions; and
 The wishes of the parties on any prospective transfers were sought by the
docket judges (or otherwise known by them), and acknowledged prior to the
making of the transfer decisions.
As to what should be regarded as a reasonable period at a first directions hearing for
the parties to be in a proper position to articulate their positions on transfer is not an
exact science. A 'standard' first directions hearing may typically last between 10 and
15 minutes,174 but can be briefer or longer depending upon the level complexity of the
proceedings, issues canvassed, individuals appearing before the Court and the attitude
of the judicial officer. It is fair to assume that a first directions hearing, at which the
proceedings are first addressed in open court and the question of potential transfer to
another court is ventilated and then decided, would run ideally for not less than 10
minutes if these issues are to be addressed properly and fully. Ten minutes is still an
imperfect measure, but it provides a general yardstick by which the study group
matters can at least begin to be evaluated.

(b)

The FMC as a More Appropriate Forum

The second aspect of the working definition of fairness adopted in this thesis relates to
an objective of the FCJS itself; namely, that the FMC be a forum for the resolution of
general federal law disputes in a manner that is cheaper, simpler and quicker than the
174
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FCA. Added to this notion is an expectation of the FMC being an appropriate court for
the resolution of the matter, including that it is vested with sufficient jurisdiction and
resources to hear and determine the transferred proceedings.
This study therefore assesses fairness in the transfer process of the study group matters
by regard to whether the matters were transferred to a ‘better’ forum. It would be
unfair if the respondent and applicant (having elected to lawfully litigate their matter in
the FCA) were to have their proceedings transferred to an inferior federal court that
was not more appropriate or better suited to resolve the dispute than the original choice
of court for this task. It is considered whether the FMC was possessed of the
appropriate jurisdiction to proceed to determine the study group matters and, if so,
whether the matters were ultimately resolved more cheaply, simply and quickly than
had they remained in the FCA. Although on one level the above working definition of
fairness may appear to be more concerned with the substantive merits of the transfer
decision, it is argued that the adverse consequences flowing from any matter being
‘inappropriately’ transferred include procedural issues. These issues include an
increase in delay (justice delayed is justice denied),175 costs, inconvenience to the
parties and confusion about individual court procedures and policies and in relation to
transfers under the FCJS. The specific approaches used to evaluate in practice the
concepts of 'cheaper, simpler and quicker' are articulated in Chapter 4.

3.3.4

Provision of Adequate Reasons

It has been said previously in this thesis that, under the FCJS, there effectively exists a
dichotomy of competing choices of forum between the applicant litigant (and
potentially that of the respondent) and docket judge, with the choice of the latter
prevailing in the event of conflicting preferences. The potential for any actual or
perceived unfairness arising from this dichotomy in practice may be avoided or
ameliorated, it is argued, by the judge providing clear indication of their reasoning
processes and sound justification for the outcome. In other words, if a transfer decision
appears to have been arrived at appropriately and fully, having regard to the transfer
provisions and their appropriate application to the facts of the given case, then a
175
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litigant may at least hopefully understand why that change has come about and
ultimately accept the decision. In the absence of any, or any adequate, reasons for
decision being furnished by a judge, a litigant can conceivably feel confused and even
removed from the process. This may be particularly so where the decision has not been
made in open court or with the input of the parties. There are other important and more
fundamental bases for judges providing reasons for their transfer decisions, such as
providing an educative role for the legal community and public, which is discussed
further below and in Chapter 10.
This next part of the current chapter examines the issue of why judges should provide
reasons for decision to transfer proceedings from the FCA to the FMC, what form
those reasons should take and how the adequacy of any such reasons provided in the
case of the study group matters is assessed in this thesis.

(a)

Is There a Legal Duty to Provide Reasons for Transfer Decisions?

In Australia, there is no universal statutory or common law rule that obligates a judge,
including one exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth, to provide reasons
for a judicial decision. The practice to do so arises as a norm or expectation.176 As a
matter of policy, and as part of the judicial function, reasons should be provided
whenever possible to facilitate promotion of the rule of law and justice. It was held by
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Wiki v Atlantis Relocations Pty Ltd177 that a
miscarriage of justice can arise where a judge fails to disclose reasons that would be
contrary to the principle of open justice.
The underlying rationale for this practice of providing reasons for decision often has
been said to rest upon the need for a case to be properly and sufficiently laid before the
higher appellate court,178 but such case law has typically involved appeals on final
court judgments or final decisions of administrators empowered with strong
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discretionary powers. Is this requirement confined to such matters, particularly those
on appeal, or can it extend to interlocutory decisions? An interlocutory decision or
judgment is one made by the judge during the course of a proceeding that does not
finally hear, determine and dispose of the substantive issues in dispute between the
parties.179 As seen in Chapter 2, interlocutory transfer decisions generally are not
appealable in the FCA, whilst other decisions of an interlocutory nature are appealable
with leave of the Court.180
There exists FCA authority to the effect the requirement to provide reasons should not
be limited to cases where an appeal lies or involving a substantial or final decision. It
was recognised in SZDCJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs,181 concerning an issue on appeal of whether the learned trial
federal magistrate erred in law by not providing adequate written reasons for judgment
on an interlocutory point, that judges in various courts have observed for several
decades the requirement for reasons is not restricted to potentially appealable
decisions.182 Similarly, in Echo Tasmania Pty Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries
PLC,183 the majority of a Full Court of the FCA (comprised of Black CJ and Sackville
J) held the learned trial judge had erred by failing to provide adequate reasons for
decision in respect of an interlocutory point pertaining to discovery. What their
Honours regarded as 'adequate' in the provision of reasons for decision is explored
shortly.
In reflecting legal authorities on the subject, the general literature suggests that the
duty to provide reasons can be over-ridden and is not inflexible in its application and
that consequently 'there are some types of interlocutory applications, mainly of a
purely procedural kind, upon which a judge can properly make an order without giving
reasons'.184 Does this mean that transfer decisions, being essentially of a case
management or procedural nature, do not require articulation of reasons justifying their
179
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making? This thesis argues definitely not. This position finds some support from
various judicial and academic sources.
To begin with, there is the New South Wales Court of Appeal case of Apps v Pilet185
involving a trial judge failing to provide reasons for an interlocutory procedural
decision concerning the case list (a decision to dismiss an application for an expedited
hearing). Priestley and McHugh JJA both emphasised listing decisions (and one might
include case management decisions more broadly) should not be subject to the duty to
provide reasons, but that the parties were entitled to have an indication 'however
shortly' of why the motion for expedition of hearing was denied 'in view of its
substantive importance to the parties'.186 Kirby J expressed the reasons for returning
the matter to the trial judge for reconsideration most reflective of the concern of this
thesis, and in the event judges were actually legally permitted to make FMC transfer
decisions in secrecy and without the articulation of reasons. His Honour said:
In the absence of such reasons, the parties are left to speculation. Was it
something not available to them ... which influenced his Honour?
…Was it a decision, without a full hearing in the merits … Was it a
consideration other cases should have a higher priority in the Court’s
listing arrangements than the determination of [this matter]? .... Was it
some unknowable feature of the [court] List, known to his Honour, but
undisclosed to the parties or their representatives? … It is possible that,
if reasons had been given, an application such as the present would not
have been brought….187
The sentiments of Professor H L Ho, writing on the judicial duty to provide reasons for
decision, are also embraced and applied to transfer decisions in this thesis to the extent
it is argued:
Many of these exceptions [to the requirement] involve a large element
of discretion. But the discretionary nature of a decision cannot in itself
justify the dispensation of explanation. The reverse could be argued: it
is where the judge has a discretion that the need for accountability is at
185
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its strongest. The common denominator of these exceptions seems to be
that they are not decisions that bear directly on 'substantive' matters.
Could we have fallen into the error of equating 'non-substantive' with
'not important'? Perhaps the thinking is that where a decision is
relatively unimportant or insignificant, we can safely dispense with the
duty to give reasons. It is in principle unobjectionable to rest an
exception on the basis that the decision is of little consequence.188
This view is echoed by Sir Harry Gibbs, when the former Chief Justice of Australia
wrote '... the fact that a decision has no value of [being a precedent] or no general
interest does not mean that the parties lose the right to have explained to them, in the
reasons for judgment, why the court reached the conclusion ... '.189
Finally, a judge should provide reasons for decision because it provides transparency
in the decision-making process and the exercise of power by a judge. It is also the
manner by which the reliability and veracity of judicial decision-making can be
ascertained, leading to assessment by the affected parties, the general community
interested in the case or topic of case transfers and any reviewing judicial authority. As
stated by Lord Denning, who identified principles of fairness and open justice
permeating the duty to provide reasons:
The judge must give his reasons for his decision: for, by so doing, he
gives proof that he has heard and considered the evidence and
arguments that have been adduced before him on each side: and also
that he has not taken extraneous considerations into account. It is of
course true that his decision may be correct even though he should give
no reason for it or even give a wrong reason: but, in order that a trial
should be fair, it is necessary, not only that a correct decision should be
reached, but also that it should be seen to be based on reason; and that
can only be seen, if the judge himself states his reasons.190
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It is the contention of this thesis that transfer decisions, whilst on the surface appearing
to be procedural and thereby legally insignificant, in fact play an important role in the
proper administration of justice within the FCA as part of its case management
practices. Perhaps more significantly, they are of importance to the parties who may
suddenly find the forum of their federal litigation changed by a judge and who
potentially incur tangible cost and delay caused by an inappropriate transfer, as
considered in detail in later chapters.

(b)

The Form of Reasons for Decision

If it is accepted that judges should provide reasons for transfer decisions, then the next
question is what form should such reasons take? As with any reasons published by the
FCA to the parties in a proceeding and available to the public, the reasons for transfer
decision may be in either or both of two forms: written and oral.
Written reasons for judgment, or reasons for decision (Reasons) as they are referred to
in the FCA, typically follow the format of outlining the relevant facts relied upon by
the judge and the application of the relevant legal principles to those facts, leading to
the legal conclusions on the primary issue(s) before the judge. Unless considered and
ordered confidential, it is common practice for the FCA to publish its Reasons to the
parties of the case by providing them with a hard copy of the document and to then
make the Reasons publicly available on the court file and on the internet (principally,
on the AustLII website).191 Reasons are not usually published on the internet until after
the judge has delivered the reasons for judgment orally in open court or the parties
have had the written Reasons provided to them by the Court in the occasional situation
of the matter not being listed for judgment in open court.
Oral reasons for decision are communicated to the parties or their legal representatives
appearing before the judge in open court (including when the matter is listed for
judgment). Members of the public attending such proceedings would also be privy to
those oral reasons and decision of the judge. Oral reasons may be sometimes
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accompanied by written reasons provided by the Court either immediately or at a later
stage. The manner in which reasons are furnished is largely up to the individual judge.
In determining whether a judge should provide written or oral reasons (or both) for a
decision to transfer, the primary consideration of the judge is likely to be his or her
personal workload. The writing of the Reasons would be a task added to the work of
the judge following a full day of hearings in court, the writing of Reasons in respect of
lengthy and complex final decisions and the other daily judicial tasks of the judge. It is
understandable a judge may choose not to add to an already overloaded work schedule
and not commit reasons for transfer to writing. This view finds some support from
McHugh JA in Apps v Pilet:
A judge who has to contend with the enormous volume of
work…cannot reasonably be expected to give reasons for every
decision made in the course of administering his list. If he was, court
lists would become even more congested than they are; the expense of
litigation would increase substantially...192
Further, by reducing workload, both by transferring less complex matters and not
providing written reasons for a procedural transfer decision, the judge is able to
concentrate on more complex matters and to provide justice to more litigants within
the FCA system.
The above are cogent arguments against the provision of written reasons for mere
interlocutory or case management decisions such as transfers. There are, however,
three main reasons why it is argued a judge should seek to provide written reasons
whenever possible in respect of transfers to the FMC. First, the process of reducing to
writing thoughts and decisions on why a matter should be transferred facilitates a
cognitive function of testing the foundations of the decision and of revealing any
weaknesses in the reasoning process or substance of the decision. To this end, it is
noted by one FCA judge:
A judge should not generally form a concluded view until he or she has
fully tested the relevant reasoning. The ultimate decision-making
process will proceed in tandem with the preparation of reasons. The
192
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processes are inevitably intertwined. If one has difficulty in expressing
reasons in written form, it may well be that the thought process has
miscarried. One possible reason is unrecognised prejudice.193

Secondly, there is a tangible benefit in the federal magistrate (or even a reviewing
judge in the event of an application for judicial review of the transfer decision) having
a written copy of the reasons for transfer when assessing the appropriateness of the
transfer. A person may appear justified in thinking the federal magistrate might simply
rely upon the written transcript of what was said in the courtroom by the judge and on
behalf of the parties. There are limitations, however, on relying upon transcript from a
directions hearing at which a matter is ordered transferred. For example, the judge may
have made the decision prior to attending the courtroom, so what is conveyed orally to
the parties is very brief in nature or of little explanatory benefit. If the parties are taken
somewhat by surprise at the judicial choice to suddenly transfer the proceeding, there
may be a stark absence of meaningful exchange from the bar table as to why the
proposed transfer is or is not appropriate in the opinions of the parties or in the
circumstances of the case. Further, as Jacobson J in SZDCJ v Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs noted, even if the transcript of proceedings
may be of assistance in understanding the issues raised by the parties, it does not
enable 'the parties to see the extent to which their arguments have been understood and
accepted as well as the basis of the judge's decision'.194
The third reason for arguing in this thesis that it is preferable Reasons be provided for
transfer decisions is the educative role of written reasons. Apart from the parties to the
specific proceeding having a direct interest in the making of a transfer decision, the
broader legal community (comprised of other litigants, lawyers and legal academics)
has a legitimate interest in being educated on how (and why) such decisions are made
in the FCA. The suggestion that judgments are written for the legal community, rather
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than for the parties and community at large, has been made by Sir Anthony Mason.195
The importance of involving the academic community in justice and law reform issues
is recognised.196
Related to the above point, and the final reason advanced in this thesis regarding the
desirability for the greater publication of Reasons for transfer decisions, is the fact
transcript evidencing the making of a transfer decision is seldom available to nonparties. The FCA may obtain transcript of directions hearings, but there is often a
significant cost associated with purchasing transcript from the external transcription
service provider. Accordingly, whether transcript is purchased, and placed on the
Court file, is at the discretion of the individual judge and the protocols of their
chambers. As seen earlier, under the FCA Rules (and the new Rules), permission of the
Court is required for a person to access a copy of the transcript. Thus, even if a nonparty has the inclination to seek out the transcript evidencing the making of the transfer
order, it could well prove a difficult, if not futile, exercise. Without access to published
written reasons or transcript, a non-party is unlikely to be in a position to attend a
sufficient number of transfer proceedings to gain a proper first-hand comprehension of
transfer decision-making in a federal jurisdiction like the FCA.
The position adopted in this thesis, therefore, is that the probative and educative
aspects of transfer decision-making are served best by the provision of written reasons
for decision, which the affected parties and relevant federal magistrate can obtain and
members of the public can access electronically or on the Court file. This is
particularly so given the FCA does not appear to have any publicly available policy or
guidelines on this area of civil procedure. As a default measure, the provision of oral
reasons is acceptable, provided they are of sufficient probative value. At the absolute
least, and bearing in mind there are problems with public access, correspondence from
the Court explaining the reason(s) for transfer is preferable to there being no reasons
furnished at all. Accountability in decision-making comes about through such
transparency.

195

Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Courts as Community Institutions' (1998) 9 Public Law Review 83, 86. It
has been queried what is meant by the 'public', who actually reads judicial decisions and what benefit is
actually obtained: Mitchel De S - O - L'E Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of
Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press, 2004) 320-321.
196
Rosalind Croucher, 'Introduction: Justice Behind the Scenes' (2011) 10(2) Canberra Law Review 1.

94

(c)

Assessing the Adequacy of Reasons for Transfer Decision

The assessment of the 'adequacy' of reasons provided for transfer decisions in the case
of the study group matters is not a straightforward task. Chapter 8 examines how the
FCA apprised the study group litigants of both the transfer decisions and reasons for
same. Ideally, this will be seen to have occurred in the form of Reasons published on
the internet (for the benefit of parties and non-parties, alike). Where such Reasons are
seen to be limited or deficient, the task must turn to examining the nature and
adequacy of any oral reasons for transfer decision that occurred in open court. The
tests adopted in this thesis for evaluating the adequacy of reasons on transfer are both
qualitative and quantitative in nature.
When evaluating the adequacy of reasons provided in a qualitative manner, there is the
potential for subjectivity in regards to what is, or is not, adequate in both scope and
content. What is required is some objective indicator, such as legal authority from the
FCA itself as to what it regards as ‘adequate’ in respect of the provision of reasons for
final and/or interlocutory decisions, generally. 197 Unfortunately, there is no such
indication available specifically in relation to transfer decisions under the FCJS. It can
be seen from such cases as SZDCJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs that '[r]easons need to be given only so far as is necessary to
indicate to the parties why the decision was made and to allow them to exercise such
rights as may be available to them in respect of it'.198 This broad description of
adequacy, if applied to transfer decisions, would require the statement of reasons to
have some 'explanatory power'199 and 'to have as much detail as is reasonably
practicable'200 needed to achieve the above-stated goal.
There exists Full Court FCA authority along similar lines. In Echo Tasmania Pty Ltd v
Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, considered previously, the Full Court (Black CJ,
197
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Sackville and Emmett JJ) dealt with an application for leave to appeal from a judgment
relating to an interlocutory decision. The trial judge had provided a lengthy written
judgment, but had provided only an oblique reference to the nature of a case identified
by one of the parties and did not record at all the arguments made by the other party in
opposition to an application for an interlocutory order. The majority of the Full Court
held:
While brevity is not the same as failure to give adequate reasons, the
paragraph in substance asserts conclusions and does not explain the
primary Judge’s reasoning process. In our view, [the applicant] has a
legitimate complaint that it cannot discern from the primary judgment
why its arguments were rejected. [It] has therefore established that his
Honour did not provide adequate reasons and that he thereby erred in
law.201

Applying the above notions of ‘adequacy’, this thesis searches for the following
objective indicia of adequacy when evaluating the study group matter transfer
decisions:
 A clear, even if concise, explanation of why the matter is transferred and why
the FMC, rather than the FCA, is regarded by the judge as the most appropriate
forum for the conduct, determination and disposition of the matter.
 If the parties had made any submissions either consenting to or opposing the
transfer, an express recognition of those submissions or positions and
explanation as to whether, and why, the submissions are accepted or rejected.
 A succinct statement of the legal basis upon which the judge makes the transfer
decision (for example, pursuant to s 32AB of the FCA Act and O 82 of the FCA
Rules, or under the AAT and TPA considered in Chapter 2).
 A clear statement of the relevant statutory transfer criteria and an express
articulation of the application of those criteria to the facts of the individual
case, with sufficient particularity to demonstrate the articulation is specific and
201
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unique and not merely some template statement of the criteria. By way of
example, it is regarded as inadequate for a judge to state merely: 'Having regard
to the criteria in s 32AB of the FCA Act and O 82 of the FCA Rules, I believe
this matter should be transferred to the FMC'. Put bluntly, this statement
explains little.
 In regards to the transfer criterion relating to the need to have checked the FMC
has the resources to determine the proposed transfer matter (pursuant to
s 32AB(6)(c)), that there has been an actual enquiry of the FMC, and
confirmation by it, to this effect.
 Finally, if the low level of complexity of the matter is a key reason for the
decision to transfer, then that should be addressed openly and fully, particularly
given (as seen in Chapter 2) it is not a formal statutory transfer criterion.
It should be borne in mind that the scope and nature of the reasons provided will vary
depending upon the circumstances of the individual case, as recognised in the case
law.202
Consideration, quantitatively, of the adequacy of oral reasons is somewhat less
straightforward. With oral reasons, adequacy is regarded as achieved if there is
evidence the transfer order was made in open court (at a directions hearing or, if an
application is made by a party, at a hearing of the motion for transfer) and the recorded
duration of that listing or time in court exceeds 10 minutes. This period takes into
account:
 The usual formalities of opening and concluding a directions hearing or
interlocutory hearing of a motion (such as announcing legal appearances);
 Any administrative matters to be addressed;
 The judge raising the subject of proposed or sought transfer to the FMC;
 The time it would reasonably take for each party to present their submissions in
support or opposition of the proposed transfer;
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 The judge pronouncing the transfer order and any other directions for the
ongoing efficient and timely conduct of the proceeding (for example, what
documents are to be filed, by which party and by when); and
 Reasons being given for any or all of the above orders and directions.

This temporal measure is admittedly a subjective one, but the practical difficulties of
evaluating quantitatively a uniform time for courts to perform various functions are not
'sufficient excuse for not quantifying the normal time for judicial proceedings'.203 It is
designed to provide an absolute minimum yardstick. For the above-listed tasks to
occur fully and properly, a reasonable period would exceed 10 minutes. The measure
of 10 minutes is chosen for the reasons explained earlier in this chapter in respect of a
similar time measure being used in this research to evaluate the principle of fairness.
As stated previously, most standard directions hearings tend to last approximately 10to-15 minutes. If the additional issue of a potential transfer of proceedings to the FMC
were introduced in the course of a directions hearing, it might be reasonably thought
that 10 minutes would represent insufficient time to address the matters outlined in the
above list. Interlocutory application hearings would ordinarily take longer than merely
this amount of time because of each side presenting its case.

3.4

The Importance of Promoting Procedural Justice

Promotion of the principles of procedural justice may lead to certain positive
consequences for the administration of justice by the FCA. Most fundamentally,
judicial accountability is fostered and this, in turn, can serve to promote public
confidence in the functions of the federal judiciary. Much has been written on judicial
accountability generally, and this thesis does not provide a detailed exploration of that
literature. For its purposes, we are concerned foremost with the discrete analytical
question of how the notion of accountability relates to the making of transfer decisions
during the operation of the FCJS. In so doing, it is hoped the cry of the Hon Murray
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Gleeson, that the concept of accountability is 'frequently invoked for rhetorical, rather
than analytical, purposes', can go some way towards being redressed.204
The final part of this chapter considers briefly the concepts of accountability and
public confidence. It argues that if judges are seen to transfer cases to the FMC in
accordance with the transfer criteria and in promotion of the principles of procedural
justice, then their decisions theoretically should be beyond reproach. Should it
transpire, however, the decisions (either individually or collectively) have the effect of
not promoting any one or more of the principles examined, the decisions might not be
technically legally invalid,205 but may be regarded as compromised and have
significant implications for the reasons canvassed in the last two chapters of this thesis.

3.4.1

The Need for Judicial Accountability

Two main types of judicial accountability are reflected most commonly in the legal
literature:206 judicial tenure (the circumstances in which a judge may be removed from
office and pertaining to serious misconduct or ill health) and accountability arising
from the provision of cogent (written) reasons for decision and in acting fairly and
transparently in the performance of judicial functions.207 The former is not relevant
here, as it is not suggested the non-promotion of a principle of procedural justice alone
constitutes professional misconduct. Instead, this thesis focuses upon the latter notion
of accountability for, as suggested by a former judge of the FCA, openness (and one
might add, the other principles of procedural justice) in judicial decision-making is an
indicator of accountability and therefore of good judicial performance.208
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A perception of accountability is important for the FCA for two main reasons. First,
the FCA has a tangible need to be seen as demonstrating accountability in a financial
and managerial capacity.209 Being a self-administered agency of the Commonwealth,
the FCA enjoys a certain degree of autonomy not necessarily experienced by the state
courts. Such autonomy is not unrestricted; the FCA is directly accountable to the
federal government, and indirectly to the Australian people, for its expenditure of
government funding and for its conduct of its ‘business’ of supplying court services to
the general public.210 This duty extends to the way the Court deals with all aspects of
judicial business (including case transfers), and it arises within a climate of greater
parliamentary and public interest in the efficiency of judicial administration, which
was previously regarded as a matter exclusively for the judges.211 As observed by the
Hon Murray Gleeson:
Court rules and procedures, techniques of case management, listing
arrangements, the giving of priorities to certain types of case, and a
number of other administrative matters are all capable of having a
substantial effect upon the efficiency with which a court disposes of the
business that comes to its....Ministers find that they are being called to
account, in parliament and in the public arena, for the degree of
efficiency with which the court system operates ...212
The Australian Parliament and community scrutinise, and are otherwise kept apprised
of, the efficiency levels and performance of the Court in the appropriate management
of public funding through the publication of its yearly annual report, in addition to
audits and periodical appearances by FCA officials before parliamentary committees.
It has been recognised that the FCA has responded to these influences by adopting
'modern management techniques to maximise efficient use of the resources available'
to it.213 That the Court is concerned with external perceptions of its performance, and
209
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with the need for it to provide justification for the funding sought and obtained by it, is
seen by the key performance indicators set by it. The FCA has adopted, for example, a
case disposition timeframe policy of 18 months from date of filing to disposition and a
timeframe for the handing down of decisions of three months from hearing to
judgment, as part of its striving for efficiency.214
The second reason accountability is important for the FCA, and linked to the
discussion above, is because the Court has an obligation to make sound decisions
about case transfers consistent with the social justice objectives of the Parliament. The
legislature entrusted the FCA in 2000 with the discretionary power to oversee an
important aspect of the political rationale for the establishment of the FCJS – to enable
appropriate FCA cases to be transferred to the supposedly cheaper, simpler and
quicker FMC. This was done, as may be recalled from Chapter 1, for the purposes of
enhancing access to justice for all Australians involved in general federal law
litigation. If FCA cases are seen to be transferred inappropriately, including without
due regard to the principles of procedural justice or the transfer criteria, then this
would constitute a serious erosion of that responsibility and of the accountability of the
Court in achieving the objectives of the legislature in the field of access to justice in
the federal courts. The FCA has an unenviable fine balancing act to perform between
maintaining its productivity levels and giving due recognition to the due administration
of justice in all its judicial business, including case transfers to the FMC. The extent to
which it has succeeded in doing so in respect of the study group matters is of interest
to this research.

3.4.2

Public Confidence in the System

A primary consequence of any civil justice system being perceived to be operating
legitimately and with due regard to the principles of procedural justice is the
promotion of public confidence in that system. It is commonly accepted courts operate
most effectively when they enjoy the confidence of the community and maintenance of
214
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this confidence might be seen as part of a ‘more consumer-oriented approach’ to the
work of the federal courts.215 The point is often emphasised that accountability and
public confidence in the judiciary operate in tandem in the effective administration of
justice and, more broadly, in reflecting community standards216 and fulfilling the goals
of a democratic society.217
The objective of maintaining public confidence in the legal system is also expressed as
the need to have appropriate judicial conduct in the administration of that system.
According to the Guide To Judicial Conduct, applicable to FCA judges, a judicial
officer should adhere to the following principles of conduct in office: 'to uphold public
confidence in the administration of justice; to enhance public respect for the institution
of the judiciary; and to protect the reputation of individual judicial officers and of the
judiciary'.218 In turn, the confidence of the public provides the judiciary with full and
proper authority to make decisions affecting members of the community and to
adjudicate their disputes.219
Apart from the FMC, as the court inheriting the transferred matters, there are two main
categories of persons possibly interested in, or affected by, transfer decisions made
under the FCJS and whose confidence it might be argued is vital to the FCA and the
legitimate operation of the FCJS. The first category is the parties most directly affected
by the transfer. In the second category is the broader community - the legal community
(comprised of legal practitioners and academics) and the litigants whose own
proceedings may become the subject of a FCA-to-FMC transfer order.
Users of the FCA might reasonably have certain high expectations of it given its status
as a superior court. More pragmatically, the hefty filing fees involved to litigate in that
forum may cause litigants to expect the delivery of a certain standard of justice and
service. Court users have various other expectations in relation to judicial processes in
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any court. They include: that of fairness based on the ability to be heard;220 that
decisions will reflect fully the reasoning of the judge based on facts properly found and
not based upon personal preference;221 there be daily behaviour of judges
demonstrating a commitment to decisions being correct and to 'impartiality,
professional competence, honesty, diligence and an absence of prejudgment or overhasty judgment';222and finally, that judges will be open about the rules and procedures
by which they function.223
In the advent of the establishment of the FCJS, judges spoke publicly of a possible
erosion in confidence in the Australian civil justice system. For example, the Hon D A
Ipp wrote in 1995 of the undermining of public confidence in the justice system as a
consequence of the need for reform to civil justice.224 Similarly, Justice Susan Kenny
of the FCA was of the view in the late 1990s that the decline in public confidence
could be attributable to perceptions of: deficiencies in judicial performance, the legal
system itself and a 'lack of balanced public debate about the judiciary'.225 Justice
Kenny expressly noted the decline in confidence was not because 'it has been
suggested that judges are proceeding to hear cases in secret cabal or that they are not
publishing their reasons, or that the reasons, when given, are not genuine reasons'.226
This is precisely what is now sought to be ascertained in the case of studying the
effects of the operation of the FCJS. As argued in Chapter 10, if the FCJS is seen to be
operating in a manner that does not accord with the principles of procedural justice,
then it might be perceived to be doing nothing to retard the erosion of public
confidence in the federal civil justice system, and may in fact serve to contribute to
that gradual process.
Finally, the provision of open and fair justice fosters certainty in this area of FCA
practice and procedure through the development of legal knowledge and jurisprudence
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(primarily through precedent). When the legal community is able to peruse and
understand the development of such a body of legal principles, then such knowledge
can be disseminated more readily to the general community in the form of proper legal
advice, analysis and representation.

3.5

Summary of Working Definitions

It has been argued in this chapter that the potential for the inappropriate or arbitrary
exercise of judicial discretion during case transfers by the FCA to the FMC may be
most effectively avoided or ameliorated by judges promoting access to procedural
justice. This may occur best through adherence to the four principles of procedural
justice, as is evaluated in the case of the study group matters in this research. When
these principles are promoted in the course of the transfer process, the FCJS may be
seen to work towards attainment of its first policy objective of providing access to
justice for litigants, and even though there has been a change of forum from that which
the applicant chose originally for the resolution of their legal dispute. The ability of
litigants to participate fully and meaningfully in the transfer decision-making process
(that is, the participation model) and the process being perceived to be fair, open and
transparent work in tandem to foster judicial accountability and public confidence in
the federal civil justice system (including the FCJS).
For ease of convenience, the following is a brief summary of the working definitions
of the principles of procedural justice discussed in this chapter.
(a)

Equality in relation to the study group matters in practice means all
FCA proceedings are treated equally in the sense of there being no
predisposition by the judicial decision-maker towards transferring
matters simply based upon notions of the legal representation status of
the applicant (self-representation), the place of filing or the cause of
action of the matters.

(b)

Whilst arguably transfer decisions may be made in chambers, in
practice it is desirable they are seen to have occurred mainly in open
court (or at the very least via other public means, such as the
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publication of written reasons on the internet) and that the involvement
of the decision-maker in the transfer process is clear.
(c)

The principle of fairness is satisfied where, in the course of the transfer
decision being made, the relevant parties are seen to have an
opportunity to be heard fully on the issue of potential transfer, be this
by virtue of appearance in open court for a duration of at least 10
minutes (or through correspondence with the FCA) prior to the transfer
order being made. There should also be sufficient indication by the
Court that the wishes of the parties on the subject of transfer are being
heard and considered fully by it. So, too, any transfer decision may be
regarded as fair where it is seen the FMC is a more 'appropriate' forum
than the FCA in the sense that it is seized of necessary jurisdiction and
resources to determine the case and it is a cheaper, simpler and quicker
court than the FCA for the determination of the matter.

(d)

A transfer decision-maker should most ideally provide written reasons
(published on the internet) for a transfer decision and, at the very least,
oral reasons in open court. In either event, the provision of reasons
should be ‘adequate’. Assessed qualitatively, reasons should be of
sufficient educative and probative value to apprise the parties and
broader community of the true basis for the making of the decision and
for the development of jurisprudence in this area of law. In the situation
of oral pronouncements of transfer reasons, the time spent in doing so
in open court should be of a duration of greater than 10 minutes.

The precise methodology by which the above working definitions are put to work, and
how the extent to which the operation of the FCJS promoted or impeded procedural
justice through the application of the four principles is tested, in this research is
explained in the next chapter.
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PART II –
RESEARCH METHODS AND STUDY
FINDINGS
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
The value of a mixed-methods approach.

4.1

General Approach to the Study

The effects of the operation of the FCJS on access to justice, as seen in relation to the
study group matters, is evaluated in this thesis through the use of evidence-based
research techniques in social science. Evidence-based research is chosen for this study,
in preference to purely doctrinal methods, because of the increasing political, academic
and judicial recognition of the ability of such research to inform the administration of
justice.227
This research has adopted a mixed-methods or triangulation of methods approach to
research (that is, both quantitative and qualitative methods), with particular emphasis
on the use of quantitative measures - specifically, statistical analysis. The findings in
Chapters 5 and 6 (the extent to which the study group transfers reflect the principles of
equality and openness) are gathered from a primarily quantitative approach, whereas
the findings in Chapters 7 and 8 (evaluating fairness and the adequacy of reasons)
reflect a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. A triangulation of
methods approach is favoured in seeking to provide a more objective and balanced
description of what occurred, and to provide a more comprehensive study.228 The
former is important given the professional background of the researcher, including at
the time of the study periods.
The transfer decision-making processes are studied years after the transfer events,
principally through inspection of court records and statistical analysis of the findings
arising from a number of measures explained below. The qualitative aspect of the
research centres mainly on analysis of the content of documents or records gathered,
including published written judgments concerning transfer orders and, to a lesser
extent, the personal observations and knowledge of the researcher gained whilst
227
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employed with the FCA and the FMC. Knowing where to look for information, and
what it all means, was of considerable assistance.

4.2

Defining the Study Group

The study is comprised of 204 matters transferred by the FCA to the FMC during the
financial years of 2000-01 (first study period) and 2002-03 (second study period). The
former period of study involves 145 matters and the latter 59 matters.
All matters transferred nationally by the FCA to the FMC within all FCA registries
during the study periods are examined, with the exception of the 657 migration cases
transferred in 2002-03.229 The areas of jurisdiction (or types of cases) studied include
all (non-migration) areas of concurrent jurisdiction applicable at the relevant time bankruptcy, human rights, TPA, AAT appeals and AD(JR) Act applications - the nature
of which jurisdictions was discussed in Chapter 2. Included also in the study is a
copyright matter transferred in the first study period.
The entire population of non-migration transfer cases is chosen for the study because
of an inherent risk that using selective areas of jurisdiction or registries would provide
skewed results, with the findings being influenced potentially by the idiosyncratic
practices of specific registries. The scope of the study would also be limited if only one
or two areas of jurisdiction were chosen. Migration matters are excluded from the
study because their case management is a distinct phenomenon, particularly having
regard to the high volume of such matters transferred en masse prior to the changes to
the migration legislation in 2005. Including such transfers within this study would give
greater insights into the transfer decision-making processes, however, doing so poses
also the risk of yielding distorted findings.
Both self-represented and legally represented matters are included in the study. When
considering the issue of representation, data was collected on applicants only because
the research is interested in the fact the applicants chose the FCA as the forum of their
litigation. Data collection on legal representation is difficult by virtue of the fact
representation can change throughout the proceedings for either or both parties. Such
229
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changes would not necessarily be captured by court staff and recorded on the computer
records system. Indeed, the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the FCA
explained to the Senate Estimates Committee hearing in May 2002 the reason for the
inability of the Court to record accurate and full data on the number of self-represented
litigants within its jurisdiction in the following terms:
That is one of the reasons why we have to replace FEDCAMS: it does
not give us the information we need to be able to easily capture
information about litigants in person. I can give you one example of
how difficult it is. Often when a case commences a person will be
unrepresented; they will subsequently be represented and become
unrepresented again. Alternatively, they commence as unrepresented
and, vice versa, become represented. It is quite difficult to catch all the
precise information on that situation.230
Gamble and Mohr made a similar observation of the inadequacies of statistical data on
self-represented litigants in the FCA in their study in the 1990s.231 More is said on the
method of capturing this data below.
The reasons the two study periods are selected for study, as distinct from any other
period(s) of the existence of the FCJS, are primarily three-fold. First, an assumption is
made that the first year of operation of the FCJS was likely to provide a significant
number of transfer cases because the system was new and likely to be utilised to the
fullest extent possible. Secondly, financial, rather than calendar, years are chosen since
the FCJS and FMC commenced in late June 2000, a good six months into that calendar
year. It is noted FCA and FMC annual reporting also follows a financial year
approach. Thirdly, by selecting the early years, all of the transferred matters should by
now be finalised within the FMC and FCA, including any appeals. This is important in
seeking to ensure a comprehensive view of the proceedings is achieved.
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As alluded to in Chapter 1, the period between the two study periods (2001-02) is not
included in the study. It is sought to discern whether there are any significant changes
in the decision-making processes and case management practices of the FCA over
time, as between the first year of the operation of the FCJS and a sufficient interval (its
third year). Furthermore, by the time of the second study period transfers, the workload
of the FMC itself had increased as it settled well into operation. The effects of this
increased workload are seen in Chapter 10.

4.3

Data and Information Collection

The study group matters were identified initially by perusal of FCA and FMC annual
reports for the relevant periods (to gauge volume generally) and from old statistical
lists produced by the FCA (to identify matters specifically).232 The lists were produced
from computer records of each matter the Court had transferred to the FMC during the
study periods. They include the following information: the FCA matter number, area
of jurisdiction, 'city' (registry) concerned, the 'end date' of the matter (essentially, the
date of transfer order), the primary statute under which the proceeding was
commenced, the new FMC matter number and the date 'filed' in the FMC (that date
should technically mirror the end date). The matters that were transferred to the FMC,
but re-transferred to the FCA, are also indicated. These lists provided the most
straightforward means of identifying the study group matters.
There is a discrepancy in the number of matters falling within the first study period as
identified by the FCA, and as determined during the research. According to the FCA,
140 matters were transferred that period. The Court does not seem to regard matters
that have been transferred to the FMC and then re-transferred to the FCA as
representing a transferred matter. By contrast, this study does include such retransferred matters for its statistical purposes. The former approach is sensible for the
purposes of the FCA determining the actual number of matters making up its annual
workload. The approach adopted in this study reflects more accurately the incidence of
transfer decision-making.
232
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The specific research tools employed were the following: FCA and FMC computer
records of the study group matters, published written reasons for transfer decisions of
the FCA and FMC, file inspections of the New South Wales and Australian Capital
Territory study group matters and annual reports of the two courts. 233 Each research
tool is explained next.

4.3.1

Court Computer Records

The gathering of raw data relied heavily upon access to the computer records of the
FCA and FMC, and there were a number of changes to the electronic case
management systems of the courts during the research. There was access to the former
computer records systems of the FCA known as FEDCAMS and its FMC counterpart,
MAGCAMS. The current system for both courts, known as Casetrack, was
implemented nationally in 2004, but the former systems remained on-line for a period
thereafter. Much of the matter information on FEDCAMS and MAGCAMS was
migrated to the new system. With the introduction of Casetrack and other electronic
initiatives, court users may access many types of data about matters directly on the
internet as publicly available information.234 Searches on any of the systems generally
are made using the matter number of a proceeding or the name of a party for any
matter commenced after 1 January 1984.
From the information provided in the FCA transferred matter lists, data was collected
on each study group matter in order of the date of transfer, which correlated with the
sequence of the matters in the lists. This was done using the FEDCAMS and
MAGCAMS systems and Casetrack (and associated electronic systems). Data
collection did not occur in one distinct block, but was spread over a period of years as
the progress of matters was tracked (particularly in respect of any appeals). Actual data
233
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collection occurred by using the FCA matter number, and then verifying this was the
correct matter by confirming from the computer records the matter was recorded as
transferred.

(a)

FEDCAMS

Raw data gathered from (primarily) FEDCAMS and its successor systems in relation
to each of the 204 matters included the following information.
 The date of filing was checked as to whether the matter was filed prior to,
or after, the commencement of the FCJS. The date of transfer confirmed the
inclusion of a matter in the study group.
 Close attention was paid to the place of commencement and transfer of the
matter (the relevant registry). The matter number prefix of the cases cannot
be relied upon as being a determinative indicator of the registry involved. It
is the practice of the FCA for a matter to retain its original filing registry
prefix in the matter number even if the matter has been transferred to
another FCA registry.
 The status of representation of the applicant was determined by checking
the relevant field on the computer screen – 'Litigant in Person:…'. An
indication of 'Y' means the applicant is self-represented and 'N' means there
is legal representation on record. Such entry was checked against another
field - 'All Parties: A1…..' - to see whether there was the name of a law
firm. The record of representation status was either confirmed or adjusted
according to the entry in that field. If an applicant were truly selfrepresented, then there would be no law firm details entered next to their
name. A busy registry officer may be more inclined to amend on the system
changed contact details of a party, than their representation status.
For any matter (of which there were few) where there was recorded more
than a single applicant, if at least one of those applicants was indicated as
self-represented, then the matter was tagged as being a self-represented
applicant matter for statistical purposes in this thesis.
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 It was noted whether the parties had any court filing and hearing fees
incurred, waived or exempted. This is of relevance to the issue of whether
the FMC was a 'cheaper’ court than the FCA for the conduct of the study
group matters, as part of the tasking of evaluating whether the principle of
fairness was promoted (see Chapter 7).
 The area of jurisdiction under which the matter was commenced was noted.
This is discernible from the field 'Act (1)', denoting the primary statute for
the cause of action and that invoked the jurisdiction of the FCA. That Act
also served to alert any potential anomalies in relation to the transfers (such
as the transfer of any matter outside the jurisdiction of the FMC).
 The identity of the maker of each transfer order was ascertained. It was
noted whether this was the same identity as that of the recorded docket
judge (or registrar).
 The outcome of the matter, as having been transferred to the FMC, was
confirmed via two fields – 'Where Gone' and the entry under 'Remarks'.
Remarks are recorded typically along the lines of 'Transferred to FMC per
order of [judge] on [date] (FMC file number)'.
 The number, type and duration of all the listings for the matter before the
FCA were recorded with particular interest because such data sheds light on
the circumstances of the making of the transfer orders. The system
indicated the date of each court listing, its time (of day), type, duration
(time spent in open court), location, result (such as allowed, dismissed,
orders made, adjourned, transferred etc) and the identity of the decisionmaker in open court. The main types of listing recorded were 'DIRL' (first
directions hearing), 'DIR' (subsequent directions hearing) and 'NM' (notice
of motion).
 The ‘Judgments’ field was also of particular importance to this research as
it flagged the existence of published written Reasons. More is said about
the methods used to access the Reasons below.
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(b)

MAGCAMS

The above general process was repeated with the study group matters on MAGCAMS
(and other systems). The new FMC matter number for each such transferred matter
was available from the FCA lists and from information verified from FEDCAMS.
Each individual matter was searched for the purpose of gathering information on the
following:
 The number, types and duration of all the listings for each relevant matter
in the FMC and, to some extent, the outcome of the proceeding
(particularly if there had been a re-transfer of the matter to the FCA).
 The relevant date of finalisation of the proceeding was recorded, as was any
information concerning an appeal of the FMC outcome to the FCA.
 The legal representation status and nature of filing fees paid, waived and
exempted were noted.
 Information gleaned from FEDCAMS was generally cross-referenced and
checked as against the entries in MAGCAMS.
In cases where the outcome in the FMC was appealed to the FCA, the appeal matter
number was noted from MAGCAMS and was then used for the main purpose of
checking on either FEDCAMS or Casetrack (via the internet) the composition of the
FCA bench for the appeal hearing. More is said on this subject in Chapter 9 when
considering the reduction of the workload of the FCA by transferring the study group
matters.

4.3.2

Published Reasons

If a computer records system indicated a 'Judgment' (that is, Reasons) existed in
respect of a transfer decision, such document was obtained through the internet via the
AustLII website.235 The same occurred in instances where it was found that a federal
magistrate had published reasons for decision for re-transferring a matter to the FCA.

235

For the website details, see above n 160.
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Having observed the limited number of Reasons regarding study group matter
transfers, the researcher was curious about whether the judges published Reasons for
other types of transfer decisions made during the study periods. To this end, every
published judgment of the FCA pronounced during 2000-01 and 2002-03 was viewed
on AustLII to ascertain whether the FCA was publishing written reasons for other
inter-court and inter-registry transfers to the same degree as the publication of Reasons
in respect of transfers to the FMC. For the purposes of the discussion in Chapter 10,
the incidence of FCA-to-FMC transfer Reasons in recent years was also examined on
AustLII.

4.3.3

File Inspections

Following completion of the data gathering from computer records systems, FCA and
FMC file inspections were conducted of the study group matters in two registries of
the FCA. File inspection of each of the 204 matters was not possible due to the cost
and time associated with travelling to each FCA registry. A smaller sample of FCA
and FMC files (totaling 114 files) from the New South Wales (Sydney) and Australian
Capital Territory (Canberra) registries, was more easily inspected. There were 56
Sydney matters and a single matter in Canberra. Virtually the entire contents of a FCA
file are usually transferred to the FMC and placed on its file when a matter is
transferred, but is was still necessary to inspect the original FCA file in case the
correspondence section remained therein.
As most of the information sought was obtained already from computer records and
the internet, it was not anticipated much new data would be obtained from file
inspections, but it was interesting to see whether the correspondence sections of the
files could shed any further light on the transfer decision-making processes. In
particular, written requests by the parties for transfer or letters from chambers advising
of, and explaining, transfer decisions were vital information for gauging the potential
degree of openness, fairness and the nature of any reasons for decision provided in the
matters.
The FMC files inspected were particularly useful in that they contained the actual
transfer order (not necessarily available on the internet at the time of the research) and
the internal reports of listing of the FCA for the matters (not usually available to the
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public or parties). This enabled the researcher to discern whether the transfer occurred
with the consent of the parties or upon the successful application of a party (for
example, 'motion to transfer allowed'). The latter document records, amongst other
things, the appearances of the parties and outcomes of a court listing. It can also
provide good indication whether a matter was transferred by consent by reference to
the phrase 'By consent, the Court orders that ...'.

4.3.4

Annual Reports

FCA annual reports published over the periods 1990-91 to 2010-11 were reviewed for
two main reasons. First, to see whether there is any discernible trend in case transfer
practices of the FCA, generally. Secondly, the annual reports are a source of limited
statistics about transfer numbers, but a wealth of information on the workload of the
Court. The FMC annual reports since its establishment similarly were considered for
the latter reason. Where the FCA annual reports were found to be lacking in sufficient
particularity of workload details, statistics helpfully provided by the Court were relied
upon.236

4.3.5

Tables

From the above computer and other information gathered, the matters in each of the
study periods were coded and tables prepared displaying the following information:

236



transfer matter number (in sequence of transfer);



matter number in both the FCA and FMC;



place (registry);



area of jurisdiction;



status of legal representation (of applicant);



payment of court fees or the waiver or exemption of same;

van Os, above n 128; Bill van Os, Statistics for Judges' Meeting (Federal Court of Australia, 27
August 2004).
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filing date of matter and whether this preceded the establishment of the
FCJS (some matters were already on foot when the FMC started);



transfer date;



number of days the matter spent in the FCA, determined as the period
between the date of filing and the transfer date;



identity of the maker of the transfer order (judge or registrar);



whether published Reasons exist for the transfer decision;



identity of the instigator of the transfer (where known);



stage of the proceedings when, and venue at which, the matter was
transferred (for example, before any listing, at the first directions hearing, at
the hearing of a notice of motion etc);



total duration of time spent in open court listing(s) leading up to the making
of the transfer order; and



any other comments and observations noted from the computer records and
file inspections (including the existence and substance of correspondence
between the FCA and parties regarding the topic of transfer).

The data gathered from the FMC records was reduced similarly to table format
reflecting the following indicia:


matter number, jurisdiction and legal representation status of the applicant;



payment of court fees or the exemption or waiver of same;



outcome of the proceeding before the FMC and when it occurred (stage of
proceedings);



duration of each transferred matter in the FMC;



any appeal from the outcome; and



any other pertinent observations noted.
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4.4

Surveys and Interviews

This research required several decisions in relation to the scope and nature of the
matters to be included in the study. Like any piece of empirical research, it also
required at times difficult choices about the nature of the methodological tools to be
employed, in particular, whether interviews or surveys would be conducted.
Whilst it is acknowledged findings from interviews of judges would reveal fascinating
insights into the judicial decision-making psyche in this field of jurisprudence, the
research has not been based upon formal interviewing of judicial officers or
conducting of questionnaires or surveys. There would be limitations in interviewing a
sufficient number of original study group decision-makers (many have since left the
FCA), and who are prepared to comment on specific cases or judicial approach in
more than the most general and cursory of terms. It is also deemed unnecessary to
conduct formal interviews to ascertain why an individual judge chose to transfer a
given matter. Rather, the research considers objectively how the exercise of discretion
as a collective phenomenon seemingly occurred in the course of case management
practices during specific periods of the operation of the FCJS and how this affects
access to procedural justice. As mentioned earlier, it is for the reason of seeking
objective findings (as distinct from subjective viewpoints) that a predominantly
quantitative approach has been taken in conducting this research.
For similar reasons, the exact reasons for the applicants (including their legal
representatives) choosing the FCA is not examined by way of interviews, surveys or
questionnaires. The research problem does not require detailed examination of the
specific rationale of the applicants for choosing to litigate in the FCA. It is sufficient
for present purposes that the proceedings had been commenced in the FCA based on
free will and were then transferred by the Court. The perceptions of court users
regarding the operation of the FCJS is suggested in the final chapter as a future
research endeavour.
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4.5

Research Questions - Methods and Measures

The above-mentioned raw data and other information collected has been employed to
address the question of the extent to which the transfer decision-making processes in
the case of the study group matters seemingly promoted or adhered to the principles of
equality, openness, fairness and the provision of adequate reasons for decision. The
answers assist in evaluating the effect of the operation of the FCJS on access to federal
civil justice. The findings on these issues is separated between the first and second
study period matters so that clear observations of any differences and changes between
the two periods can be made.

4.5.1

Equality

It was seen in Chapter 3 the principle of equality is assessed in this thesis by reference
to whether, in the case of the study group matters, there is seen to have been equal
treatment in regards to the incidence of transfers to the FMC for:
 self-represented and represented litigants;
 all types of cases (areas of jurisdiction) under the FCJS; and
 all places (registries) of transfer.
This approach adopts the ‘who, what and where’ quantitative measures in respect of
case transfers. The relevant data collected from FEDCAMS (and similar computer
records) for addressing the 'who' factor pertains to the status of legal representation of
the applicant - specifically, whether (a) FEDCAMS indicated the applicant as a
'Litigant in Person'; and (b) the stated address for the applicant was that of a law firm.
The area of jurisdiction - 'what' was transferred- is determined from the FEDCAMS
data on the 'Primary Act'. The place or registry of transfer - 'where' the transfers
occurred - is ascertained from the prefix of the matter number (each registry has a
specific prefix) and confirmed by noting any indication the matter had been the subject
of an inter-registry transfer (for example, by reference to the identity of the decisionmaker and the usual known registry of same). If a matter had been the subject of an
inter-registry transfer prior to being transferred to the FMC, then the place of transfer
is taken (rather than the place of initial filing of the matter) for statistical purposes.

119

The findings from the above raw data is set out in tables in Chapter 5. The tables are
divided into a number of individual and combined categories reflecting status of legal
representation, area of jurisdiction and place of transfer. Such permutations are done so
as to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the situations and to identify any
differences between the various registries. Statistics from the Court regarding
workload are relied upon to redress any limitations of the annual reports. The
categories with the highest recorded incidence of transfer are noted.

4.5.2

Openness

The principle of open justice is approached in Chapter 6 primarily from the
quantitative perspective of establishing from the FEDCAMS data the venue in which
the transfer decision was made (open court or chambers) and the identity of the
transfer decision-maker (based upon the name on the transfer order and the relevant
'docket'). The data is used to indicate whether the transfer order was pronounced in the
course of an open court listing or, alternatively on a date when there was no such
recorded listing and so, by deduction, the order was made in chambers. Technically,
decisions made in chambers should be recorded as an administrative listing, but this is
not evident in the data collected from FEDCAMS and so it is deduced a transfer order
made on a given date in the absence of a court listing was made in chambers (not in
open court). Where the data suggests the transfer decision-making occurred in
chambers, or by a registrar (rather than a judge), the factors of registry, area of
jurisdiction and status of legal representation are considered so as to understand better
the phenomenon.

4.5.3

Fairness

Chapter 7 sets out the findings in relation to the principle of fairness, which it may be
recalled is approached in this thesis in a two-fold manner. First, the parties ought to be
provided with a reasonable opportunity to present their position on the subject of
potential transfer prior to the making of the transfer order, and to have their wishes on
the subject considered fully by the decision-maker. Secondly, any transfer should have
the effect of changing the chosen forum of the proceedings to one that is more
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appropriate and cheaper, simpler and quicker than the FCA would have been had the
proceeding remained with it.

In respect of the former issue, the findings are based upon quantitative and qualitative
assessments of the data in respect of the following:
 The number of matters (considered by reference to area of jurisdiction and
registry) that had been transferred to the FMC prior to any listing in court
(and as reflected by the absence of any record of listing on FEDCAMS
preceding the making of the transfer order);
 The number of matters that had numerous listings in the FCA compared
with the matters (shown by area of jurisdiction and registry) that had
merely a single listing in open court prior to transfer, and the median time
spent by the latter on those occasions (so as to evaluate how meaningful
any such opportunity was for the presentation of the position of the parties
on the topic of transfer);
 FCA file inspection of New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory
study group matters, providing a qualitative assessment of any
correspondence about potential transfer between the parties and Court; and
 Using the same files, a qualitative assessment of the documents as to
whether the relevant parties instigated or consented to the transfers.

The question of 'appropriateness' of the FMC as the new forum for the study group
matters is approached also both quantitatively and qualitatively. The study group
matters that were the subject of re-transfer to the FCA by order of the FMC is
addressed by reference to: indications to this effect on both FEDCAMS and
MAGCAMS, the content of published judgments of the FMC and revelations from
both FCA and FMC file inspections of (particularly) New South Wales study group
matters. The issue of whether the FMC was a cheaper, simpler and quicker court for
the determination of the transferred matters is approached qualitatively and
quantitatively, and each factor is considered separately.
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The concept of whether the FMC is a 'cheaper' court is evaluated first by reference to a
comparison between the respective FCA and FMC regulations concerning the payment
and exemption or waiver of court filing and hearing fees applicable at the time of the
study periods. This is examined further in light of the FEDCAMS and MAGCAMS
data about the waiver or exemption of fees for the study group litigants. Secondly, the
(party-party) costs regimes contained in the respective rules of court of the FCA and
FMC are examined in making an assessment of the extent to which the potential
payment or recovery of costs in the two courts differed for the study group matters. A
few New South Wales matters, arising from file inspections, are considered in relation
to the specific costs outcomes in those matters.

The degree to which the FMC is a 'simpler' court is considered by a qualitative
comparison of the practices and procedures of it and the FCA, both as to the level of
informality in the conduct of proceedings and the rules of court. This is done for the
purposes of ascertaining whether there are any substantial similarities or differences
between the two courts in the conduct of proceedings before them, including of the
study group matters.
In relation to whether the FMC was a 'quicker' forum for the study group matters, as
intended by the legislature, it is equivocal what is meant by this term within the
context of transfers to the FMC under the FCJS. It could refer to the duration of a
hearing, the period leading up to the hearing date or the time spent by the court
finalising a case. As revealed by some of the findings in Chapter 7, there is indication
some of the transferring judges favoured the middle construct. In this thesis, the last of
these three possible constructs is used to evaluate the performance of the FMC because
the finalisation of a matter (including the handing down of final judgment) is of greater
significance to parties than merely a speedy and brief hearing alone.
To say the FMC was quicker than the FCA in the finalisation of matters would perhaps
best be determined by comparing disposition rates for comparable matters in the two
courts during the relevant periods. The problem in executing this approach is two-fold.
First, it is difficult to identify truly comparable matters if in fact the transferred matters
are ‘less complex’ than the matters that remain in the FCA. Secondly, whilst the FCA
does publish statistics in its annual reports on its workload, it does not provide a
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breakdown of those statistics in respect of the disposition timeframes of its specific
concurrent jurisdiction areas. The indicator used, therefore, for measuring whether the
transfer of the study group matters had the result of effecting an expeditious
finalisation of the proceedings is to consider the policy of the respective courts in
respect of case disposition rates and to compare the various findings with these
policies. In other words, it is ascertained whether the determination of the proceedings
by the FMC was 'quick', as judged by the standards of that court and of the FCA as the
transferring court.
The FCA had at the time of the study periods, and continues to have, a case disposition
policy of seeking to finalise its proceedings within 18 months from the date of
commencement.237 The FMC prefers a more ambitious policy of six months.238 To
evaluate whether the study group matters were determined within such timeframe in
the FMC, a smaller population of the study group matters is taken; namely, those 144
matters that actually proceeded to determination by the FMC (102 matters in 2000-01
and 42 matters in 2002-03). This group includes matters with applications that were
allowed or dismissed by the Court and excludes matters that were abandoned, settled
or discontinued by the parties. The latter category of matters is excluded due to the
absence of strong indication from the raw data as to the extent to which the FMC acted
as a catalyst, or otherwise facilitated, the resolution of all those matters. Both the FMC
and FCA encourage court-assisted mediation (primarily, by registrars of the courts).
Those matters may have settled had they remained in the FCA.
An approach is taken of ascertaining the median time spent by the relevant population
of matters in the FMC and observing how the time compares with the case disposition
policy of that court. A median time of less than 183 days suggests the FMC determined
the matters expeditiously and accords with the policy of the court, as well as that of the
FCA. To evaluate the time spent by the matters in the FCJS both pre and post transfer,
and thereby to measure the true effect of the transfer on the duration of the litigation,
the median time spent by the matters overall in both the FCA and FMC is considered.
This overall median time is then itself viewed in light of the respective case disposition
policies of the courts.

237
238

See, eg, FCA AR 2000-01, above n 10, 36.
See, eg, Federal Magistrates Service, above n 8, 36.
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4.5.4

Provision of Adequate Reasons

The extent to which the FCA published (adequate) Reasons is addressed in Chapter 8
by examining the Reasons on the AustLII website for those study group matters that
FEDCAMS indicated (in the 'Judgment' field) as having a written judgment delivered.
Qualitatively, the adequacy of written reasons is evaluated by having general regard to
the factors outlined previously (in Chapter 3) and the scope of the reasons provided. A
comparison is made between the approach of the FCA in relation to the publishing of
Reasons for FCA-to-FMC transfers and for matters involving other inter-court and
inter-registry transfers during the study periods. This was arrived at by accessing and
perusing each FCA judgment published on AustLII during the study periods
(admittedly a laborious exercise, but this approach was both comprehensive and easier
than first ascertaining the list of all matters transferred using FEDCAMS).

In discovering the limited number of Reasons concerning the study group matter
transfers, it is necessary to see whether it is the preference of the FCA to have
pronounced the reasons for transfer orally in open court. Due to the difficulty of
obtaining transcript (as alluded to previously and discussed below), the potential
adequacy of any oral reasons delivered to the parties in open court cannot be examined
by reference to a written record of what transpired. Instead, it is necessary to determine
the median time spent in open court for the matters collectively (based on registry and
area of jurisdiction), and in circumstances where the time recorded on FEDCAMS
indicates a transfer order was made on the same day as a matter was listed in open
court (otherwise, it may be assumed the decision was made in chambers). The
adequacy of this period, for the full and proper statement of transfer decision reasons,
is evaluated by reference to the time measure of 10 minutes (for the reasons discussed
in Chapter 3).

4.6

Limitations of Methodology

The above methodology has a number of actual and potential limitations, as confirmed
in Chapter 10.
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First, transcript of court listings at which the study group matters was transferred has
not been accessed, which would have otherwise gone some way towards revealing the
exact nature of the transfer decision-making in the absence of any written judgment.
As alluded to previously, most registries of the FCA do not, for cost-saving reasons,
order printed transcript for retention on the Court file of directions hearings, which is
the stage of proceedings at which a matter is potentially most likely to be transferred
(that is, prior to hearing). Some chambers do order transcript for directions hearings,
but their practices vary as to whether a copy of the transcript is included on the Court
file, their own chambers 'dummy' file or is retained electronically by chambers staff.
Secondly. for the reasons canvassed earlier, only the study group files of two registries
were inspected physically. The potential for gaining deeper insights may be missed by
not having the benefit of perusing documents from other registries.
Thirdly, considerable reliance has been placed upon the list of transferred matters
provided by the FCA. Throughout the data-gathering process, steps were taken to
check those matters had indeed been transferred (including cross-referencing statistics
in annual reports and the matters on the computer system). If there were any additional
matters that ought to have been included in the study group, then regrettably those
matters have been over-looked.
Fourthly, the accuracy of the data and findings relating to the computer record searches
is only as good as the raw data entered into the record systems by the FCA and FMC.
Care was required in ensuring certain information, such as that relating to legal
representation status, was not taken at face value but rather confirmed by reference to
other data fields in FEDCAMS and MAGCAMS. Some fields were left blank in
various matters by omission or in all matters by certain registries seemingly as of
practice. Of course, responsibility for the final accuracy of the material presented in
this thesis remains with the researcher.
Finally, it should be disclosed the concurrency of jurisdiction system commenced
formally on 23 June 2000, whereas much of the information obtained from FCA
statistical records and publicly available materials (such as the volume of filings)
covers the period 1 July 2000 onwards. This does not affect the analysis since, as far as
can be ascertained, no transfer orders were made in the last week of June 2000.
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CHAPTER 5: THE SEARCH FOR EQUALITY
Some unexpected findings.

5.1

Approaching the Task

As foreshadowed, the data and findings relating to the promotion of the principle of
equality in the case of the study group matters are approached in terms of: who was
most likely to be transferred, what type of matter (area of jurisdiction) was most likely
to be transferred and where did most of the transfers occur (the registry)? The findings
are also divided into the first and second study periods. The omission of any particular
registry or type of matter from a table indicates the absence of such transfers for the
relevant period.

5.2

Who was Most Likely to be Transferred?

The first question addressed in this research is whether the principle of equality was
upheld in relation to the study group matters by reason of both legally and selfrepresented litigants being evenly statistically represented in the data collected. It is
tested whether self-represented applicant matters were most likely to be transferred by
the FCA to the FMC because of the case management problems and increased
workload potentially associated with such litigants for the FCA (see discussion in
Chapter 3).

5.2.1

First Study Period

The findings in respect of the period 2000-01 reveal that self-represented applicants
were not most likely to be transferred by the FCA to the FMC. The following table
shows that almost twice as many study group matters transferred during this period
involved the applicant to the proceedings being legally represented. Even if the entire
number of ‘unknown’ matters were added to the number of self-represented applicants,
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there would still be fewer such applicants transferred than legally represented
applicants (64 matters, or 44.1% of the total number of transferred matters).

Table 5.1: First study period – transfers by representation.
Represented Applicant
Matters (RAM)

81

RAM as
SelfSRAM as 'Unknown'
UM as
Percentage represented Percentage
Percentage
Matters
of
Applicant
of
of
Matters
Transfers
Transfers
(UM)
Transfers
(SRAM)
55.9%

46

31.7%

18

12.4%

The ‘unknown’ column represents the 18 matters for which FCA registry staff (in the
Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia District Registries) had not entered
any data in the relevant 'Litigant in Person?' field on FEDCAMS. A more detailed
search of both FEDCAMS and eSearch did not reveal a law firm as being on record for
any of the applicants in those matters. A number of these matters involved government
and corporate respondents and such parties ordinarily would have a legal
representative on record, particularly as it is mandated by the rules of court that bodies
corporate be represented legally (except with leave of the Court). Nonetheless, it is
risky to treat the matters as conclusively involving a represented applicant and so they
are relegated to the ‘unknown’ category of matters.

5.2.2

Second Study Period

A similar positive finding, that self-represented applicants did not constitute a
substantial number of the parties sent to the FMC, arises in respect of the period
2002-03. Some 63% of the 59 transferred matters during this time had applicants with
legal representation, indicating a slight increase of around 3% from the first study
period. The recording of information on FEDCAMS pertaining to the status of legal
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representation of the applicants in the transferred matters was performed seemingly
more thoroughly during this period, and there were consequently no matters falling
within the ‘unknown’ category of legal representation. This may explain why the
findings on paper, if not in reality, indicate roughly a 5% increase in the percentage of
transferred matters involving self-represented applicants.

Table 5.2: Second study period - transfers by representation.
Represented Applicant Matters (RAM)

37

RAM as
SelfSRAM as
Percentage represented Percentage
of
Applicant
of
Matters
Transfers
Transfers
(SRAM)
62.7%

22

37.3%

The above two tables do not reflect the status of legal representation of applicants as a
percentage of national filings. It is unknown, therefore, whether self-represented
applicants were statistically most likely to be transferred to the FMC as a percentage of
all matters filed in the FCA by such applicants. The Court had some statistical
information regarding the numbers of cases involving self-represented and represented
litigants for the study periods,239 however, that information was not relied upon
because it does not distinguish between applicants and respondents (this research is
more interested in the former). There were also a high number of ‘unknown’
representation cases recorded in that document (on average, 1000 matters for the two
periods of study), which also did not assist this task. The annual reports of the Court
for the study periods are similarly unhelpful because they do not provide information
on the precise number of filings by self-represented applicants and in what
jurisdictions and registries the filings occur.

239

van Os, above n 128, 14.

128

5.3

Do the Place and Type of Matter Make a Difference?

The above findings support the conclusion self-represented applicant matters during
both study periods were not likely to be singled out for transfer, compared with
represented applicant matters, but do not otherwise provide insight into what was
actually occurring with the transfer of the former group matters in regards to particular
registries and areas of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the next four tables set out the
findings for both study periods based on the representational status of the applicant in
combination with the variables factors of place (registry) of transfer and type of
proceedings.

5.3.1

First Study Period

It seems that a self-represented applicant in the first study period was most likely to be
transferred if litigating a human rights proceeding in the New South Wales District
Registry (22 out of a total of 46 self-represented matters, or 47.8% of all transfers
involving a self-represented applicant during that period). This also equates to 81.5%
of all New South Wales transfers involving a self-represented applicant and 15.2% of
all transfers (irrespective of representational status) during the relevant period.
Where an applicant was legally represented during this period, they were most likely to
be transferred if pursuing a bankruptcy matter in the Queensland District Registry
(seen as 20 out of the 81 represented matters transferred, 24.7% of all represented
matters transferred that period, 71.4% of all Queensland transfers involving a
represented applicant and 13.8% of all second period transfers). This is generally
consistent with bankruptcy proceedings in the FCA usually involving a represented
creditor as applicant, who has filed a creditor's petition in seeking a sequestration order
be made against the estate of a respondent debtor. The next largest number of transfers
involving represented applicants concerned human rights matters in the New South
Wales District Registry.
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Table 5.3: First study period – self-represented applicant matters by registry
and jurisdiction.
SA

NSW

Vic

Qld

WA

TOTAL

Bankruptcy

0

3

0

1

0

4

TPA

0

1

0

1

0

2

Human Rights

4

22

6

3

2

37

AD(JR) Act

0

0

1

0

0

1

AAT Appeals

0

1

0

1

0

2

TOTAL

4

27

7

6

2

46

REGISTRY
JURISDICTION

Table 5.4: First study period - represented applicant matters by registry and
jurisdiction.
SA

NSW

Vic

Qld

WA

Tas

TOTAL

Bankruptcy

0

5

7

20

7

0

39

TPA

0

2

3

1

1

0

7

Human Rights

1

10

8

2

1

1

23

AAT Appeals

0

0

7

4

0

0

11

Copyright

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

TOTAL

1

17

26

27

9

1

81

REGISTRY
JURISDICTION

130

The unknown representational status matters (referred to in Table 5.1) occurred in
predominantly bankruptcy and human rights proceedings, and are not reflected in the
above two tables because of the inability to correctly allocate them to a specific table
with any certainty.

5.3.2

Second Study Period

When incorporating the variables of place and jurisdiction, the second study period
data provides unremarkable findings. Numerically, the most transfers involving a selfrepresented applicant occurred in the AAT appeals jurisdiction in the Victoria District
Registry (five out of the 22 self-represented applicant matters, or 22.7% of all such
matters). The findings otherwise are evenly and closely spread out in terms of
numbers, with no stand out results for any one registry or area of jurisdiction, at least
as compared with the findings in respect of the first study period.

Table 5.5: Second study period – self-represented applicant matters by
registry and jurisdiction.
SA

NSW

Vic

Qld

WA

ACT

NT

TOTAL

Bankruptcy

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

TPA

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

4

Human Rights

0

2

1

1

0

0

0

4

AD(JR) Act

0

0

1

2

0

0

0

3

AAT Appeals

1

1

5

3

0

0

0

10

TOTAL

1

4

7

6

2

1

1

22

REGISTRY
JURISDICTION
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Perhaps a finding of note, and as seen in the next table, is the fact most represented
applicant matter transfers during the second study period occurred in Queensland
bankruptcy, New South Wales human rights and Victoria AAT appeals matters in
identical numbers (six matters, or 16.2 % of the total, for each district registry). More
is said about a possible explanation for the decline in Queensland and other registry
bankruptcy matter transfers and filings in this jurisdiction, relative to the numbers for
the first study period, further below.

Table 5.6: Second study period – represented applicant matters by registry
and jurisdiction.
SA

NSW

Vic

Qld

WA

Tas

TOTAL

Bankruptcy

0

0

4

6

2

0

12

TPA

1

1

2

0

5

1

10

Human Rights

0

6

2

1

0

0

9

AAT Appeals

0

0

6

0

0

0

6

TOTAL

1

7

14

7

7

1

37

REGISTRY
JURISDICTION

5.4

Jurisdiction Most Likely to Transfer Cases

The second question considered is the nature of the area of jurisdiction most
commonly involved in the transfer of the study group matters. It may be recalled from
Chapter 2 that the areas of concurrent jurisdiction during the study periods were:
bankruptcy, AD(JR) Act, AAT appeals, TPA and human rights. Although the FMC
commenced its copyright law jurisdiction during the second study period, this occurred
late in the piece (in May 2003) and, in any event, there were no transfers recorded in
the copyright area. Accordingly, copyright is not included in the second study period
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findings, but has been necessarily included in the findings for the first study period to
reflect the single transfer in the jurisdiction that occurred at this time.

5.4.1

First Study Period

The 145 transfers studied in respect of the first study period represent 2.7% of the
5395 filings in the FCA during 2000-01 in all areas of jurisdiction, including
concurrent jurisdiction.240 If one considers that at the time the migration jurisdiction
was the largest of all jurisdictions of the FCA (representing over 1300 matters),241 and
that the FMC lacked jurisdiction initially in such matters, then the number of transfers
in 2000-01 may have been considerably higher and could have been dominated by
migration cases.
The specific breakdown, by area of concurrent jurisdiction, for this period is as
follows:

Table 5.7: First study period - transfers by area of jurisdiction.
Number of
Transfers

Transfers as
Percentage
of All
Transfers for
Period (%)

Number of
National
Filings in
Jurisdiction(a)

Transfers as
Percentage
of National
Filings in
Jurisdiction
(%)

Bankruptcy

51

35.2

1190

4.3

AD(JR) Act

1

0.7

117

0.9

AAT Appeals

15

10.3

179

8.4

TPA

9

6.2

310(b)

2.9

Human Rights

68

46.9

115

59.1

Copyright

1

0.7

75

1.3

JURISDICTION

240
241

Ibid 3.
Ibid.
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Sources and notes:
(a)

(b)

FCA AR 2000-01 143;152, 154; Bill van Os, Statistics for Judges' Meeting
(FCA, 27 August 2004) 3.
This figure is obtained from the above-mentioned latter source. The former
source suggests there were 311 filings. Nothing of significance turns on this
discrepancy for present purposes.

It is clear from the above table that by far the most commonly transferred type of
matter in the first study period was that of human rights – numerically, as a percentage
of transfers that period (close to half of all transfers) and as a proportion of the total
national filings of the Court in a given jurisdiction. Almost 60% of the national filings
in that jurisdiction were transferred during 2000-01.
Although numerically there were more bankruptcy than AAT appeals transfers, the
latter represents a greater proportion of transfers as a percentage of filings in a
jurisdiction of the Court. There is a limitation with the data obtained for AAT appeals,
however, insofar as the FCA annual report relied upon (as referred to in Table 5.7)
does not provide filings statistics for such matters. Recourse was had to a statistical
document of the Court (see also Table 5.7), which did not refer to such filings directly,
but rather under a general heading of 'Single Judge Appeals'. It is not clear from this
reference whether it is intended to cover solely AAT appeals or whether other original
jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction matters are also included. This fact may
undermine the strength of any findings pertaining to AAT appeals in this regard.
It is noted that, whilst there were more AD(JR) Act than human rights filings for this
period, there was merely a single AD(JR) Act transfer all year. Does this suggest such
matters are, by their very nature, ‘complex’ and the only matter to have been
transferred was the least complex of all such matters? The data and findings shed no
real light, either way.
The relatively low number of TPA matter transfers is understandable if one considers
that this jurisdiction can be a complex area of law and, as alluded to in Chapter 2, the
complexity of such matters is not necessarily determined by the quantum of the claim.
The percentage of TPA transfers to overall national filings in that jurisdiction (2.9%)
has built into that figure all aspects of this legislation in respect of which the FCA has
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jurisdiction. The FMC has a narrower jurisdiction in trade practices law to that of the
FCA. Consequently, the transferred matters themselves represent effectively aspects of
only consumer protection, whereas the overall FCA TPA filings would be broader in
scope and nature and would include competition law.

5.4.2

Second Study Period

There is seemingly a marked reduction in the number of transfers during the second
study period from that of the first period – 59, as distinct from 145, matters. The reality
is that there was actually a sharp increase in the overall number of transfers by the
FCA if the 657 migration matters, not covered by this research, were included in the
total number of FCA-to-FMC transfers. Fewer matters across all areas of FCA
jurisdiction were filed during this period compared with the period 2000-01 (4840
matters).242 The transfer of non-migration matters represented 1.2% of these new
matters before the Court (and excluding whatever additional, older matters it had
current at the time, which are difficult to pinpoint because of the lack of statistical
information in the annual report).
In working with the 59 non-migration transfers, we see a breakdown of transfer
numbers according to area of jurisdiction in the following terms:

242

Ibid.
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Table 5.8: Second study period - transfers by area of jurisdiction.
Number of
Transfers

Transfers as
Percentage
of All
Transfers for
Period (%)(a)

Number of
National
Filings in
Jurisdiction(b)

Transfers as
Percentage
of National
Filings in
Jurisdiction
(%)

Bankruptcy

13

22.0

482

2.7

AD(JR) Act

3

5.1

100

3.0

AAT Appeals

16

27.1

185

8.6

TPA

14

23.7

241

5.8

Human Rights

13

22.0

30

43.3

JURISDICTION

Sources and notes:
(a)

Due to rounding, the total does not add up to 100%.

(b)

FCA AR 2002-03 122, 130; Bill van Os, Statistics for Judges' Meeting
(FCA, 27 August 2004) 3.

As the relevant FCA annual reports are silent on the number of filings for various areas
of jurisdiction, recourse was had again to a separate document of the Court (see Table
5.8) to complete the statistical information required in respect of AD(JR) Act and
human rights proceedings and AAT appeals. Caution is required still in considering the
possible percentage of AAT appeals transfers to overall AAT appeals filings in the
FCA because of the available statistics from the Court referring to ‘Single Judge
Appeals’ without distinguishing between AAT appeals and other matters potentially
appealable to a single judge. It should be remembered also that references in such
documentation to national filings in the TPA jurisdiction would include matters outside
the scope of the FCJS.
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Considered numerically, the types of matters transferred during the second study
period appear more consistent across the board, with no particular jurisdiction
experiencing transfers in sharp contrast to that of other jurisdictions. AAT appeal
matters are marginally greater in number (16 matters), and therefore also as a
percentage of all transfers (27.1%), than the other jurisdictions. Given that appeals
from the AAT proceed to the FCA on questions of law, it is somewhat surprising that
such transfers exceeded other potentially less complex areas of jurisdiction, such as
bankruptcy and human rights. In any event, we see again that human rights
proceedings transfers, vis-à-vis national human rights filings for the period, are most
statistically significant. Some 43% of human rights filings were transferred; this is
down from the previous study period, but still represents a significant number of
matters. The question of where (in which registry) the human rights matters were being
most transferred, as a possible explanation for the number of transfers in this area, is
considered later in this chapter.
A few points can be made about the bankruptcy jurisdiction and transfers made there
under. The substantial decline in the number of national filings in the FCA in the area
of bankruptcy, down from 1190 matters in 2000-01 to 482 matters two years later, may
be explained by an increase in the use of the FMC by applicants in those types of
matters as the FMC became well-established. Litigants and legal practitioners became
more accustomed to filing in the FMC. They were often encouraged by Court staff to
file in the other court because of the cheaper filing fees. In addition, the same registrars
perform the bulk of the FCA and FMC bankruptcy workload, and so it is for the main
part immaterial whether the registrar is sitting as the FCA or the FMC in respect of any
given matter.
The 13 bankruptcy matters transferred to the FMC represent something of an anomaly.
These matters were presumably so complex as to warrant (predominantly) a judge
dealing with the matters (although it will be seen later that a number of matters were
transferred by registrars) after referral to a judge by a registrar. At the same time, the
matters were regarded as being ‘less complex’ in nature so as to warrant a transfer to
the FMC. Surely, the matters are either complex (and thus referred to a judge because
they are outside the scope of powers of a registrar to handle) or they are not
particularly complex (and so are determined by a registrar of the FCA with no
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corresponding need to transfer them to the FMC)? The available statistics perhaps
imply the matters were too complex for a registrar to determine, but not sufficiently
complex for a judge. The answer is not certain and requires further investigation (the
existence of published reasons for transfer would assist in this task).

5.5

Registry Most Likely to Transfer Matters

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the FCA has a registry in every capital city in Australia
and each study group transfer decision was made within a specific District Registry.
One may expect smaller registries (namely, the Australian Capital Territory, Northern
Territory and Tasmania District Registries) would not have a large volume of transfers
because of the relatively small number of filings per annum in those registries. It is
tested whether the New South Wales District Registry, as the largest and busiest
registry of the FCA, transferred the most matters as a means by which its workload
could be reduced (and in fulfilling the second objective of the FCJS).

5.5.1

First Study Period

This aspect of the research reveals some interesting findings. The question of whether
proceedings brought in New South Wales were numerically most likely to be
transferred is answered in the positive. There is a surprising finding underpinning this
conclusion, which tempers the above finding to some extent. Although the New South
Wales District Registry was the busiest registry of the FCA, with filings in 2000-01 of
in excess of 2550 matters,243 the 44 matters transferred by it represent merely 1.7% of
the total filings of the Registry for that period. This figure is less than that for the
Tasmania District Registry, one of the smallest registries of the Court. These overall
findings suggest that the New South Wales District Registry transferred the most
number of cases, but that it was overall statistically less inclined to do so as a registry.
The different findings relating to the eight registries of the FCA are set out in the next
table.

243

Ibid 2.
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Table 5.9: First study period - transfers by registry.
Number of
Transfers

Transfers as
Percentage
of All
Transfers for
Period (%)(a)

Number of
Registry
Filings(b)

Transfers as
Percentage
of Registry
Filings (%)

NSW

44

30.3

2555

1.7

Vic

33

22.8

1483

2.2

ACT

0

0.0

91

0.0

Qld

41

28.3

401

10.2

SA

13

9.0

230

5.7

Tas

1

0.7

53

1.9

NT

0

0.0

99

0.0

WA

13

9.0

483

2.7

REGISTRY

Sources and notes:
(a)

Due to rounding, the total does not add up to 100%.

(b)

Bill van Os, Statistics for Judges' Meeting (FCA, 29 August 2003) 2.

It is seen from the above table that the Queensland District Registry was most likely to
transfer proceedings, as a percentage of its filings during the first study period (10.2%
of its 400 or so filings). If one considers the findings provided under the discussion on
who was most likely to be transferred earlier in this chapter, a possible explanation for
Queensland having the greatest statistical representation in the findings on transfers
relates to the relatively high number of (represented) bankruptcy matters transferred by
it in 2000-01 and, to a slightly lesser extent, in 2002-03.
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5.5.2

Second Study Period

A slightly different story to that found above is revealed in respect of the second study
period. During this time, as evidenced by the table below, the registry with the most
number of transfers was clearly that of the Victoria District Registry (21 transfers, or
more than a third of the 59 matters transferred all year). As seen with the New South
Wales District Registry previously, the highest number of transfers did not translate
into the greatest proportion of transfers vis-à-vis total registry filings. The Victorian
transfers represent merely 1.6% of filings in that registry. Again, it was the Queensland
Registry that was statistically most likely to transfer a matter (5.7% of its overall
filings), although there was a reduction in the figures from the previous period studied.
This was the case even though it was only the fourth busiest registry in 2000-01 and
the fifth busiest in 2002-03 in terms of filings (in other words, it sat roughly in the
middle of all the registries in terms of workload).

For this period, the New South Wales District Registry transfers, as a percentage of its
filings for the period, actually decreased from the earlier study period to merely 0.5%
of its filings. The reason(s) for this decrease in transfers is not evident from the raw
data and it is not clear whether it was responsive to a decrease in the workload of the
Registry that year.
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Table 5.10: Second study period - transfers by registry.
Number of
Transfers

Transfers as
Percentage
of All
Transfers for
Period (%)

Number of
Registry
Filings*

Transfers as
Percentage
of Registry
Filings (%)

NSW

11

18.6

2075

0.5

Vic

21

35.6

1339

1.6

ACT

1

1.7

46

2.2

Qld

13

22.0

230

5.7

SA

2

3.4

735

0.3

Tas

1

1.7

24

4.2

NT

1

1.7

44

2.3

WA

9

15.3

352

2.6

REGISTRY

Source:
*

5.6

Bill van Os, Statistics for Judges' Meeting (FCA, 29 August 2003) 2.

Summary of Findings on Equality

The findings reached from the raw data collected from FEDCAMS (and other sources)
are mixed, and the following conclusions may be drawn tentatively from them.
(a)

If the only variable considered is that of the status of legal
representation of the applicant, then legally represented applicants in
the study group matters were statistically most likely to have their
matters transferred to the FMC than applicants who were selfrepresented. A proviso to this finding is that, if one takes into account
the additional variables of place and jurisdiction of the proceedings,
then a self-represented applicant litigating a human rights proceeding in
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the New South Wales District Registry during the period 2000-01
seems most likely to have been transferred.
(b)

Human rights proceedings were more often transferred than any other
area of concurrent jurisdiction, and the original assumption that this
would be the situation (for the reasons stated in Chapter 3) was found to
be essentially correct. This was clearly the case in relation to the first
period of study and statistically the case (as a percentage of national
filings in the area) in respect of the second period of study. Otherwise,
for the latter period, AAT appeals were (marginally) most often
transferred in numerical terms.

(c)

A somewhat surprising finding from the raw data gathered on the place
of transfer is that the New South Wales District Registry was not
unequivocally the registry most likely to order a transfer of a study
group matter to the FMC. Although the busiest registry, and having the
greatest number of transfers during the first year of the operation of the
FCJS, the Registry was statistically one of the least likely registries to
transfer a matter in both periods studied. The findings as to the registry
most likely to transfer matters varied as between the two periods:
Queensland cases were statistically most likely to be transferred in both
instances, although the Victoria District Registry had the highest
number of transfers in the second period. The smallest registries
(Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Tasmania)
unsurprisingly tended to hold on to their matters and had very few
transfers.

What these findings entail for the principle of equality in regards to accessing justice is
analysed in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 6: OPEN DECISION-MAKING
Transparency in the transfer of cases.

6.1

Looking at 'Open' Transfers

The making of a transfer order may be expected reasonably to occur in open court
during a directions hearing or the hearing of an interlocutory application for transfer.
In open court, there are the benefits of the affected parties appearing before a judge
and having the opportunity to make submissions on the question of transfer. As seen in
Chapters 2 and 3, however, the legislature has arguably conferred upon the FCA
judges the ability to make transfer decisions whilst sitting in chambers. The findings in
this chapter seek to clarify the incidence of open court, as distinct from chambers,
transfer decision-making as it occurred with the study group matters. The chapter also
examines the raw data collected from FEDCAMS as to the identity of the relevant
transfer decision-makers, in taking steps to understand their involvement in this
process.

6.2

Open Court - versus - Chambers

As in the preceding chapter, the findings are categorised under the two main study
periods. Any registries or areas of jurisdiction omitted from tables are done so due to
the absence of relevant transfers.

6.2.1

First Study Period

Table 6.1 shows that, in the first 12 months of the establishment of the FCJS, the FCA
transferred matters predominantly in open court. This was the case for some 55% of all
matters transferred that period. It is still somewhat disconcerting, however, that this
leaves almost 45% of study group matters being determined for transfer in chambers.
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The Queensland District Registry was by far most likely to decide a transfer in
chambers - 58.5% of all such transfer decisions (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.1: First study period - number and percentage of transfer orders by
venue.
Open Court

Chambers

80 (55.2%)

65 (44.8%)

Table 6.2: First study period - transfer orders by venue and registry.
Open Court

Chambers

NSW

39

5

Vic

19

14

Qld

3

38

WA

5

8

SA

13

0

Tas

1

0

REGISTRY

It was observed in Chapter 5 that during the first study period human rights
proceedings were most likely to be transferred and it has been borne out positively by
the data that this decision-making occurred mainly in open court. In terms of what type
of transfer decision-making was dealt with mostly in chambers, the next table shows
there was seemingly a strong predilection towards bankruptcy cases.
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Table 6.3: First study period - chambers transfer orders by area of jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION

Chambers Orders

Bankruptcy

TPA

37

3

Human

AAT

Rights

Appeals

13

12

Most of the 37 bankruptcy matters transferred in chambers occurred in Queensland (25
matters, or almost 68% of those proceedings). This is followed by the Western
Australia District Registry, which had all but one of its seven chambers transferred
matters in the bankruptcy jurisdiction.
The data is Table 6.4 reveals a positive finding that self-represented applicant matters
constitute a relatively low percentage (around 14% of chambers transfers). This means
self-represented litigants arguably had the best opportunity to present their views on
transfer to the judge in open court, rather than merely advised by the Court of the
transfer after the transfer order was made. The extent to which study group litigants
had the opportunity to be heard on the subject of whether their proceedings should be
transferred to the FMC is considered within the context of the fairness principle in the
next chapter.

Table 6.4: First study period - chambers transfer orders by representational
status of applicant.
Self-represented Represented Unknown
Applicants
Applicants
Representation
9 (13.8%)

48 (73.8%)

8 (12.3%)
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6.2.2

Second Study Period

The transfer decision-making is seen to have been even more open as the FCJS became
more settled in its third year of existence. This may be due to the overall decrease in
the number of general federal law (as distinct from migration law) transfers at the time.
As seen below, the percentage of transfers occurring in open court had increased since
the earlier study period, from about 55% to over 62% of relevant study group matters.

Table 6.5: Second study period - number and percentage of transfer orders by
venue.
Open Court

Chambers

37 (62.7%)

22 (37.3%)

Table 6.6 shows the Victoria District Registry had the highest number of transfer
orders made in chambers, but again the registry in Queensland statistically seemed
most likely to decide a transfer in chambers (eight, out of its 13, transfers or 61.5% of
its matters transferred during the second study period):
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Table 6.6: Second study period - transfer orders by venue and registry.
Open Court

Chambers

NSW

9

2

Vic

11

10

Qld

5

8

WA

8*

1

SA

2

0

Tas

1

0

ACT

0

1

NT

1

0

REGISTRY

Note:
*

Six of these matters were related trade practices proceedings and were casemanaged together. They are examined more closely in subsequent chapters.

The areas of jurisdiction involved in the chambers transfers are set out in Table 6.7.
Queensland District Registry matters most transferred in chambers were again in the
bankruptcy jurisdiction. All of the AAT appeal matters transferred in chambers
occurred in Victoria. It is not apparent from the data collected why this was the
situation.
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Table 6.7: Second study period - chambers transfer orders by area of
jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION

Bankruptcy

TPA

Human

AAT Appeals

AD(JR) Act

6

2

Rights
Chambers Orders

7

3

4

Most chambers transfers continued to involve legally represented applicant matters.
There is seen, however, a significant increase in the percentage of self-represented
applicant matters transferred in chambers than had been the case with their
counterparts in the first year of study (see next table). Such increase does not warrant
concern given the small number of such transfers involved, and particularly as
compared with legally represented transfers.

Table 6.8: Second study period - chambers transfer orders by representational
status of applicant.
Self-represented Represented
Applicants
Applicants
5 (22.7%)

6.3

17 (77.3%)

Judges - versus - Registrars

The identity of the transfer decision-maker and basis for their involvement are
important in evaluating whether the transfer decision-making processes occurred in a
fully open and transparent manner. In the course of gathering the raw data for this
research, it was noticed registrars were recorded on FEDCAMS as having made a
number of transfer orders. For the reasons canvassed in Chapter 2, it is assumed in this
thesis that the registrars who ordered transfers were authorised to do so pursuant to an
appropriate delegation of power by a judge. Nonetheless, the presence of transfer
orders made by registrars raise some questions as to how these transfer decisions had
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actually come to be made by a registrar, rather than by a judge as provided by the
transfer provisions.
The raw data for the study group matters, as summarised in the two tables immediately
below, demonstrates that judges made the clear majority of transfer orders. Such
judicial officers made at least 87% of all transfer decisions in 2000-01. The 'unknown'
column represents the six, or 4.1% of, matters that had no clear record on FEDCAMS
of who made the decision to transfer. There were a similar percentage of transfers
made by judges in the second study period. Not only did registrars also make transfer
decisions, the percentage of their decisions increased from the first study period to the
next. The latter may be due to the absence of matters in the 'unknown' column in the
second of the two tables.

Table 6.9: First study period - maker of transfer orders.
Judge
126
(86.9%)

Registrar

Unknown

12

7

(8.3%)

(4.8%)

Table 6.10: Second study period - maker of transfer orders.
Judge
52
(88.1%)

Registrar
7
(11.9%)

The above findings show registrars ordered a number of transfers - around 8% of the
transfer orders in 2000-01 and almost 12% of such orders in 2002-03. Some questions
remain in relation to how the exercise of transfer power by registrars occurred in
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practice. In looking at the findings more closely, it is observed registrars transferred a
range of matters in the following areas of jurisdiction, numbers and registries.

Figure 6.1: First study period - registrar transfer orders by registry and area of
jurisdiction.

AAT
Appeals

•Queensland (3)

Bankruptcy

•Victoria (1)
•Western Australia (4)
•New South Wales (1)

TPA

•Western Australia (1)

Human
Rights

•Queensland (1)
•Victoria (1)

Figure 6.2: Second study period - registrar transfers by registry and area of
jurisdiction.

Bankruptcy

TPA

AD(JR) Act

•Queensland (1)
•Victoria (4)

•Northern Territory (1)

•Queensland (1)
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The above suggests Queensland and Victorian registrars (followed closely by those
from the Western Australia District Registry) were most likely to transfer a matter. The
bulk of these transfers were in the area of bankruptcy, which is understandable given
such matters are often listed in registrar dockets and handled solely by them. It is not
obvious how the other matters above ended up before a registrar, as such matters
would ordinarily go into the docket of a judge at the time of commencement.
The researcher postulated whether registrars made the AAT appeal transfer orders
during the first study period for the pragmatic reason that the parties consented to
transfer whilst appearing before them at application papers index settlement
appointments (a function performed by registrars under the rules of court). This is not
supported, however, by FEDCAMS, which records no index settlement appointments
for the relevant matters occurred on the same date as registrars made the transfer
orders.
The data reveals also that in half of the registrar transfers in 2000-01, the relevant
registrar made the transfer order in a particular matter even though it is recorded in
FEDCAMS as being in the docket of a specific judge. This number decreased to a little
over a quarter of such transfers in 2002-03. It is customary for a matter listed in the
docket of a judge to remain in the hands of the judge and not for a registrar to make
significant orders concerning the matter. It may be assumed that in such cases the
relevant registrar had acted with the prior knowledge and approval of the relevant
docket judge, but there is no direct evidence within FEDCAMS to either support or
refute this assumption. In addition to the above anomalies, judges also seemed to have
at times transferred matters otherwise recorded as being in registrar dockets. This is
not out of the ordinary if indeed the exercise of statutory transfer powers is required to
be performed by a judge.

6.4

Summary of Findings on Openness

During the study periods, the FCA mostly transferred matters in open court, but there
were still a significant number of transfer orders made in chambers. The Queensland
District Registry was seemingly the most 'secretive' compared with other registries in
terms of the volume of cases transferred in chambers, particularly within the
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bankruptcy jurisdiction. Transfers concerning self-represented applicant matters were
addressed mostly in open court. The circumstances surrounding registrars making a
number of transfer orders leave still unanswered questions.
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CHAPTER 7: FAIR CASE TRANSFERS
Getting the choice of forum right and hearing the parties.

7.1

Evaluating Fairness in Practice

In the previous chapter, it was explored to what extent the study group were able to
participate in a transparent transfer process by observing and understanding the
process as it was actually occurring, rather than solely after the fact. In being
transferred justly to another forum, it is also essential the parties were able to have a
voice during the initial decision-making process. The findings on the extent to which
the study group parties had a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the FCA prior
to the making of the transfer decisions is addressed in this chapter under four main
indicia:
(a)

Study group matters that had been transferred to the FMC prior
to any FCA court return date (that is, an open court listing such
as a directions hearing or the hearing of an application for
transfer or other interlocutory issue);

(b)

The number of matters transferred at the first return date (or
shortly thereafter) and the median time spent at that return date
when the question of transfer may have been addressed;

(c)

Evidence on the New South Wales and Australian Capital
Territory District Registry files pointing to an exchange of
correspondence between the parties and FCA on the topic of
transfer; and

(d)

The extent to which the Court, as evidenced by such
correspondence, seemingly took into account the wishes of the
parties regarding the transfer of the above registry matters.
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Regardless of whether the parties to a matter are heard on the question of transfer, it is
reasonable to expect the transfers do not affect adversely the interests of the parties.
Consequently, data and other information was also collected addressing the issue of
whether the FMC was a 'more appropriate' forum for the study group matters, by
serving to avoid or reduce cost and delay for the parties. This is considered within the
context of the extent to which the FMC was, as envisaged by the legislature when
creating the FCJS:
(a)

Equipped to hear and determine the study group matters by
reference to its jurisdictional limits and available resources;

(b)

A cheaper court for the matters than had they remained in the
FCA;

(c)

A court with a simpler approach to the resolution of the disputes
than the FCA; and

(d)

A quicker forum than the FCA would have been for the
determination of the matters.

7.2

Was the Study Group Heard Prior to Transfer?

Similar to previous chapters, the findings on the first question addressed are set out in
a number of tables. The registries and areas of jurisdiction excluded from any table
below are done so as to reflect their absence from the available raw data.

7.2.1

Matters Transferred Prior to a Listing

During the first study period, the FCA seems to have transferred most of the study
group matters with the parties having the benefit of at least one appearance, or return
date, before a judicial officer in open court and during which time they could
conceivably have presented their position on the subject of transfer (if it arose). This
finding serves to bolster positive findings made in Chapter 6 about the openness of the
transfer decision-making process during this period of the operation of the FCJS.
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There are, however, 14 matters (or almost 10% of all first year transferred matters) that
appear from the computer records not to have progressed to a return date before it was
decided the matters should be sent to the FMC. This phenomenon occurred in only a
handful of registries of the FCA, but involved all areas of concurrent jurisdiction
except AD(JR) Act proceedings, as shown in the following table.

Table 7.1: First study period - pre-directions hearing transfers by registry and
jurisdiction.
JURISDICTON Bankruptcy

Human

AAT

Rights

Appeals

TPA

TOTAL

REGISTRY
Qld

1

3

4

1

9

Vic

0

1

1

0

2

WA

2

1

0

0

3

TOTAL

3

5

5

1

14

The above table indicates the Queensland District Registry had the majority of matters
transferred prior to any first directions hearing or other listing in open court. This
finding is consistent with previous findings that this registry was seemingly the most
likely to transfer matters in chambers (see Chapter 6), although it had been seen the
majority of such transfers occurred in the area of bankruptcy. As regards pre-directions
hearing transfers, it seems human rights and AAT appeal matters are represented most
in these findings (about 36% each of the relevant matters). In the case of the Western
Australia District Registry, the matters in question did not have a pending listing on
FEDCAMS; that is, the matters may have been transferred before a first directions
hearing was even allocated administratively by the Registry. This finding is somewhat
odd, given a first directions hearing date is allocated ordinarily at the registry counter
at the time the applicant files the originating process. It is possible this particular
registry had a different practice regarding the listing of matters for first directions.
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Similar findings are seen in respect of the second period studied insofar as most of the
59 transfers occurred post-first directions hearing. What is observed, however, is an
increase in the proportion of the matters that were transferred pre-directions hearing. In
this category, nine matters did not receive any time in open court, which translates to
an increase of in excess of 5% for such transfers from the earlier period of study. The
specific registry and jurisdictional findings are outlined in the next table. The
Queensland District Registry no longer had the most number of matters transferred
prior to any return date; that distinction went to the Victoria District Registry.

Table 7.2: Second study period – pre-directions hearing transfers by registry and
jurisdiction.
Human

AAT

AD(JR)

Rights

Appeals

Act

Qld

0

0

Vic

1

ACT
TOTAL

JURISDICTON

TPA

TOTAL

1

0

1

4

1

1

7

0

0

0

1

1

1

4

2

2

9

REGISTRY

There is nothing indicated in the FEDCAMS searches that might explain the reason(s)
for the 23 study group matters, across both periods of study, being the subject of such
expeditiously made transfer orders. Whether the New South Wales and Australian
Capital Territory District Registries files shed any light on this question is addressed
later in this chapter.
In respect of both study periods, it is seen represented applicant matters were most
likely to be involved in a swiftly made transfer decision: 15 matters in total, compared
with only six self-represented matters (with two matters having 'uncertain'
representational status in FEDCAMS). This finding accords with similar earlier
findings to the effect the FCA did not appear to single out self-represented study group
applicants when ordering transfers to the FMC.
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7.2.2

Matters Transferred with a Single Return Date

The next indicator considered for whether the study group received an opportunity to
be heard prior to transfer is that of the number of matters that were transferred at, or
shortly after, a single return date in open court (most notably, the first directions
hearing). On its own, the existence of a return date does not provide strong indication
the parties addressed the subject of transfer before that decision was made by the FCA,
and so the collective median time spent in open court during all of the return dates is
examined also so as to achieve a fuller picture.
During the first study period, the Court transferred the majority of study group matters
following numerous return dates, at which time the parties could potentially state their
position in respect of any prospective transfer, either sought by them or instigated by a
judge. It should be noted there were 58 matters (constituting 40% of transfers in 200001) that were commenced prior to the establishment of the FCSJ, and so had a number
of court return dates before the question of transfer to the FMC was even an option.
One third of the study group matters falling within this period, however, were
transferred either at the first directions hearing, or after one but before a second return
date. By the time of the second study period, this percentage had increased to 45.8%
(27 matters in total). Perhaps the Court was by then more readily able to spot ‘less
complex’ matters, and was thereby even more prepared to order a transfer after a single
return date than it had been during the initial stage of the operation of the FCJS?
Human rights matters clearly tended to be most likely transferred to the FMC with the
benefit of only one return date, and this most commonly occurred in the New South
Wales District Registry, which is not surprising given the earlier findings about the
volume of human rights matters transferred by that registry. In the second study
period, human rights matters still received a significant representation in the results. A
breakdown of the findings for each period is set out in the next two tables.
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Table 7.3: First study period – single return date transfers by registry and
jurisdiction.
JURISDICTON Bankruptcy

Human

AAT

AD(JR)

Rights

Appeals

Act

TPA

TOTAL

REGISTRY
NSW

1

16

1

0

2

20

Qld

3

3

3

0

0

9

Vic

2

7

5

1

1

16

WA

1

1

0

0

0

2

SA

0

1

0

0

0

1

TOTAL

7

28

9

1

3

48

Table 7.4: Second study period – single return date transfers by registry and
jurisdiction.
JURISDICTON Bankruptcy

Human

AAT

AD(JR)

Rights

Appeals

Act

TPA

TOTAL

REGISTRY
NSW

0

7

0

0

1

8

Qld

3

2

0

1

0

6

Vic

3

1

6

0

0

10

SA

0

0

1

0

1

2

Tas

0

0

0

0

1

1

TOTAL

6

10

7

1

3

27

Whilst the parties in the above 75 matters across both study periods were potentially in
a position to present their views on transfer because they were in open court when the
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transfer order was pronounced, it still needs to be evaluated how meaningful an
opportunity to be heard was granted actually. To do this, the median time of the
matters spent at the first directions hearing (or other return date) is assessed.
Surprisingly, the median time spent in an initial return date in open court for both
study periods was the same; namely, seven minutes. Twenty-two matters in the first
study period (15.2%) and 11 matters (18.6%) in the second study period had a
recorded time below the median time. The briefest time spent at any one such event in
either period was a mere minute, and one may query the ability of a party to articulate
sufficiently their position on the subject, and for a judge to make the transfer decision
and provide reasons for same within this period. The longest periods were 56 minutes
in the first study period, and 37 minutes in the later period studied. These are arguably
more appropriate timeframes in which the Court and parties could address and explore
the pros and cons of a matter being transferred to another forum. These are issues for
broader consideration in Chapter 9.
An interesting point arises from a comparison between human rights and trade
practices matters during the first study period. The former category of transferred
matters, argued previously in this thesis to be the least complex of the areas of
concurrent jurisdiction, were seen during 2000-01 to be transferred below the median
time of seven minutes (namely, five-and-a-half minutes). This is not remarkable in
itself if, indeed, that type of matter is the least complex of matters studied. What is
more difficult to explain, however, is the reason for trade practices matters – the most
potentially legally complex of the cases – having a median time in court of only two
minutes. There is no indication these matters were transferred by consent.
The findings do not seem to suggest that anything of significance turns on whether the
transfer decision-maker was a judge or registrar. Both decision-makers were involved
in the making of transfer orders at, or shortly following, a preliminary directions
hearing, with the median time spent in court being slightly less in the case of judges.

7.2.3

Correspondence

It may be queried whether the study group had been given sufficient opportunity to
present their views on transfer despite the apparent absence of any, or any sufficient,
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time spent in open court. To this end, it was considered whether correspondence or
evidence of other communication between the parties and the FCA prior to transfer
existed. The FCA and FMC files of the New South Wales and Australian Capital
Territory transferred matters were inspected. The findings are limited.
No relevant correspondence was located on the single Australian Capital Territory file
inspected. If correspondence did exist in respect of the transfer of the New South
Wales matters, it may be that it was retained by chambers, although it might be
expected to be kept on the court file in the correspondence section. Only two instances
of correspondence between a party and chambers were discovered on the files
inspected. The first of those instances concerned a human rights matter commenced
approximately a fortnight before the commencement of the FCJS. It had spent a total
of 27 minutes in open court: twice before a registrar and once before the transfer judge.
The associate of the relevant judge wrote to the parties in August 2000:
His Honour is considering the possibility of transferring your
matter to the [FMC]... This would, among other things, have the
advantage of probably enabling an earlier hearing of the case. If
you have objection to this decision, please [make] ...
submissions ...244
The self-represented applicant wrote to the associate indicating her objection, but she
provided no grounds in support. The following day, the other side forwarded to
chambers short minutes of orders regarding a transfer and the judge made the orders
‘by consent’.
In the second instance, another self-represented applicant in a human rights proceeding
wrote to the relevant judge not consenting to a transfer of the matter because she felt
the matter was too ‘serious and complex’ to be heard and determined by the FMC and
so should remain in the FCA. When the judge continued to transfer the matter to the
FMC, the applicant sought to appeal the decision but, as seen in Chapter 2, this
statutory right is not available.

244

The specific details of the relevant chambers and parties in this, and other study group matter files
inspected, are omitted so as to protect privacy.
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There exists correspondence on most files inspected, from either the FCA or the FMC
to the parties, indicating the transfer of proceedings after the event. Does the limited
correspondence opposing a prospective transfer support a finding the vast majority of
study group litigants consented to the transfers? This is considered next when
addressing the findings on whether the wishes of the parties on transfer were
considered by the FCA prior to the making of the transfer orders.

7.2.4

The Wishes of the Parties

When exercising the discretion to transfer a study group matter to the FMC, the FCA
may take into account the 'wishes of the parties' pursuant to O 82 r 7(d) of the FCA
Rules (discussed in Chapter 2). It is considered, therefore, whether the study group
parties were not merely provided an opportunity to be heard, but the extent to which
their wishes regarding transfer were seemingly taken into account during transfer
decision-making. In other words, did the Court hear their voice?
This is a difficult exercise, as FEDCAMS did not record ordinarily all the details
surrounding a transfer. The result recorded most appropriately within the FEDCAMS
records for a study group matter was that of 'TRANSFER', indicating the primary
outcome of a judicial decision on a given date, but not whether the result was with the
consent of the parties. Recourse was had, therefore, to the New South Wales and
Australian Capital Territory District Registry files to delve more deeply into the
circumstances surrounding the transfers. The single file of the latter registry revealed
only that the matter was transferred at the motion of the judge sitting in chambers
without hearing from any of the parties. The following general observations are made
from the former registry file inspections.


There were no written submissions filed on the question of transfer to
the FMC on behalf of any of the parties.



Around a dozen New South Wales matters bear an indication on the
FCA file of having been transferred with the consent of the parties.
Most of the transfer orders on the files do not indicate the consent of the
parties. The words 'by consent' are absent from such document, which
otherwise would be expected if orders were made with the consent of
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all the parties to the matter. The absence of this specific wording does
not conclusively indicate the parties opposed the transfer, but it does
lean towards a finding that the parties did not instigate the transfer by
way of short minutes of consent orders. Only occasionally does a
transfer order on the New South Wales files state the transfer is made
'on the Court’s own motion'.


One matter stands out due to the judge having provided clear advance
notice to the parties of a proposal to transfer proceedings during the
course of a number of court return dates. There were also a few cases of
judges seeking the views of the parties about a proposed transfer or
providing them with an opportunity to file submissions on the subject.
The problem, however, is that the seeking of the wishes of the parties
was couched at times in terms of the parties making submissions on, or
even filing a notice of motion in relation to, an opposition (rather than
consent) to a proposed transfer. It is reasonable to assume a party is
prepared to incur the expenditure of resources in making an application
seeking a positive order or relief, rather than to apply for the Court to
refrain from doing something it has intimated it is keen to do. This
effectively makes the Court the contradictor to the application and it is
not surprising if the parties in the relevant proceedings did not take the
Court up on its offer to oppose the proposed transfer.



A couple of matters were transferred after the hearing of formal
applications made by parties. There are also a couple of examples of
matters transferred following the hearing of a notice of motion on issues
unrelated to transfer. The judicial officer concerned in each such matter
seemingly unilaterally included a transfer order in the orders made
regarding the outcome of the particular interlocutory application.



Where the consent of all parties was not obtained prior to transfer, there
were implications before the FMC. In one case, an unconscionable
conduct proceeding under the TPA, the judge instigated the transfer of
the matter to the FMC without the express consent of the parties. Once
in the FMC, the respondent filed submissions challenging the
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jurisdiction of that court to hear and determine the matter and noting the
matter was transferred on the motion of the judge. The federal
magistrate agreed with the submissions on jurisdiction and the matter
was re-transferred to the FCA after spending almost a week in the
FMC.


In several matters, at least one of the parties was not present in open
court during the making of the specific transfer order. The wishes of the
absent party about transfer were seemingly unknown by the Court.
These parties may have first learned of the transfer upon receipt of a
letter from the FCA advising of the transfer, or from the FMC
essentially confirming the transfer and advising the directions hearing
listing details before a federal magistrate.



It would appear self-represented litigants were prepared at times to
voice strongly objection to a transfer and to be concerned overtly about
the ability of the FMC to determine their dispute. Such litigants are
observed in at least three New South Wales study group matters, where
there is evidence on the files of correspondence by aggrieved selfrepresented litigants to the FCA to this effect. They generally expressed
a wish to appeal the transfer decision and, in one instance, the litigant
sought to bring their objection to transfer to the notice of the federal
Parliament and Governor-General of Australia.



Finally, the Court was seemingly at times prepared to transfer matters to
the FMC even though the matters had hearing dates allocated in the
FCA, suggesting the matters were almost ready for hearing. The FCA
does not ordinarily set hearing dates until proceedings are sufficiently
advanced and either ready (or nearing readiness) for hearing and
determination.

The impression obtained from inspecting the relevant files is that the New South
Wales study group transfers were often occurring at the instigation of the FCA, with
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the parties essentially ‘going along with it’ or, in a handful of cases, opposing the
transfer before both the FCA and FMC.

7.3

Was the FMC the More Appropriate Forum?

As indicated previously, the question of whether the study group matters were afforded
fairness is also approached from the perspective of whether they were transferred to a
court that was a more appropriate forum for the resolution of their legal disputes. This
would be in keeping with the objective of the FMC being a cheaper, simpler and
quicker federal court and the principle of fairness that the transfer of the proceedings
should not result in increased delays and costs for the parties. That alternative forum
would also need to be equipped sufficiently to deal with the transferred matters, both
as to its jurisdiction and resources.

7.3.1

Could the FMC Determine the Matters?

Most, around 95%, of the study group matters remained in the FMC for determination
post-transfer. A small, yet notable, number of matters were re-transferred to the FCA
by the FMC. The details of these 10 re-transfers are outlined in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5:

First and second study periods - matters re-transferred to the FCA
by the FMC.

FMC

REGISTRY

JURISDICTION

Vic

TPA

ORDER
Matter 1

DURATION
IN FMC
(days)
53

REASON FOR RETRANSFER
Reason not revealed in
FEDCAMS or MAGCAMS.

22/9/00

No judgment published
by FMC.

Matter 2

Vic

Copyright

22

No judgment published or
indication in computer

25/9/00

records. Reason most
likely due to lack of
jurisdiction.

Matter 3

NSW

TPA

162

File inspection indicates
parties approached FMC

11/10/00

about lack of jurisdiction.
Even though matter had
settled, it apparently had
to be re-transferred for
proper finalisation.

Matter 4

NSW

TPA

7

File inspection indicates
FMC lacked jurisdiction to

24/10/00

grant relief sought for
unconscionable conduct
claim.

Matters

WA

5 – 10

TPA

513

Reasons provided in
Kurniadi v Loh

245

(discussed below).

14/8/02

245

[2004] FMCA 5 (8 January 2004).
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The number of matters in the above table does not accord with the statistics provided
in the FCA annual reports for both relevant periods. A possible explanation for this
discrepancy is that, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the FCA does not seem to include in its
transfer statistics any matters subsequently re-transferred to it by the FMC. The retransferred matters are returned invariably to the original docket judge and FCA file.
The matters that returned to the FCA were almost exclusively in the trade practices
area. Apart from the Western Australia District Registry group of six-related TPA
proceedings, the FMC may have felt compelled to return the other matters to the FCA
because its own jurisdiction was not invoked properly by the subject matter of the legal
claims. The TPA matters in Victoria and New South Wales were transferred
expeditiously at the first directions date in the FCA, with the median time spent in
court being only two minutes. The copyright matter clearly should not have been
transferred to a court lacking any copyright jurisdiction during the relevant period.
Some matters remained in the FMC for what may be regarded as significant periods prior to
re-transfer. In the instance of the Western Australia TPA matters, re-transfer did not occur for
one-and-a-half years. The reasons for re-transfer may be gleaned from the only judgment
published during the relevant periods.246 The basis for the matters being in the FMC is
explored fully in the next chapter, but essentially the transfer was done at the instigation of
the judge and without the express approval of the parties. His Honour held the interests of the
administration of justice were served best by transferring the matters to the FMC and that it
had the resources to hear and determine the matters. This was ordered notwithstanding
submissions of the parties to the effect there would be additional applications filed and the
combined quantum of the claims could reach the vicinity of $900 000 - an amount exceeding
the monetary jurisdiction of the FMC.
Before the FMC, respondents sought the re-transfer of the proceedings. The six matters
had been consolidated into one large proceeding along with another seven new matters
that had been foreshadowed before the judge in submissions opposing transfer to the
FMC. The parties in favour of re-transfer noted the objective of the FMC is to deal
with less complex matters and that the complexity of the proceedings precluded the
speedy resolution of the litigation in that forum.247 Over the 513 days spent in the
246
247

Ibid.
Ibid [12].
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FMC, the proceedings had undergone a number of developments including: the
addition of 13 new applications, lengthy discovery and numerous other interlocutory
processes, and the ambit of the claims expanded substantially. Although these
developments occurred after the making of the transfer order, the parties had
foreshadowed them to the FCA. The consolidated action, in its current form, now
exceeded $1 million and the estimated duration of the hearing was 10 days.
Noting the complexity of the matter and the impact this would have on both the
resources of the FMC and the administration of justice, the federal magistrate held the
matters, old and new, should be transferred to the FCA pursuant to s 39 of the FM Act:
[I]t is relevant to take into account the undesirability of a transfer back
into the [FCA] of a matter originally filed in that court and transferred
to the [FMC]. However, for the reasons stated, it is my view that the
[FMC] does not have the resources to adequately deal with the
applications now pleaded and it would not be in the interests of justice
to simply retain the matter before the [FMC] when the applications can
be heard and determined in the [FCA]. Whether there is a delay in the
final determination in the [FCA] will depend on the management of the
applications in that court. As indicated earlier, an assessment of the
time frame in matters of this kind must include adequate time to reflect
upon and deliver a judgment in a timely manner. Given the current
workload in this court including a high volume of migration matters, I
am satisfied that there is a greater likelihood that the application will be
finally determined in the [FCA] earlier than may be the case if the
matter remained in the [FMC].248

What is observed in these matters is the transfer of proceedings by the FCA in the
'interests of the administration of justice' because a judge had regarded the most
efficient allocation of judicial resources would be achieved if the matters were to be
litigated elsewhere. The matters were returned to the FCA a lengthy time later also
because of the most efficient allocation of resources. Whether the criterion of 'the
248

Ibid [21].
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interests of the administration of justice' is being judicially interpreted and applied to
equate to ‘the most efficient allocation of resources for the court concerned’ is an issue
warranting closer scrutiny in later chapters.
There is further remarkable evidence of study group matters being transferred from
court-to-court. In one example, the FCA transferred to the FMC a Queensland
bankruptcy matter during the first study period. The matter was transferred next by the
FMC to the Family Court. The latter court rejected the transfer and re-transferred the
matter back to the FMC. The potential ‘boomerang’ effect of transfers between the
FCA and FMC operates in both directions. A further bankruptcy matter, this time in
South Australia, was transferred by the FMC to the FCA in late 2000. Some three
months and a number of return dates later, it was transferred back to the FMC by order
of the FCA. In another two cases, the proceedings had been transferred across the
country, from one registry to another, before being transferred to another court
altogether. The records inspected do not indicate the underlying reasons for all these
transfers.
Finally, there are a number of instances noted from the inspection of MAGCAMS
records where one might expect those matters to have been re-transferred to the FCA
by virtue of the duration of the hearings before the FMC. It may be recalled from
Chapter 2 that the FMC has an informal guideline of transferring family law matters
with an expected hearing duration exceeding two days (on the basis these matters
would be complex and that FMC resources would be stretched). No such guideline has
been expressed publicly in respect of general federal law proceedings, however, one
might suppose reasonably that similar considerations apply for all FMC proceedings.
The computer records indicate at least 10 study group matters had hearings before the
FMC exceeding two days. Nine human rights matters (in New South Wales, Victoria
and Queensland) and one bankruptcy matter (in Victoria) fell within this category. The
hearing in one of the Victorian human rights matters was listed for 15 days, a time
exceeding most FCA hearings of any type.
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7.3.2

Was the FMC Cheaper?

Whether the FMC was a cheaper court than the FCA for the resolution of the study
group matters is evaluated from two main perspectives. First, whether at the relevant
time the filing and hearing fees of the FMC were less than the corresponding fees in
the FCA. Secondly, the extent to which the legal costs of a successful study group
litigant before the FMC were (on a party-party basis) less in quantum compared with
similar costs should the matters have proceeded to resolution in the FCA and been
assessed pursuant to the FCA Rules.

(a)

Court Fees

As remains the case today, the document filing and hearing fees of the FMC during the
study periods were, for the main part, theoretically cheaper than those of the FCA. In a
number of instances, however, the FMC was not necessarily a cheaper forum for the
resolution of all the study group matters.

The fees of the FCA and FMC are set out in the respective regulations of the two
courts.249 In some regards, the two courts had during the study periods (and continue to
have) identical fees, but in most instances the document filing and hearing fees of the
FMC are at least 50% less than those of the FCA. In a number of respects, the FMC,
unlike the FCA, does not charge a fee. Such examples include the searching of a file
by a non-party, photocopying of file documents, filing of an application for
interlocutory orders in human rights proceedings, daily hearing fees and the issue of a
subpoena. On the surface, the FMC was a cheaper court than the FCA for the study
group matters based purely on a comparison of the fee structures of the respective
courts.

Under both of the court regulations, a study group litigant could be eligible for a fee
waiver or exemption.250 Such waivers and exemptions extend to the holders of
concession and health cards or such situations in which the payment of court fees
249

The comparative fees of the two courts during the first study period are set out in this thesis as
Appendix B. The fees increased during the second study period, but the FMC continued to have lower
fees than the FCA. A similar situation still applies today.
250
FCA Regulations regs 2(2), 2(2A), 2(4), 2AA, 2A; FMC Regulations regs 8(1), 8A, 8B, 9.
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would be onerous on financial hardship grounds. It is seen that in the order of 40% of
matters in each of the study periods (55 matters in the first period and 25 matters in the
second period) had recorded on FEDCAMS a FCA fee waiver or exemption. Given the
regulations for the FCA and FMC are virtually identical on this subject, many of the
study group litigants who received a fee waiver or exemption in the FCA ultimately
received, or were entitled to receive, a similar waiver or exemption in the FMC after
the proceedings were transferred. This is supported by the MAGCAMS raw data on
fees collected (or waived and exempted) by the FMC in respect of the transferred
matters examined. It follows, therefore, that in respect of over a third of the study
group (80 matters), the FMC was not in practice a cheaper forum for the resolution of
the proceedings than the FCA. In short, if a party were legally entitled to a fee waiver
or exemption in the FCA, then they did not incur court-related fees in the FMC. The
forum of the determination of the proceedings was in that regard immaterial and the
transfer of the matter to the FMC did nothing to save such expenses.

For the study group parties not entitled to a fee waiver or exemption, representing the
majority of litigants, these litigants incurred the higher fees of the FCA whilst their
matters were conducted in that court, particularly the payment by the applicants of the
hefty filing fee to commence proceedings. The extent to which these expenses are
recoverable is examined later in this thesis.

(b)

Legal Costs

The researcher examined the applicable legal context in which the study group matters
may have had a costs order made by the FMC. A successful party is, as a general
proposition but not automatically, entitled to the payment of its party-party legal costs
by the unsuccessful opponent.251

The FMC Rules provide in pt 21 and sch 1 the appropriate scale for a party-party costs
order (other than in bankruptcy proceedings, which are to be determined pursuant to
the FCA scale).252 The FMC scale approaches costs on a fixed lump sum award basis

251

See, eg, Stack v Brisbane City Council [2004] FCA 354 (30 March 2004).
Regarding bankruptcy proceedings after 2005, refer to Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy)
Rules 2006 (Cth) rr 13.01, 13.03.
252

170

for various stages reached or performed by the successful party and the disbursements
'properly incurred'.253 The FCA scale, under FCA Rules sch 2 (nowadays under pt 40
and sch 3 of the new Rules), provides a detailed breakdown of the type of legal work,
and corresponding amounts, in respect of which a successful study group party can
claim costs.254 Such breakdown of work claimed provides potentially for a higher
quantification of costs than does the event-based FMC costs scale and requires the
assessment of costs to be performed by a taxing officer of the FCA (registrars of the
FCA are also taxing officers) if the parties are unable to agree on costs.

The absence of well-defined or predictable procedures on the taxation of costs may
have led to uncertainty in the case of the study group matters as to how a federal
magistrate will deal with such disputes and what costs are awardable (see further
discussion in Chapter 9). The study findings reveal that a federal magistrate may
exercise discretion to order costs be assessed in accordance with pt 21 and sch 1 of the
FMC Rules, but he or she can alternatively order the costs of the proceedings be
assessed by reference to the FCA Rules (or using any other method deemed
appropriate by the federal magistrate). File inspections of the New South Wales study
group matters reveal several matters with costs orders made by the FMC to the effect
of 'the costs to be taxed in accordance with the FCA scale in the event they are not
agreed between the parties'.

The above result may not be as undesirable for the parties as first may be assumed if
one takes into consideration examples of matters where the FMC did proceed to assess
or otherwise determine the costs. Several matters from the New South Wales District
Registry raise a reservation concerning the economic viability of the parties having
proceeded to hearing and determination by the FMC. In one of those matters, a sexual
discrimination case, the published reasons for decision of the FMC on the substantive
issues ran for almost 80 pages (a lengthy judgment) and the written reasons on the
costs issue ran for a further eight pages. Notwithstanding the length of the hearing of
some four days and detailed reasoning of the federal magistrate, plus the voluminous
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material filed on the court file, the applicant was awarded a mere $1000 in damages
(inclusive of interest) at the end of the day. The applicant had succeeded on only two
minor aspects of the claim and was ordered to pay the costs of the hearing of the
respondent fixed in the sum of $4707.50. The respondent was ordered to pay 50% of
the costs of the applicant (except for the costs of the hearing) in accordance with the
FMC costs scale. Such party-party costs are unlikely to have gone far in covering any
solicitor-client costs payable by the parties to legal representatives.

In a further matter, another unlawful discrimination proceeding, the applicant failed to
appear at the hearing and the FMC consequently dismissed the application and ordered
the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent fixed in the sum of $3500. It is
probable the solicitor-client costs far exceeded this amount, as the court file itself was
so voluminous that it occupied three volumes and was stored in a box. Such a
respondent arguably would be positioned better seeking the enforcement of a costs
order under the FCA costs scale.

Self-represented litigants in the study group who were successful in their proceedings
before the FMC potentially encountered the same problems as their counterparts in the
FCA in seeking to recover legal costs against an opponent. The general position is that
such a litigant is not entitled to the recovery of legal costs pursuant to court costs
scales given that, logically-speaking, they have not incurred the expense of legal
representation in the conduct of their proceedings.255 At best, they may seek the
recovery of disbursements reasonably or properly incurred.

A further issue concerns the legal costs associated with the conduct of the proceedings
whilst in the FCA, pre-transfer to the FMC. Unless provided by statute, the costs of a
party incurred whilst conducting proceedings in another (transferring) court do not
automatically form part of the costs of the proceedings in the new court. Rule 21.05 of
the FMC Rules enables the FMC to make an order for costs incurred prior to the
transfer by the FCA in circumstances where the FCA has not done so already. Any
such costs are to be in accordance with pt 21 of the FMC Rules and thereby assessed
pursuant to the fixed costs set out in sch 1 (unless ordered otherwise by the FMC). It
255

See Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403.

172

was observed transfer orders in the study group matters inspected on the New South
Wales files seldom referred to the issue of costs. Consequently, the FMC was
responsible for determining the costs of the FCA-related part of the proceedings and
those costs may not have reflected fully the actual costs incurred by the parties whilst
litigating in the FCA.

A related concern arises in relation to the disbursements incurred by a party for the
payment of FCA filing fees. For example, the filing fee, seen above to be double that
of the corresponding fee in the FMC in most instances, would not have been
refundable to the applicant (in full or in part) upon transfer to the FMC. This was
confirmed by the inspection of FCA and FMC files in respect of the New South Wales
matters. This means that an unsuccessful party, who had incurred the higher court fees
in the FCA, would not be entitled to recover those disbursements in the FMC.

In summary, the party-party costs potentially recoverable against a study group litigant
are seen to be less in the FMC than in the FCA and, to that extent, the FMC was a
'cheaper' court from the perspective of the losing party. It was, conversely, a
potentially less positive experience for successful parties who found themselves unable
to recover from their opponent more costs than those modest amounts allowable
pursuant to the FMC Rules or potentially fixed by the relevant federal magistrates (at
least as far as some of the New South Wales files suggest). For those study group
matters that had costs orders made in accordance with the FCA Rules costs scale, the
costs recovered would be essentially the same as though the matters had remained in
the FCA.

7.3.3

Was the FMC Simpler?

The next issue addressed is the extent to which the FMC fulfilled its objective of being
a simpler court than the FCA for the resolution of the general federal law disputes of
the study group matters. For the FMC to have determined the study group matters in
accordance with its own statutory requirements, it must be seen to have proceeded
'without undue formality'.256 The issue of procedural simplicity is considered in respect
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of the comparative practices and procedures of the two courts in relation to courtroom
etiquette and the conduct of proceedings, and the rules of court. The findings point to a
conclusion the FMC facilitated the conduct of the study group matters in essentially
the same manner as would have been the case had the matters remained in the FCA.
The rules of court of the FMC departed from those of the FCA in minor ways that are
of no, or little, consequence for the purposes of the transferred matters studied.

(a)

Etiquette and the Conduct of Proceedings

A review of the respective practices of the FCA and FMC during the study periods
reveals few, if any, real differences between the two courts in relation to the conduct of
general federal law matters, including the study group matters. The same degree of
courtroom formality appears to have applied to the study group litigants in both the
FCA and FMC (with the exception of the New South Wales matter discussed below).
In either court, the studied parties could appear with legal representation or be selfrepresented. Both courts are able to provide a certain degree of procedural advice and
assistance to practitioners and litigants at the registry counter level, but cannot provide
legal advice. Inside the courtroom, the judge or federal magistrate is to be addressed as
‘Your Honour’ and such judicial officers and counsel are robed during final
hearings.257

The study group matters proceeded to hearing in the FMC and FCA based on evidence
adduced by the parties in the form of affidavits, oral testimony of witnesses and
tendered exhibits. The rules of evidence under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) apply
equally to matters in the FMC and FCA.258 Like a judge, a federal magistrate presiding
over the study group matters could make directions and orders dealing with the filing
of affidavits, witness statements, written submissions and lists of authorities. Both
types of judicial officer can make orders or directions limiting the number of pages of
written submissions filed by parties and the duration of oral evidence. In either court,
the parties could seek the leave of the court for discovery of documents and
257
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interrogatories.259 The same applies in respect of the issue of subpoenas, although the
FMC allows a party to issue their first five subpoenas without leave.260 Similar to the
situation in the FCA, court-assisted mediation was potentially available to the study
group matters in the FMC as a means of seeking to resolve matters without the need to
proceed to a hearing. Mediations in both courts are conducted by the same registrars,
given these officers of the FMC are at the same time officers of the FCA.

Two observations stand out from inspecting the New South Wales study group matter
files. First, it is noted there was a propensity for parties in a number of cases to file
many and voluminous affidavit materials and to issue numerous subpoenas,
particularly in the unlawful discrimination study group matters. In this regard, various
FMC files do not give the impression of the matters having proceeded in a simpler
manner than if litigated in the FCA. Secondly, and on a more positive note, it would
appear the FMC did operate in a simpler manner for at least one of the study group
matters, although a judge may have extended the same degree of latitude had the
matter stayed in the FCA. In that case, the federal magistrate commented:

I was greatly assisted by the courtesy of [the respondent] in
allowing the proceedings to be conducted in a reasonably
informal manner and in particular in allowing [the applicant] to
give his evidence by way of narrative from the witness box and
without requiring him to utilise only what was within his
affidavits.261

(b)

Rules of Court

The FMC Rules commenced on 30 July 2001. From the date of the establishment of
the FMC to that date, the Court relied upon a draft set of rules and the FCA Rules in
respect of the conduct of general federal law matters, pursuant to s 44(2) of the FM
Act. This period covers the entire first study period. Once the FMC had its own set of
rules, a number of the FCA Rules relating to practice and procedure were replicated.
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For a time, the FMC continued to accept a document for filing if it were a form used
for a similar purpose in the FCA. Where the FMC has potentially more simplified
procedural rules is in respect of the commencement of proceedings - a single basic
form may be used for most types of matters. Such a document is, however, of no
relevance to the study group matters in that they were transferred after the filing of an
originating application in the FCA.

Some of the forms arguably may have presented confusion and uncertainty for the
study group litigants and their legal representatives, such as the absence of a notice of
motion form for the making of interlocutory applications. Such applications are
brought under the response form by ticking a certain box for interim orders sought.
Another potential area of confusion is whether a filing fee is payable in respect of a
respondent seeking to make an application for interlocutory orders or to bring a
counterclaim, because there is no distinct form for such a procedure and the respondent
is required to use the correct box on the response form. For practitioners and FCA
registry staff accustomed previously to the filing of distinct documentation in general
federal law proceedings, this practice and procedure in the FMC during the study
periods arguably did not serve to simplify the conduct of proceedings.
The FCA Rules pertaining to several areas of concurrent jurisdiction – bankruptcy,
human rights, AD(JR) Act proceedings and appeals from the AAT – have been
substantially repeated in the rules of the FMC.262 Where the respective rules of the two
courts depart from one another is more in respect of the forms to file, rather than
matters of substance. This again potentially adds to the confusion and uncertainty,
rather than serving to simplify things for transferred parties, who have litigated part of
their proceedings under one set of practices and procedures and then been required to
adopt a new set of procedural rules that mirror FCA practices and procedures in some,
but not all, regards.
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See FMC Rules ch 4 and FCA Rules O 77 in respect of bankruptcy proceedings; FMC Rules ch 5 and
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7.3.4

Was the FMC Quicker?

For the study group matters to be treated fairly, the transfers to a new court should not
have served to protract or delay their resolution,263 and the FMC should not be a
slower functioning court than the FCA. Chapter 4 noted the FMC has a case
disposition policy of six months (from commencement to finalisation) and the FCA
has a corresponding policy of 18 months. A median time of less than 183 days
suggests the FMC determined the study population of 144 study group matters
(identified in Chapter 4) expeditiously and accords with the policy of the court and of
the FCA. This provides, however, merely half the true picture of whether being
transferred to the FMC resulted in the study population having their proceedings
determined more quickly than had they remained in the FCA. To see the entire picture,
the median time spent by these matters overall, in both the FCA and FMC, is
considered. This overall median time is viewed then in light of the two case disposition
policies.

(a)

Time Spent in the FMC

One might expect the first 12 months of the operation of the FMC to be a time when
the new court had a slowly and gradually evolving workload; it was in a strong
position to hear and determine transferred matters promptly. This is reflected in the
findings. The median time spent by the relevant population of study group matters was
137 days - well within the FMC six month disposition timeframe and the 18 month
timeframe of the FCA. By the second study period, and presumably as the FMC
became more established with an increased workload, the median time increased by
around 50% to 205 days. This time remains well within the FCA preferred case
disposition timeframe, but is ‘slow’ by FMC standards.
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Table 7.6: First and second study periods - median time of litigation for
population matters.
STUDY PERIOD

TIME IN FCA
(days)

TIME IN FMC
(days)(a)

OVERALL
DURATION
(days)(b)

2000-01 (102)

84

137

264.5

2002-03 (42)

58

205

266.5

(Matters)

Notes:
(a)

Unless specified otherwise in the discussion below, the time spent by a matter
in the FMC runs from the date of commencement in that court post-transfer to
the ‘end date’ of the matter recorded on MAGCAMS. Matters appealed from
the FMC to the FCA, and remitted to the former for final determination, are
included in the timeframe calculations.

(b)

The overall duration of a matter includes the date of filing in the FCA to the
‘end date’ in the FMC. Matters re-transferred by the FMC do not have the
time spent in the FCA after re-transfer included in the calculations.

The shortest period spent by any matter in the FMC during the first study period was a
single day (20 minutes in open court on the date of transfer), raising the question of
why the particular Victorian bankruptcy matter was transferred and not simply dealt
with by the FCA at or around the date of transfer? One may speculate the answer lies
in the availability of judicial officer, FMC rather than FCA, to deal with the matter on
the day required by the parties. The longest duration, of 1701 days, was in respect of a
Queensland human rights matter, a period well outside the timeframe desired by both
the FMC and FCA. Two main explanations emerge from the data collected from
computer records for matters having lengthy durations in the FMC of many hundreds
of days or, in a handful of instances, exceeding 1000 days. Some matters were heard
reasonably promptly following transfer, but the judgments were reserved (not handed
down) for lengthy periods, notably a year or longer. Some matters were determined by
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the FMC, but then appealed successfully to the FCA. The matters were then remitted
to the FMC for final determination. With the remaining long-running matters, it is not
possible to discern conclusively from the records the reason(s) for the lengthy duration
of the matters in the FMC.
During the second study period, the longest-running matter before the FMC was an
AAT appeal in Queensland (1225 days). The quickest matters were in relation to the
Victorian FMC registry within the bankruptcy jurisdiction – one day for two separate
matters. The bases for these durations of proceedings are less evident from the
computer records, than for the earlier study period.
The following series of tables show the median times for the studied matters in the
FMC post-transfer and in relation to the litigation overall, based upon the registries and
areas of jurisdiction involved.

Table 7.7: First study period - median time of litigation by registry.
TIME IN FCA
(days)

TIME IN FMC
(days)

OVERALL
DURATION
(days)

NSW (28)

82

127

220

Qld (38)

108.5

118

276.5

Vic (23)

87

145

302

WA (9)

15

48

80

SA (4)

122

441.5

563

REGISTRY
(Matters)
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Table 7.8: Second study period - median time of litigation by registry.
TIME IN FCA
(days)

TIME IN FMC
(days)

OVERALL
DURATION
(days)

NSW (6)

30

258

283

Qld (10)

71

115.5

186

Vic (14)

35

180

229.5

WA (9)

83

513

600

SA (1)

29

115

144

ACT (1)

9

2

11

NT (1)

645

534

1179

REGISTRY
(Matters)

Table 7.9: First study period - median time of litigation by area of jurisdiction.
TIME IN
FCA
(days)

TIME IN
FMC
(days)

OVERALL
DURATION
(days)

Bankruptcy (47)

99

106

251

Human Rights (36)

81

188

299.5

AAT Appeals (12)

77

248.5

360

AD(JR) Act (1)

8

39

47

TPA (5)

65

67

223

Copyright (1)

173

22

195

JURISDICTION
(Matters)
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Table 7.10: Second study period - median time of litigation by area of
jurisdiction.
TIME IN
FCA
(days)

TIME IN
FMC
(days)

OVERALL
DURATION
(days)

Bankruptcy (11)

78

59

119

Human Rights (5)

56

75

142

AAT Appeals (14)

35

260

312

AD(JR) Act (3)

28

590

618

TPA (9)

87

513

600

JURISDICTION
(Matters)

During the first study period, the longest median time spent by the relevant matters in
the FMC occurred in South Australia, and AAT appeal proceedings tended to spend
the longest amount of time before the Court. By the second period, this had changed to
AD(JR) Act proceedings and it was the FMC registry in the Northern Territory that
witnessed the longest-running proceeding in the Court. It is noted, however, that this
finding relates to a single proceeding.

(b)

Overall Duration of Proceedings

As seen in Table 7.6 above, the time spent overall by transferred matters in the FCJS
remained constant between the two periods of study. One might expect the second
period to reveal a much longer overall duration than the first period, as the FMC takes
longer to finalise transferred matters in amongst its increasing workload of original
filings. The actual result is caused presumably by the fact the FCA seemingly, and for
the main part, transferred the matters in a shorter period of time post-filing than it had
during 2000-01. This is not surprising if it is considered that over a third of the first
period study group matters had been commenced prior to the establishment of the
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FCJS and so had been in the FCA for a period before it was possible to be transferred
to the FMC.
The results suggest that, considered collectively, the matters during both study periods
determined by the FMC were finalised by that court in a median period of time that
accorded with the FCA policy on case disposition. Those matters were also finalised
within a suitable timeframe in accordance with the policy of the FMC in the case of the
first period of study, but not the second period. When the matters are considered on an
individual basis, it is seen that a number of them (10 in 2000-01 and five in 2002-03)
awaited final determination in the FMC for a period exceeding 18 months. Overall, 24
matters in the first study period (or 16.7% of the entire population studied) and 14
matters in the second study period (or 9.7% of the population) took longer than 18
months to finalise, from date of commencement in the FCA to final disposition in the
FMC. Even for those matters that were determined by the FMC within a six month
period, the fact they spent time in both the FCA and the FMC caused the overall
timeframe for their disposition to exceed that same period. In short, it would appear
that even in instances where the FMC had dealt with a matter ‘quickly’, the overall
transfer process within the FCJS may have served to protract or delay the finalisation
of the matter.

7.4

Summary of Findings on Fairness

This chapter reveals some positive findings in relation to the transfer of the majority of
study group matters after (at least) one appearance in open court, at which time the
topic of transfer of proceedings could be ventilated. There are, however, a number of
matters that raise questions of the extent to which the relevant parties were afforded
any, or any sufficient, opportunity to be heard on the question of transfer, or indeed for
their wishes about choice of forum to be considered during transfer decision-making.
The implications for matters that were transferred inappropriately to the FMC are
highlighted by the instances of matters requiring re-transfer to the FCA, which no
doubt added to the cost and delay of the litigation for those parties. Whilst the FMC
may well be a cheaper, simpler and quicker court in theory, some practical realities
shed doubt on the extent to which the court satisfied all these worthwhile objectives in
the case of all of the matters studied.
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CHAPTER 8: PROVIDING REASONS FOR TRANSFER DECISION
The need for more adequate reasons for transfer.

8.1

Apprising Parties of the Transfer

This chapter is the last of the empirical findings chapters of this thesis. It presents the
raw data collected from FEDCAMS and AustLII on the nature and extent of the
reasons for transfer (both written and oral) relating to the study group matters.
Evidence of the approach of the FCA with respect to judgment publication in this field
is compared with that concerning other inter-court and inter-registry transfer decisionmaking. Migration transfer judgments are not considered because they fall outside the
scope of this study, for the reasons explained previously. There is no intention to
provide an opinion as to the legal correctness of any reasons for transfer, but rather to
show the extent to which the parties and broader legal community may reasonably
understand the rationale for transfer and the application of the statutory transfer criteria
in the particular proceedings.

8.2

Written Reasons

There exist a limited number of published Reasons on the AustLII website (that is,
written judgments) regarding the study group matter transfers. Judgments are observed
in respect of only 10 (or less than 5%) of the matters. Even then, six of those
judgments concern a related group of proceedings and are set out in virtually identical
terms. None of the registrars who had transferred matters published reasons on
AustLII, which is consistent with usual practice in the FCA in relation to registrar
decision-making. It appears also that the relevant federal magistrates involved with the
re-transfer of matters to the FCA (as discussed in Chapter 7) did not always publish
written reasons for such re-transfers.264 The raw data and other information collected
supports, therefore, a findings that the study group matter parties were informed
264
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mostly of the reasons for transfer decision orally in open court, or through the receipt
of a formal transfer order (and possibly other documents) after the transfer decision
was made in chambers. There does not appear to be any uniform approach adopted by
the FCA, and the provision of reasons for transfer decision remains at the discretion of
the individual judge.

8.2.1

First Study Period Judgments

During the period 2000-01, the FCA published only two written reasons for judgment
in relation to non-migration transfer decisions: Charles v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty
Ltd265 and Travers v State of New South Wales.266 Both judgments arose from human
rights proceedings within the New South Wales District Registry. Although drafted by
different judges, the judgments reveal similarities in judicial approach.
Both matters concerned alleged breaches of disability legislation. Prior to the final
hearing, interlocutory applications were brought by the respondents in the respective
proceedings, but no actual application for the transfer of the proceedings was made by
any of the parties under O 82 of the FCA Rules. Much of the respective 13-page and
eight-page judgments are based upon the exercise of judicial discretion in relation to
the interlocutory orders sought by the respondents. One or two paragraphs are devoted
to the transfer decision, at the end of each judgment. In both matters, the judge
instigated the transfer decision, but the judgments state it occurred with the express
consent of each party. In the Charles case, his Honour noted that at the time the
applicant commenced proceedings, the FMC had not existed and it was now the
'existence of that alternative forum' that led to considering positively that this is an
appropriate matter for the exercise of the power conferred by s 32AB(1) of the FCA
Act.267
Presumably, their Honours considered the nature and merit of the claims in these two
matters when entertaining the respective interlocutory applications (respectively, on
the ambit of the claim and whether the proceeding should be dismissed summarily).
The question of the complexity of the proceedings is not discussed in either judgment.
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Their Honours do, however, give express regard to the criteria in s 32AB(6) of the
FCA Act. With respect, the judgments do not provide any substantive light on how the
criteria were considered, analysed or distinguished from other matters. They appear to
be a brief survey of the content of the above statutory provision, and no express
mention is made of O 82. For example, in Charles his Honour said of the decision to
transfer the proceedings to the FMC:
Having had regard to the matters referred to in s 32AB(6) of the
Act, I have decided to do so. In particular, I am satisfied that the
resources of that Court are sufficient to hear and determine the
proceeding and to do so sooner than could be done by me. I am
also satisfied that the parties will both be benefited by having
the proceeding heard by that Court, not only by reason of an
earlier determination of the proceeding, but also by reason of
reduced exposure to costs in that Court as compared to this
Court.268
Similarly, in Travers it was held:
The power to transfer a proceeding to the [FMC] is conferred by
s 32AB of the [Act]. An order may be made on the Court’s own
initiative. Subsections (3) to (6) prescribe requirements to be
observed and matters to be taken into account. In considering
whether an order should be made in this case I have, of course,
had regard to these provisions. Particularly, I have considered
the matters which s 32AB(6) requires to be taken into account. I
have ascertained that the resources of the [FMC] are sufficient
to hear and determine the proceeding and, in my view, the
interests of the administration of justice would be served by
ordering the transfer. In those circumstances, in addition to the
orders disposing of the motion [to dismiss the proceeding], I
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order that he proceeding be transferred from this Court to the
[FMC].269

8.2.2

Second Study Period Judgments

The period 2002-03 sees written judgments provided in eight matters – four times
more matters than in the first year and despite fewer proceedings falling within this
study group. Six of the matters involve related, and eventually consolidated,
proceedings and essentially the same written reasons for judgment are provided for all
matters.270 In reality, therefore, there are only three judgments in respect of which one
may seek to discern the true nature of the transfer decision-making process during this
period. Apart from the Kurniadi judgment in the Western Australia District Registry,
the other two judgments are, as with the published judgments in 2000-01, both in the
area of human rights (disability discrimination) and in the New South Wales and
Victoria District Registries. The matters within the scope of the Kurniadi judgment
ultimately experienced re-transfer by the FMC to the FCA for reasons explored
previously in Chapter 7, but as far as the principle of the provision of adequate reasons
for decision is concerned, it represents the only judgment in the findings with
sufficiently detailed articulation of the reasons for transfer.
Unlike the 2000-01 judgments considered above, the Kurniadi judgment is concerned
solely with the issue of transfer to the FMC. The six matters involved applications
each seeking, as against the respondents, approximately $50 000 damages pursuant to
s 82 of the TPA or, in the alternative, under s 1005 of the Corporations Law arising
from contractual disputes over the agistment of ostriches. It should be remembered that
the jurisdiction of the FMC at that time was limited to consumer protection claims not
exceeding $200 000 damages and the Court did not have (as it does not have today)
express concurrent jurisdiction in Corporations Law matters.
From the Kurniadi judgment, it is clear the Court instigated the question of transfer to
the FMC and that this was done with the express lack of consent of the parties, who
had filed written submissions expressing their strong wish the applications remain in
269
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the FCA (as mentioned in the preceding chapter of this thesis).271 Some of the main
submissions considered by, but that ultimately did not sway, his Honour included:
(a)

The applications be regarded as a test case – a further seven similar
applications were expected to be filed;

(b)

The combined quantum of damages in the current and contemplated
proceedings would be in the vicinity of $900 000;

(c)

The FMC lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine the Corporations
Law component of the applications.

After outlining the legislative framework of the transfer criteria, his Honour based the
decision to transfer the proceedings to the FMC on the following numerous grounds:
(a)

The applications do not involve questions of general importance;272

(b)

Transferring the proceedings will lead to significantly less cost and
more convenience to the parties than if they stayed in the FCA;273

(c)

The proceedings will be conducted with much less formality;274

(d)

Based upon information provided by the FMC about the case
management rates and times in the FMC, each application is likely to be
heard and determined earlier in that court;275

(e)

The preference of the parties for the matters to remain in the FCA has
been accorded a reasonable degree of weight;276

(f)

It is acknowledged there are no associated matter proceedings pending
in the FMC;277
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(g)

The indication of the FMC Registrar that the resources of the FMC are
sufficient to hear and determine the applications;278

(h)

Each application involves only an average of $50 000 damages claimed,
even if the respondents are correct in their submission the applications
combined could reach $900 000;279 and

(i)

The Corporations Law claims fall within the accrued or associated
jurisdiction of the FMC and it will have jurisdiction according to
conventional principles.280

There is one further ground for the decision to transfer the proceedings that warrants
close attention. Unlike the previous judgments in this area, the judgment explores
openly the criterion of 'the interests of the administration of justice'. The judge was of
the opinion such interests will be equally served whether the applications are heard in
the FCA or in the FMC.281 His Honour went on to hold, however, that the efficiency of
the allocation of resources is one key aspect of the administration of justice; a view
similarly expressed by his Honour in an earlier transfer case in the migration
jurisdiction.282 Judicial resources are saved by any potential appeal from the FMC to
the FCA because the appeal bench is most likely to be constituted by a single judge
sitting within the appellate jurisdiction of the FCA, rather than a Full Court bench
comprised of three judges. It was observed that
[t]he administration of justice includes not only the giving of a fair
hearing to the parties and a right of appeal, but also the expeditious
hearing and determination of other matters awaiting hearing in this
Court.283
These views are examined more closely in later chapters of this thesis, for they reveal
two potentially opposing interests in relation to law reform and the FCJS. In the
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meantime, it may be noted again the absence of any direct discussion in the judgment
of the complexity of the proceedings as a criterion of transfer.
The next published judgment examined concerns the Victorian matter of Soulitopoulos
v La Trobe University Liberal Club,284 in which the FCA was concerned with a
preliminary question of whether a particular provision of the federal disability
discrimination legislation has any effect as a law of the Commonwealth. His Honour
considered at length the ambit of the relevant section and of the external affairs power
of the Commonwealth and held the section in question did have legal effect. Such
aspects of the judgment, and therefore of the proceedings themselves, would appear to
have the potential for a significant level of complexity. Nonetheless, the matter was
transferred to the FMC, at the instigation of the judge and possibly without the consent
of the parties (this is not certain from the FEDCAMS data collected or the judgment
itself). In so doing, his Honour said:
I have some concerns about the extensive costs that have been incurred
in this matter. Although the proceeding was commenced in the [FCA] I
indicated to the parties that the proceeding was a matter appropriate for
hearing in the [FMC]. However, as the question raised by s 12(8)(e) of
the Act was of some importance I agreed to the question being dealt
with as a separate question under O 29 r 2. The respondent’s challenge
to s 27(2) could have been considered in the [FMC] as a preliminary
issue or as part of the respondent’s defence, rather than at a separate
hearing in the [FCA]… I also propose to order that the proceeding now
be transferred to the [FMC].285
The formal order provided the proceedings be transferred to the FMC for hearing on a
date that was actually more than five months after the date of this judgment or on such
earlier date as may be available, and with an estimate of five days for hearing. No
other reasons for transfer, or express application of the transfer criteria, are canvassed
in the judgment. Indeed, an estimate of a five-day hearing might suggest a matter of
some complexity. As seen in Chapter Two, the FMC has a benchmark of two days for
hearing in relation to family law matters.
284
285
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As regards the statutory criterion of the FCA taking into consideration 'the wishes of
the parties', the data collected shows this case was in the FCA system for some 898
days prior to being transferred and had nine return dates before the Court, totaling
almost 25 hours. The matter was commenced about a month prior to the establishment
of the FMC, but it would be reasonable to say that if the applicant had desired the
matter to be transferred to the FMC, there had been many opportunities over that
almost 900-day period to instigate such transfer.
The final published transfer judgment for 2002-03 concerns another disability
discrimination proceeding in the New South Wales District Registry and involving
access to a club. In Beetham v Cortra Pty Ltd t/as Cheeky Monkeys,286 it was the
respondent who sought transfer to the FMC. In granting the order sought, his Honour
held in the succinct, three paragraph judgment:
There is no question of principle involved in the proceeding. I am
satisfied that the resources of the [FMC] are sufficient to hear and
determine the proceeding and that, if the matter is transferred to the
[FMC], it is likely to be heard and determined at less cost and more
convenience to the parties than would otherwise be the case. It is not
clear whether the matter would be heard any earlier in the [FMC] but, if
it is transferred, it would not be heard significantly later than if the
matter stayed in my list. Accordingly, pursuant to s 32AB(1) of the
[FCA Act], I order that the proceeding be transferred to the [FMC].287
It is not clear from the judgment whether the applicant opposed the application to
transfer. Presumably, it had been so opposed, for it would be customary for the orders
to read 'by consent' and the judge might not have published reasons for the outcome of
an uncontested application. The matter had one directions hearing lasting seven
minutes at the time of transfer.

286
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8.2.3

The FCA Approach with Other Transfers

The limited number and scope of written reasons for the study group transfers leads to
question whether it is the practice of the FCA to refrain from publishing written
judgments on transfers, generally. The relevant annual reports of the FCA indicate the
Court had transferred 21 matters to other courts during 2000-01288 and 41 matters
during 2002-03.289 Such courts include potentially: the Family Court, state or territory
Supreme Courts, District or County Courts and state or territory Local or Magistrates
Courts.290 Section 48 of the FCA Act enables the Court or a judge to transfer a FCA
proceeding or part thereof to another place (that is, a registry of the Court other than
the filing registry). Such inter-registry transfers might occur having regard to factors
including the location of parties and witnesses, the place where the cause of action
arose and the most efficient administration of the Court.291
In searching all judgments published by the FCA during the study periods on AustLII,
the judgments pertaining to the above inter-court and inter-registry transfers are
identified: 11 written judgments in 2000-01 and 16 judgments in 2002-03. There are a
further eight judgments published over both periods on unsuccessful applications for
transfer to state courts and inter-registry transfers.292 The breakdown of transfers (and
their judgments) discussed above is set out in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1: First and second study periods - FCA inter-court and inter-registry
transfers.
STUDY PERIOD

TYPE OF

MATTERS

TRANSFER
2000-01

PUBLISHED
JUDGMENTS

Family Court

5

3

State/territory

16

3

Inter-registry

*

5

Family Court

0

0

State/territory

41

6

*

10

courts

2002-03

courts
Inter-registry

Notes:
*

The FCA annual reports for the study periods do not contain information on
inter-registry transfers, but one may assume they represent a frequent
occurrence in the business of the Court. As the exact number of inter-registry
transfers is unknown, what percentage of matters the 15 or so published
judgments represent is also unknown.

When one compares the annual report inter-court transfer statistics with the findings
from the AustLII searches, it is apparent the FCA did not publish written reasons in all
matters within most types of transfer situations. The scarcity of judgments in the area
of inter-court transfers, particularly those made pursuant to the Cross-vesting Act, may
be explained partly by the aftermath of Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally.293 In that case,
the High Court held certain provisions that purported to confer power upon Chapter III
Commonwealth Constitution federal courts to exercise state judicial power were

293

(1999) 198 CLR 511.
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invalid. This affected the jurisdiction of the FCA in matters under the Corporations
Law.
Notwithstanding the similar relative scarcity in the number of judgments published,
distinctions may be drawn between the findings from the study group matters and the
judgments concerning other types of transfers during the study periods. First, and
without going into a lengthy analysis of the inter-court and inter-registry transfer
judgments, it is seen there were more such judgments published than for transfers to
the FMC. One reason may be that such transfers are often as a result of a formal
application made by one of the parties, whereas it has been seen in this study the
transfers to the FMC seemingly occurred more often than not at the instigation of the
judge, rather than of the parties. Secondly, even where the inter-court and inter-registry
judgments arose as an outcome of the motion of the Court, the reasons for decision
contained therein are arguably more detailed or illuminating than seen in respect of the
FCA-to-FMC transfer judgments discussed previously.294 Such judgments appear to
address the specific idiosyncrasies of the particular matters at hand, rather than
perfunctorily outline statutory checklists.

8.3

Oral Reasons

Given the FCA published merely a few judgments on transfer under the FCJS during
the study periods, it is necessary to consider FEDCAMS for evidence of ex tempore
transfer judgments. As indicated earlier, it was not possible to gain access to the
transcript of directions hearings and the like involving the study group matters. The
FEDCAMS data reveals the duration of the listing in open court for each study group
matter on the date of transfer. This information is used to ascertain the median time
spent by the relevant judicial officers in advising the parties of the reasons for the
transfers.
The median times spent by judicial officers pronouncing the transfer orders and
reasons for decision in open court in the study group matters were remarkably similar
294
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during both periods of study: five-and-a-half minutes during 2000-01 and seven
minutes during 2002-03 (see Table 8.2). A distinction is drawn between transfer
decisions pronounced in open court and those made in chambers. Only the former
decisions are considered in the calculations of the median time spent providing reasons
orally to the parties because it is unlikely the parties would have appeared before the
judges in chambers at this time. It is possible judges furnished the parties in such latter
matters with reasons in the form of correspondence. Having regard to the nature and
content of letters inspected on the New South Wales District Registry files, however,
any such correspondence is likely to have been brief and have only apprised the parties
of the fact of the transfer of the proceedings.
The briefest time any matter spent in open court during the pronouncement of the
transfer decision was one minute. This occurred in 13 matters. In some of those
instances, the listing was understandably brief because the judge had also published
written reasons for decision. It was observed, however, that in some of the other
matters lasting only a minute or so in open court on the day of transfer, such matters
were subsequently re-transferred by the FMC to the FCA because the former regarded
itself as not being the appropriate forum for the determination of the matters (as
discussed in the last chapter).

Table 8.2: First and second study periods - median time spent pronouncing
transfer orders in open court.
MEDIAN
TIME IN
COURT
(minutes)

TRANSFER
ORDERS
MADE IN
COURT

2000-01

5.5

80 (55.2%)

2002-03

7

37 (62.7%)

STUDY PERIOD

194

The following two tables provide a breakdown of the findings based on the transfer
registry. Most registries had a median time in open court (on the date of transfer) of
between five and 10 minutes. The exception is the Queensland District Registry, which
appears to have spent the most time dealing with its transfers in the relatively small
number of matters it dealt with in open court. Registries with no transfer orders made
in open court are omitted from the tables.

Table 8.3: First study period - median time spent pronouncing transfer orders by
registry.
MEDIAN
TIME IN
COURT
(minutes)

TRANSFER
ORDERS
MADE IN
COURT

NSW

5

39

Vic

5

19

Qld

19

3

WA

10

5

SA

7

13

Tas

5

1

REGISTRY
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Table 8.4: Second study period - median time spent pronouncing transfer orders
by registry.
MEDIAN
TIME IN
COURT
(minutes)

TRANSFER
ORDERS
MADE IN
COURT

NSW

7

9

Vic

10

11

Qld

7

5

WA

1

8

SA

8

2

NT

15

1

Tas

5

1

REGISTRY

As seen below, the median time in open court on the day of transfer also remains fairly
constant (mainly of between four and 10 minutes duration) when the area of
jurisdiction of the transferred matters is examined. The TPA and copyright matters had
a median time of less than five minutes and they were predominantly the types of
matters re-transferred to the Court (see Chapter 7).
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Table 8.5: First study period - median time spent pronouncing transfer orders by
jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION

MEDIAN
TIME IN
COURT
(minutes)

TRANSFER
ORDERS
MADE IN
COURT

Human Rights

5

55

TPA

4

6

Bankruptcy

5.5

14

AAT Appeals

9

3

AD(JR) Act

12

1

Copyright

1

1

Table 8.6: Second study period - median time spent pronouncing transfer orders
by jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION

MEDIAN
TIME IN
COURT
(minutes)

TRANSFER
ORDERS
MADE IN
COURT

Human Rights

7

9

TPA

1

11

Bankruptcy

7.5

6

AAT Appeals

10

10

AD(JR) Act

5

1
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8.4

Summary of Findings on Providing Reasons for Transfer

The findings discussed in this chapter reveal the study group judges did not tend to
reduce to writing any, or any detailed, reasons for transfer decision, except in a handful
of matters. This practice is not necessarily at odds with the approach adopted during
the same period in respect of other types of transfers by the Court, although the latter
types of decision-making seemingly yielded slightly greater judgment writing. To the
extent the judges pronounced their transfer decisions in open court, the median time
spent on such occasions was, more often than not, less than 10 minutes.
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PART III THE EFFECT OF THE FCJS ON ACCESS TO
JUSTICE
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CHAPTER 9: THE FCJS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The realities of the system for federal case transfers.

9.1

Understanding the Study Group Findings

The preceding four empirical findings chapters have revealed numerous, and at times
mixed, findings concerning the operation of the FCJS during 2000-01 and 2002-03.
This chapter identifies what the findings mean for access to procedural justice, the
possible reasons for the FCJS operating in the manner it did during the study periods
(that is, the compatibility of the FCJS and procedural justice) and what is actually
being achieved by the operation of the system in practice.

9.2

Was there Access to Procedural Justice?

This thesis set out to test whether case transfer processes in the FCA during particular
periods of the operation of the FCJS created any impediments to access to justice for
litigants, primarily by evaluating the extent to which the transfer decision-making
accorded with the four principles of procedural justice. Specifically, it sought answers
to the question of whether the transfer decision-making promoted these notions:


Equality (was there a predilection towards a particular type of
litigant, matter or place being transferred);



Openness (was there sufficient transparency in terms of where
and who made the transfer decisions);



Fairness (were the parties afforded a reasonable opportunity to
be heard on the question of transfer prior to the making of the
transfer order and were the matters transferred to a 'better
place'); and



The provision of adequate reasons for those transfers (is the
basis for each transfer decision ascertainable).
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9.2.1

Positive Outcomes

Several findings support a conclusion the transfer processes in the case of the majority
of study group matters served to promote the attainment of procedural justice for the
parties concerned. Those positive findings are viewable in the following light.

(a)

Equality

The findings relating to the principle of equality are perhaps the most pleasantly
surprising of all the findings revealed by the study. It would appear the FCA, for the
main part, did not approach transfer decision-making under the FCJS as a means of
disposing of 'undesirable' cases. Contrary to the expectation derived from the literature
considered in Chapter 3, it is reassuring the FCA did not single out self-represented
applicants when it came to the transfer of proceedings (see Chapter 5). This positive
discovery is affirmed by the findings regarding the principle of openness in Chapter 6,
where it is seen that even when transfer decision-making occurred in the secrecy of
chambers, the matters involved were predominantly of the legally represented type. It
is affirmed again in Chapter 7 (the principle of fairness and the opportunity to be heard
on transfer), where there was an indication self-represented applicant matters were less
likely to be transferred prior to the holding of a first directions hearing in open court
than their counterpart matters. In other words, even when the FCA seemingly had the
ability to 'secretly' and expeditiously remove matters brought by self-represented
applicants, it did not do so in the majority of cases.
There is a proviso to this general finding when the additional variables of place and
area of jurisdiction are added to the equation. In such instance, it would appear that
numerically the category of applicant most commonly transferred during the first study
period was self-represented applicants in human rights matters (principally unlawful
discrimination) in the New South Wales District Registry.295 A possible explanation
for this suggested to the researcher anecdotally is that there was a well-reputed federal
magistrate in New South Wales with much professional experience in human rights
matters and in whom the judges had confidence in the transfer of appropriate matters

295

This is consistent with information of the FMC during this period - see Federal Magistrates Service,
above n 8, 26.

201

to the FMC. Even so, matters concerning these litigants were not transferred in such
substantial numbers to warrant any concern about the ability of these persons to
participate within the FCA consistently with the participation model of procedural
justice (discussed in Chapter 3). The principle of equality is upheld.
A potential contrary argument is that the findings reveal a significant disparity between
the numbers of legally represented applicants transferred compared with their selfrepresented counterparts. Some 56% and 63% (respectively) of legally represented
study group applicants had their matters transferred to the FMC during the first and
second periods of study, compared with around 32% and 37% (respectively) of selfrepresented applicants during those periods. This can be interpreted in two ways. First,
legally represented applicants are the subject of discrimination by being transferred in
such larger numbers. Secondly, self-represented applicants are being discriminated
against because they are more likely to miss the benefits of litigation in a forum that is
supposedly cheaper, simpler and quicker than the FCA.
Such arguments may be addressed simply on the basis that, although there are no full
and accurate statistics of the exact number of self-represented applicants in the FCA,
the number of legally represented applicants clearly exceeds the number of selfrepresented applicants. Therefore, the higher statistical representation of the former in
the study group findings is to be reasonably expected. In any event, the potential for
inequality arguably would be greater if self-represented applicants were selected for
different treatment (that is, removal from the FCA) in circumstances where it might be
regarded as a direct consequence of a perception they pose increased case management
requirements and workload, without which the Court would prefer to do.
The second main positive finding regarding the principle of equality is that the FCA
did not appear during the study periods to have a predilection towards transferring
matters away from its largest and busiest registry - the New South Wales District
Registry. It was assumed (in Chapter 3) that the Registry would be most likely to order
transfers to the FMC as a means of reducing its substantial workload, consistently with
one of the main objectives of the FCJS (see Chapter 1). Numerically, it had the highest
number of transfers during the first study period, however, this did not continue into
2002-03 and, perhaps more importantly, it is statistically seen to be one of the
registries least likely to transfer its cases for each of the two study periods.
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What this entails for access to procedural justice is that litigants in the New South
Wales District Registry were not denied access to equality by having chosen the
largest and busiest registry of the FCA as the forum for their proceedings. The
Queensland District Registry is a registry that during the study periods sat roughly in
the middle of all the registries of the Court in terms of workload and number of
resident judges, yet was statistically most likely to transfer proceedings. This is
difficult to explain and may simply reflect the idiosyncratic workings of that registry at
a specific period of the operation of the FCJS. A more worthwhile question to seek to
answer is what these findings mean for the operation of the FCJS in fulfilling its
objective of reducing the workload of the FCA, which is an issue considered later in
this thesis.

Finally, the findings support the assumption that human rights (unlawful
discrimination) proceedings would be most likely to be transferred to the FMC than
any other area of concurrent general federal law jurisdiction, the basis for which
assumption was explained in Chapter 3. This is supported strongly by the findings in
respect of the first study period raw data, although in the second period, AAT appeals
were slightly more represented in the numerical findings of the jurisdiction most often
transferred. When, however, the number of human rights matters transferred during the
latter period is considered as a percentage of the national findings in this jurisdiction, it
is seen that human rights proceedings again topped the types of transfers that occurred
(around 43%).
The finding, that human rights proceedings dominate the study group transfers, on its
own does not necessarily establish the principle of equality was undermined, as it is
conceivable that one given area of jurisdiction will prevail in the number of transfers.
What is somewhat disconcerting, however, is the prevalence of human rights transfers
during the first study period; almost half of all the 145 transfers that year involved
human rights proceedings. Conversely, if the original assumption held by the
researcher in Chapter 3 is correct - that the least legally complex type of proceeding in
the FCA is that of unlawful discrimination - then perhaps this finding should not be
regarded as alarming. It is consistent with how the FCJS is intended to operate; namely
that less complex matters most appropriately belong in the FMC. As such, even if the
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FCA favoured human rights proceedings in its transfer decision-making, then the
effect of transferring such matters to the FMC is not necessarily negative.

(b)

Transparency

Several of the principles of procedural justice considered in this thesis may be
regarded as enhancing transparency in the judicial decision-making processes under
the FCJS. They are the principles of openness, fairness (the opportunity to be heard)
and the provision of adequate reasons for decision. Such principles worked in tandem;
for example, the making of transfer decisions in open court facilitated the ability of
parties to express their views on potential transfer and enabled the decision-maker to
articulate the reasons for transfer to the parties directly.
Chapter 6 shows the principle of open justice were upheld in the majority of both
transferred matters and registries insofar as the findings reveal transfer decisionmaking occurred predominantly in open court, rather than in chambers. More than half
the first period study group matters (55.2% of all transfers that period) and closer to
two-thirds (62.7%) of the second period study group matters were transferred in open
court events such as a directions hearing.
Various file inspections indicate the manner by which (particularly New South Wales)
study group parties made known their wishes on potential transfer; namely: by oral
submissions made in open court (usually at a directions hearing), the filing of written
submissions (not the norm) or through correspondence between the Court and parties
(an infrequent occurrence). Most matters transferred during the study periods had
multiple return dates in open court at which time the question of transfer could be
discussed. The findings on openness serve to bolster the findings on the ability of the
parties to be heard on the subject of transfer. A factor in this outcome is the fact a
significant number of the matters (40% of the first study group matters) were
commenced prior to the establishment of the FCJS. In the absence of transcript, it is
not possible to know whether discussion about transfer occurred at one or more
directions hearings in any given matter and, if so, the nature and extent of submissions
made by the parties. Nonetheless, the potential for the topic to be addressed before the
FCA was arguably present in the matters that had at least one directions hearing post-
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commencement of the FCJS (the actual adequacy of such an opportunity is addressed
further below).
The fact transfer orders were more often than not made in open court accords with the
finding (in Chapter 8) that the FCA appears to have preferred to provide oral reasons
for transfer decision in respect of the study group matters, as opposed to publishing
written judgments. It is assumed the majority of parties received at least some oral
indication from the Court of the basis for the transfer to the FMC, which is preferable
to transfer decisions being made in chambers with no published judgment or
correspondence by the FCA to the parties.

(c)

Fairness

This thesis assesses the fairness of a transfer decision in terms of whether the transfer
resulted in greater procedural inconvenience and expense to the parties than had the
proceedings remained in the filing court. It is arguably a lessening of access to justice
when transfers increase the delay of the final determination of matters and the overall
cost of the litigation for the parties, and cause confusion in relation to different
practices and procedures between the two courts.
Around 95% of the cases studied had appropriate transfers (Chapter 7). The FMC had
jurisdiction to deal with the matters and they remained in that forum for hearing and
determination. If the political rhetoric of the legislature is to be accepted, that forum
was the most suitable place for their resolution because it was cheaper, simpler and
quicker than the FCA, assuming these matters represented a low level of complexity.
The FCA may be regarded as a specialist forum in which to litigate (including having
lengthy and detailed rules of court prior to their extensive revision in 2011), whilst the
FMC is designed to operate with as little formality in the courtroom as possible in an
effort to be more user-friendly, particularly for self-represented parties. The study
group matters, if 'less complex' in nature, would have benefited from being in a forum
with a mantra of striving for simpler practices and procedures. It was observed in a
particular New South Wales matter that the federal magistrate had made an effort to be
as accommodating and flexible as possible for the taking of evidence so to facilitate
the sense of user-friendliness.
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As addressed in Chapter 1, one of the key concerns of the legislature when establishing
the FMC was that the crippling party-party legal costs of federal litigation be
harnessed by a new court that makes litigating in the federal justice system more
affordable for more court users. This research accepts the legislature has achieved this
aim to the extent the FMC Rules provide for a potentially cheaper fixed-sum approach
to party-party costs than the individually itemised approach to costs of the FCA under
its rules of court. The FMC Regulations set out filing and hearing fees that are, in most
instances, significantly cheaper than the counterpart fees in the FCA Regulations. Most
of the study group matters experienced cheaper filing and hearing fees from the point
of transfer, as seen from the computer records of the FMC in respect of each study
group matter compared with the reciprocal records of the FCA. These conclusions are
supported by the results of surveys conducted about the performance of the FMC in its
first few years of operation, and which state those court users surveyed found the FMC
to be a cheaper court.296 Caution should be exercised, however, when dealing with
such survey results for present purposes as most of the court users involved in the
surveys were litigating within the family law jurisdiction of the FMC and their matters
may have been commenced in the FMC and not transferred.
Finally, this research reveals the FMC was a court capable of expeditious resolution of
the study group matters. The measure of speed (time) in assessing the disposition of
matters transferred to the FMC may be approached in a myriad of ways, but for
reasons explained previously, the approach of determining the time taken from date of
transfer to the handing down of final judgment (that is, final determination) have been
employed in this thesis. The case disposition rates adopted by the FCA and FMC are
used in this task; namely, 18 months from date of filing to disposition in the case of the
former and six months for the latter court. Regarding the population of 144 matters
(70% of all study group matters) transferred during the study periods that did proceed
to determination by the FMC, it is seen that these matters were determined by the FMC
in a median period of time that is within the case disposition time rates of both courts.
By the second period, the matters studied were collectively determined within the 18month preferred timeframe of the FCA, but outside of the FMC timeframe of six
296

FMC, Results of the 2001 Survey on Awareness and Performance (2001)
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months. This suggests the FMC was a 'quicker' court than the FCA across both
periods, although the second study period findings point to a clue the FMC was getting
weighed-down by its third year of operation as its own workload increased. There were
almost 5000 general federal law applications, in addition to the staggering 54 570
family law applications, filed in the FMC that year.297

9.2.2

Negative Outcomes

The majority of study group matters seemingly had access to justice during the transfer
processes of the FCA. Viewed statistically, most matters received equal treatment, had
transfer orders made in open court, and so on. When delving beneath the surface,
however, it is not convincing that each matter was granted all of the principles of
procedural justice throughout the transfer processes. This research has exposed the
FCJS operated at times in a manner that had some profound, and no doubt unintended,
effects during transfer decision-making, and in a number of cases post-transfer (such
as where matters required re-transfer). Without intending to undervalue the
significance of the positive findings, some focus is required on the more negative
findings also reached because what the latter reveal is arguably more illuminating
when evaluating the operation of a federal civil justice system. It is an ideal, and
perhaps an unrealistic goal in practice, that procedural justice requires attainment in
every case, and not just in the majority of cases.

(a)

Transparency and Being Heard

Many study group matter transfers were made in chambers and the parties seem to
have had no, or little, opportunity to be heard on the subject of transfer or to be
apprised properly of the reasons for it occurring. This affects access to procedural
justice through the principles of openness, fairness and the provision of adequate
reasons.
To begin with, openness in decision-making was arguably lacking in some 45% of
matters during the first study period. This most commonly took place in Queensland
297
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(58.5% of all transfer orders made in chambers during this time). Both Victoria and
Queensland featured prominently in the findings on chambers transfer decisions during
the second study period. Bankruptcy proceedings are prevalent in the findings on
Queensland transfer decision-making, for reasons that are not clear from the raw data
collected.

If transfers made in chambers were done with the consent of the parties, then this
would provide some transparency in the decision-making process for the parties
because it implies they instigated or otherwise agreed to the making of the transfer
order. There is no evidence obtained from the FCA computer records supporting a
conclusion the majority of chambers transfers occurred with party consent. The
existence of correspondence between the Queensland parties and relevant judges on
the subject of transfer prior to the transfer decision-making would also support a
conclusion of some transparency being present, but such evidence was not investigated
for the reasons explained in Chapter 4. Having regard to the scope and content of
relevant correspondence read on the inspected New South Wales District Registry
files, it is doubtful any Queensland correspondence, if it did exist, would yield any true
explanation for the transfers (other than to mainly notify the parties transfer was
imminent or had occurred).

The involvement of registrars in the transfer decision-making process of around 9% of
transferred cases during the study periods is far from clear. This is particularly so in
cases where FEDCAMS indicates the matters were docketed to judges. Some of these
decisions were made in open court, and the parties concerned presumably were privy
to the decision-making process and involvement of the registrar. This still does not
answer exactly how it is the matters were selected for such decision-making and the
involvement of any judge in that process.

When the findings on openness are combined with those on the extent to which the
parties had an opportunity to be heard on the subject of transfer (Chapter 7), yet more
questions are raised about the ability of various parties to engage in a fully transparent
and fair transfer process. In the order of 10% of first study period matters and 15% of
second study period matters (again, mainly in Queensland and Victoria) were
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transferred prior to any open court listing. In these primarily human rights and AAT
appeal cases, it is difficult to see how the parties had any reasonable opportunity to be
apprised (fully or at all) of the pending transfer of proceedings, for the legal
representatives of the parties to seek and obtain instructions from their clients and for
appropriate submissions to be made to the Court. It is evident from file inspections of
the New South Wales study group matters that engaging in correspondence about
prospective transfer between the Court and parties was not common practice (at least
not within that registry). It was also seen from those file inspections that it was not
customary for parties to file written submissions on transfer.
One-third of the first study period matters, and closer to half of matters in the second
study period, were transferred at, or shortly after, a first directions hearing. For those
matters, it is possible to gauge what opportunity the parties had to present their views
on transfer, assuming the period of the directions hearing is sufficient in duration. For
reasons explained previously in this thesis, what is a reasonable period within this
context is difficult to state with any degree of precision and varies from case-to-case.
The median time of the directions hearings in both periods of study is seen to be seven
minutes, a time that may be argued to fall short of a reasonable period to discuss
transfer properly when it is considered an ordinary first directions hearing (that is, one
devoid of any issue of transfer) may on average exceed 10 minutes duration.
Even if a median time of seven minutes in court were considered an adequate period
for the relevant study group matters to have had their views on transfer presented to,
and considered fully by, the Court, the question remains of the extent to which the
parties were able to properly consider and instruct on the topic of transfer. Few judges
issued parties with standard guidelines on what the Court required them to address at
the first listing. It is unlikely all legal representatives would have attended the hearing
with full client instructions on prospective transfer, and this would particularly be so in
the early days of the establishment of the FCJS when the prospect of transfer to the
FMC may have been a notion distant from the minds of the parties and their legal
representatives. If the question of transfer of the proceedings were first raised by the
judge at a directions hearing lasting less than 10 minutes, then the ability of the legal
representative to seek and obtain proper instructions from their client (who is likely to
have been absent from the courtroom) is cast in doubt.
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Regardless of whether a median time of seven minutes constitutes insufficient time for
parties to speak on transfer, what is less equivocal is that a recorded time of one
minute for a first directions hearing falls short of adequacy for the purposes of the
principle of fairness. It is acknowledged that in a few of those matters the FCA also
published a judgment, but more is said on this topic later. More often than not in such
matters, lasting a mere minute (or two) in court, it transpired that they were retransferred by the FMC after the relevant federal magistrates found they fell outside
the jurisdiction of the FMC or the court lacked the resources to hear and determine
them.
One of the factors to be taken into account when ordering a transfer of proceedings
under O 82 r 7 of the FCA Rules is that of the wishes of the parties. The New South
Wales files inspected indicate the preference of judges at the relevant time was not to
seek the wishes of the parties by correspondence. In the couple or so matters where
this did occur, it was the self-represented litigants most vocal about expressing
objection to transfer. In any event, the impression formed is that the judges seemed to
instigate the transfers, rather than the parties, who appeared for the main part not to
object to them. This non-objection is distinguishable from the parties actually
expressly consenting to the transfers; only one-fifth of the New South Wales matters
examined recorded transfer orders made by consent.
In respect of the matters where the parties unsuccessfully voiced objection to transfer,
this supports the notion of the parties having an opportunity to be heard. They had their
say against initial transfer and those submissions were rejected for whatever reason in
the consideration of the FCA. It becomes problematic, however, when the wishes of
the parties are not upheld and they are ultimately seen to have been well founded (such
as in the case of some of the re-transferred matters).
The publication of numerous judgments on transfers under the FCJS would temper the
harsh effects of some of the above results by enhancing transparency in transfer
decision-making. The findings in Chapter 8 point, however, to a relative scarcity of
published Reasons in the case of the study group matters. The researcher located only
two Reasons concerning the study group matters in respect of the first study period on
the AustLII website. This represents judgments published in only 1.4% of the 145
matters transferred during that period. The situation was marginally improved during
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the second study period. Judgments were published in almost 14% of the 59
transferred matters, however, six of the eight judgments published were virtually
identical and in respect of six related proceedings.
With respect, the transfer judgments are brief and almost template in nature and are
some way removed from meeting a substantial number of the indicia suggested in
Chapter 3 as forming the basis for adequate (written) reasons. They refer to little more
than the transfer provisions and provide scant guidance on the true basis for the
transfer being ordered. Such discussion typically occurs within a single paragraph of
the judgment. An exception is seen with respect to the Reasons published in relation to
the six related matters, which is more detailed in the reasoning for transfer, but bearing
in mind those matters were ultimately the subject of re-transfer by the FMC on
grounds similar to those canvassed in the Reasons of the FCA.
If the study group parties did not generally receive written reasons for transfer
decision, then it is expected they were at least adequately informed of the transfer
orally. For the matters transferred in chambers, it is unlikely the parties concerned
received any oral reasons for decision. For the remaining majority of matters, the
median time spent by the Court in pronouncing the decisions to transfer proceedings in
open court was just over five minutes (first study period) and seven minutes (second
study period).
As to whether the period of less than 10 minutes presents adequate opportunity to
apprise the parties of the reasons for transfer, it is conceivable a judge could provide
comprehensive, yet succinct, reasons within 10 minutes if the listing in open court is
devoted primarily to this task. This becomes more doubtful if the transfer occurs at the
first directions hearing, for the reasons canvassed previously in this chapter. Over a
dozen matters spent a mere minute in court on the pronouncement of the transfer order,
although (as alluded to previously) with a handful of matters this is partially excusable
by the publication of written reasons. In any event, there is some correlation between
the matters transferred without full explanation and the incidence of re-transfer by the
FMC.
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(b)

The FMC as a More Appropriate Forum

The ability of the study group matters to access procedural justice under the banner of
the fairness principle is evaluated further by examining the findings on whether the
transfers were to a better forum. It has been established 95% of matters were
transferred appropriately in a legal sense; that is, the FMC was seized of jurisdiction to
deal with them. The parties whose matters were re-transferred for various reasons were
required to litigate between the two courts until it was resolved which forum would
prevail. With the 'appropriately' transferred matters, and particularly those that went on
to be determined by the FMC (see Chapter 7), the question still arises whether the
transfers added to the cost, uncertainty and overall duration of the proceedings. This
thesis argues it essentially did, mostly because the litigation involved the additional
element of transfer from another court.
Ten study group matters were re-transferred by the FMC to the FCA. These retransfers may be relatively small in number, nonetheless they highlight that transfer
decision-making under the FCJS at times may be called into question and the
procedural difficulties parties may encounter when this occurs. One matter was retransferred because the FMC had not been conferred with any jurisdiction in the
primary area of the proceeding. The other nine matters were re-transferred for several
reasons, ranging from a lack of jurisdiction as regards aspects of the claims, to an
inability of the FMC to devote the required judicial resources for a lengthy and
complex hearing. Indeed, the number of matters re-transferred to the FCA might have
been double in number had the FMC also re-transferred the matters that MAGCAMS
recorded as having hearings of greater than two days duration, although the application
of the two-day hearing policy is not unequivocal in relation to general federal law
proceedings heard by that court (see Chapter 2).
In the situation of six-related trade practices proceedings in Western Australia, the
matters remained in the FMC for some 17 months before re-transfer to the FCA. This
occurred after a number of the parties had originally opposed strongly the transfer of
the matters to the FMC on grounds similar to which the federal magistrate ultimately
based his decision. The parties no doubt incurred delay, inconvenience and additional
expense as a result of both opposing the transfer to the FMC and being involved in re-
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transfer to the original court. Some of these matters had already spent a year in the
FCA prior to initial transfer.
It is accepted in this thesis that the FMC in many respects is a cheaper, simpler and
quicker court than the FCA. What it challenges is the proposition that it was absolutely
so for all of the study group matters. Several issues arise in this regard.
First, there is the situation regarding costs recovery. The parties incurred the expenses
associated with litigating in the FCA for a period, potentially without the ability to
recover all of them. For example, the applicants paid the higher FCA filing fees for the
commencement of the proceedings in that court, although in some jurisdictions
(particularly, human rights) the filing fee is identical in both courts. For the
proceedings with a protracted history in the FCA (noting that several matters had been
running for several hundreds of days prior to transfer), much of the documentation
filing and incurring of filing fees by the parties occurred in the FCA and based on the
higher rates of that court. In either scenario, there is no mechanism for the full or
partial refund of any such fee upon transfer to the FMC. At best, such disbursements
may be recovered by a litigant who incurred them upon the completion of the
proceedings in the FMC, but only if the litigant has been awarded costs as the
successful party. A cynical person might argue the litigants had paid for justice from a
superior federal court, but ultimately received inferior justice.
The findings in Chapter 7 indicate that more than one-third of the study group matters
had at least one party with a fee waiver or exemption. For these litigants, the
similarities between the relevant regulations of the two courts mean a waiver or
exemption in respect of filing fees in the FCA would result in a similar scenario in the
FMC, and vice versa. The transfer of their proceedings to the FMC did not affect their
status in this regard and so cheaper fees were not denoted.
This study exposes a number of facets of costs orders made by the FMC that raise
reservations about the Court having an unambiguous and beneficial approach to costs
in all cases. Federal magistrates in certain matters ordered the FCA scale of fees apply
in the determination of the fees payable on a party-party basis.298 In other words, the
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cheaper FMC costs schedule (discussed in Chapter 7) did not apply. Moreover, FCA
taxing officers assessed the costs effectively as though the matters had been litigated in
the FCA and by using the FCA practices and procedures. A potential problem with this
approach is that the FCA can impose a form of penalty on those applicants awarded
judgment for less than $100 000. In such cases, any part-party costs ordered to be paid
risk reduction by one-third of the amount allowable under the rules of court unless
ordered otherwise by the Court.299 The FMC procedures would be more appropriate
for the assessment of costs in less complex matters with damages awarded in a sum
less than $100 000.
There were also problems where (in the New South Wales matters examined in
Chapter 7) the FMC fixed the costs of the successful parties. The inevitable solicitorclient costs (assuming the work was not performed on a pro bono or heavily
discounted basis) would far exceed the relatively minor sums awarded in costs. In one
of the matters, the 80-page judgment suggests the proceedings were of a somewhat
complex nature, yet this is not reflected in the award of costs. The costs of the conduct
of the proceedings within the FCA prior to transfer also were not met by the scope of
the costs awarded. The solution does not necessarily lie in the respective courts
undertaking separate taxations or costs quantifications in respect of the same
proceedings, for Hely J observed in Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd300 that, in
cases of inter-court transfers, the interests of efficiency require that there be only a
single quantification of costs exercise.
A further issue arises in relation to the human rights jurisdiction. The (then) Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission undertook a review of the federal unlawful
discrimination jurisdiction for the period September 2000 – September 2002, a period
covering a significant part of the study periods of this thesis. Ordinarily, costs are said
to ‘follow the event’; that is, the unsuccessful party is ordered to pay the costs of the
successful opponent. One of the main findings of the Commission is that the FMC was
in such matters more likely to make no order that an unsuccessful applicant pay the
costs of the respondent (64% of FMC decisions compared to 50% of FCA
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decisions).301 This finding was untested in the case of the human rights study group
matters, although the review did mention briefly two of the transferred matters
(namely, the Charles and Travers matters discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis).302
What the findings of the review entail for this thesis, if correct, is that the FMC was
not necessarily a cheaper court for the human rights matters transferred during the
sample period because the successful respondents in the FMC were more likely to bear
the burden of paying their own legal costs than had they been in the FCA.
When parties in the study group matters were awarded costs in accordance with the
FMC scale of costs, there was still the potential for confusion and uncertainty in
relation to the proper amounts recoverable under such scale. Castle and Armitage,
professional costs consultants, have observed the potential for misinterpretation by
parties of what the various stages of proceedings under sch 1 of the FMC Rules
actually cover and what amounts should be most properly claimed or allowed.303 As
noted by them:

Calculations of costs under the scale is intended to be, as Driver FM
commented ...’a simple arithmetical exercise’.304 However, experience
is indicating that this is not always so; there are areas of uncertainty and
confusion and misinterpretation is common. As Raphael FM remarked
of the scale ‘[u]nfortunately, like all well-intentioned ideas it is hostage
to misunderstandings’.305

This was the experience of the researcher as a taxing officer of the FCA and registrar
of the FMC involved with costs issues in respect of non-study group matters for a
decade.

Secondly, examination of the relevant rules of court and courtroom practices
applicable at the time of the study periods leaves one questioning whether any real
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differences existed between the FCA and FMC that would have had a significant
tangible benefit to the transferred cases and their parties. At the crux of the matter is
the fact that during the first year or so of operation, the FMC developed rules of court
mirroring the FCA Rules in a number of important respects, including the conduct of
directions hearings, the filing of affidavit evidence, and other steps taken during case
preparation. There is also substantial reproduction or overlap between the respective
rules of court governing particular areas of jurisdiction, such as bankruptcy. To the
extent the FMC Rules were silent on a point of practice and procedure, the FCA Rules
applied. Any differences between the FCA and FMC rules of court were more of form
than substance.

To the extent the respective rules of court varied during the study periods, this added to
the need of the study group parties to be across different practices and procedures and
increased the potential level of confusion and uncertainty associated with litigation. It
is an issue foreshadowed by the first Chief Federal Magistrate when commenting in an
interview prior to the commencement of the FMC:

There are a number of forms I will have to look at but I am conscious of
the fact that to strictly impose another layer of forms, even if they are
more simple forms, might in itself provide more complexity both for
litigants, practitioners and for the registry staff.306

The other main reason the transfers to the FMC did not result necessarily in the study
group matters being conducted with greater simplicity is that the FMC has adopted a
docket system for the management of its matters similar to the IDS of the FCA.307 This
entails flexibility for the relevant judicial officer of either court when guiding the
parties towards determination of their dispute and in the manner by which the
courtroom proceedings are conducted. In at least one matter before the FMC,
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mentioned in Chapter 7, the flexibility enabled a party to give evidence informally
with the consent of the other side, but this is not a power confined to federal
magistrates. Federal magistrates may otherwise conduct proceedings in open court in a
manner very similar to that adopted by the FCA. The parties in general federal law
proceedings in the FMC present their evidence pursuant to the rules of evidence and
there is no, or little significant, relaxation of the practices and procedures of a federal
court of law in dealing with the making of submissions, giving of evidence by
witnesses under oath and determining questions of law and fact. The FMC often
delivers its reasons for judgment in written form rather than opt for brief ex tempore
reasons handed down at the conclusion of the hearing.308
File inspections of the FMC matters in New South Wales did not reveal any restriction
of documentation (including voluminous affidavit material) on those files consistent
with an entrenched culture of keeping proceedings as simple, and paperwork as
limited, as possible. If evidence and documentation were prepared and filed in the
FCA stage of the proceedings, it may simply have been adopted during the FMC stage
as well. When a proceeding is transferred by the FCA to the FMC, so too are the
majority of the documents contained on the FCA file. It appears, therefore, that the
FMC docket system operates in a similar manner to that of the FCA insofar as the
nature and scope of material filed by the parties would imply.
The above views are countered to some extent by the results of two FMC surveys on
‘awareness and performance’ conducted in the first two years of its establishment
(alluded to previously). After the first 12 months of operation, an external consultant
contacted a sample group of legal practitioners who had used the FMC during the
previous 12 months. Over 80% of the respondents had been involved in family law
matters, so not all of the results of the survey are necessarily directly relevant for the
purposes of this thesis. Nevertheless, it revealed that:
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 Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated there was sufficient
information available about the FMC, but that the general public itself
did not necessarily have it;
 Some practitioners were of the view the interaction between the FMC
and FCA (and Family Court) could be clearer;
 There was a need for greater information to be available about the
general federal law jurisdiction of the court;
 Around 88% of respondents believed the FMC was meeting its
objectives of providing a simpler court, however, some practitioners
commented it was still very complex for self-represented litigants and
the forms were just as challenging as the other courts; and
 Most respondents found the federal magistrates were appropriately
informal.309

In the following year of operation, a further survey found a similar number of
respondents had been involved in family law proceedings and so, again, this should be
borne in mind when considering the results of such surveys for the purposes of this
thesis. What is of relevance here is that the survey revealed a decline in the number of
respondents who had found the FMC to be a simpler court (down from 88% to 76%).
The differences in court practice and procedure (less formality) was regarded as being
less apparent in relation to general federal law matters. There was a similar decline in
the number of respondents believing the FMC to be less formal (77% compared to
85% the preceding year).310
Finally, it was shown in Chapter 7 the FMC was a relatively quick court for the
resolution of the majority of study group matters that were heard and determined by
the Court. Two negative aspects arise in respect of those matters.
Of particular concern are the instances of matters running for extended periods in a
particular registry of the FMC - 1200 days in one case and for some 1700 days in
another example. These periods far exceed the policies of the FCA and FMC on case
disposition time rates, as well as the period of three months deemed appropriate by the
309
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FCA for a judgment to be reserved post-hearing.311 An overall increase in the time
taken by the FMC to determine the second study period transferred matters was also
observed from the data collected. This is consistent with results of the 2002 Survey,
finding a decline in the number of respondents believing the FMC to be quicker (down
from 88% to 76% since the previous survey commissioned) and that the time taken to
get a hearing date and to hand down judgment had increased in some locations.312 The
FMC reported on the compromise of its ability to meet the standard for the timely
delivery of judgments during 2002-03 (and 2003-04) by reference to 'the considerable
demand on the court's filings, which have been greater than the court's capacity to
finalise matters'.313 Given the demands upon the limited resources of the FMC by the
time of the second study period, it is commendable the FMC was able to determine the
bulk of the matters studied in the timeframe it did.
One final point should be addressed regarding the time taken to finalise the transferred
matters studied. If the overall duration of these proceedings is taken into account, from
the date of commencement of proceedings in the FCA to the determination of the
matters in the FMC, then it could be argued the matters were not heard and determined
in a timely fashion (within the six-month policy timeframe of the FMC). The time
spent by the proceedings in the FCA, added to the time spent in the FMC, results in a
collective median time of 264.5 days (first study period) and 266.5 days (second study
period). The former period is comprised of numerous matters that had been
commenced in the FCA prior to the establishment of the FCJS. Even though the FMC
dealt with the matters on average within a six-month period, the overall duration of the
proceedings during 2000-01 appears similar to the duration seen for the second period,
a time when the FCA seems to have been swifter in transferring matters, but the FMC
struggled more to finalise matters within six months of transfer.

9.3

Compatibility of the FCJS and Procedural Justice

At first glance, the objective of the FCJS of transferring FCA cases that are ‘less
complex’ to the FMC appears intrinsically compatible with the notion of access to
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justice. It provides litigants with access to a court forum that is potentially more costeffective, expeditious and simple in its practices and procedures than the FCA. In
practice, however, this research reveals the FCJS has the potential to affect adversely
the delivery of procedural justice to FCA litigants whose forum for dispute resolution
is altered through the exercise of judicial discretion.
What is the underlying cause (or what are the causes) of the FCJS seemingly failing to
promote all of the principles of procedural justice in all of the study group matters?
Was this as an inevitable result of the nature of the FCJS itself or did the problem lie,
either completely or in part, with the implementation of the system? The answer is
approached by analysing the inter-relationship between the intrinsic nature of the FCJS
statutory framework and the implementation of the FCJS in practice. Whether there is
an inherent tension between any of the objectives of the FCJS (as outlined in Chapter
1) and access to procedural justice also sheds light on the workings of the system (and
is developed in Chapter 10). The further question of what is the case management
context in which judges can transfer matters to the FMC unilaterally or swiftly is also
considered in seeking to understand better the approach of the FCA in relation to
transfers.

9.3.1

The Intrinsic Nature of the FCJS

Several aspects of the FCJS statutory framework (examined in Chapter 2) may serve to
impact on the attainment of justice in practice; namely, the:
 Statutory mechanism that allows a judicial decision-maker to make
a transfer order of their own motion;
 Ability for a transfer decision to be made in chambers and not
necessarily in open court;
 Lack of any formal requirement that a transfer decision be made at a
certain stage of the proceedings, that was neither too premature nor
too long after its commencement;
 Absence of any explicit reference to the criterion of complexity
within the relevant statutory provisions;
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 Absence of any formal requirement the judicial decision-maker
provide detailed or adequate reasons for transfer decision, including
written reasons; and
 Broad and potentially vague nature of the statutory transfer criteria,
such as the reference in s 32AB(6)(d) of the FCA Act to ‘the
interests of the administration of justice’.

The above aspects are not necessarily detrimental in their own right. Many are in fact
essential in providing a judge with the necessary flexibility to do what is best for the
management of each individual case and for its most swift and efficient determination.
Judges may commonly determine matters ex parte in chambers in other types of
applications.314 The approach adopted by the legislature in relation to FMC transfers is
similar to that relating to state and territory courts under the cross-vesting scheme or
remittals from the High Court to the FCA. It is neither unorthodox nor legally
defective. The legislature has statutorily required of tribunals that adequate reasons for
decision be provided in matters (particularly those involving administrative decisions
before the AAT),315 but such requirement has not been bestowed statutorily upon the
FCA, as a superior court.316 Again, this approach is consistent with that of other case
transfer legislative schemes, such as the cross-vesting scheme.

9.3.2

Implementation of the System

Where a problem arises is when the above-listed facets of the FCJS contribute to, or
provide a basis for, the making of transfer decisions that do not accord fully with the
principles of procedural justice. Potential problems with the implementation of the
FCJS and transfer decision-making processes, as observed with the study group
matters, include:
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 The transfer order is made so expeditiously following the
commencement of the proceedings that the full scope and nature of
the proceedings are difficult (if not impossible) to gauge accurately;
 The dearth of written judgments on the subject of FCA case
transfers to the FMC;
 Neither written nor oral reasons for transfer are provided in the case
of decision-making occurring solely within chambers;
 Some inconsistency in judicial practice in respect of the extent of
publication and content of written reasons for inter-registry and
inter-court transfers compared with those for transfers to the FMC;
 To the extent written reasons are being published on the topic of
FCA-to-FMC transfers, they are for the main part brief and generic;
 Any oral reasons provided are typically brief, arguably inadequate
to explain fully the reason(s) for transfer and potentially difficult to
readily access for non-parties;
 Matters transferred contrary to the express wishes of the (majority
of) parties concerned;
 Matters inappropriately transferred to the FMC, for example, in
cases where the FMC lacks jurisdiction to deal with the specific
area(s) of law arising in the proceedings or where the proceedings
require a lengthy hearing;
 Matters being transferred prior to a first court return date and in
chambers, in circumstances where the parties seemingly were not
availed of the opportunity to be heard of the question of potential
transfer;
 The transfer order is made in open court, but the duration of such
appearance of the parties before the Court is so brief as to cast doubt
over the ability of the parties to consider, or be heard on, the issue
of transfer properly;
 It is unclear how a registrar, rather than a judge, is making the
transfer order;
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 The transfer of matters to the FMC in situations where the matters
were not necessarily dealt with more cheaply, simply and quickly as
had been envisaged by the legislature and FCA;
 Long-running proceedings in the FCA are transferred to a new court
when they are in fact ready for hearing (unless the proceedings are
less complex and the FMC is really in a better position than the
FCA to offer a prompt hearing date); and
 The idiosyncratic approaches of judges to the management of their
individual dockets.

The above findings suggest that the notion of case transfers by the FCA to the FMC is
theoretically consistent with the principles of procedural justice, but that the very
nature of the FCJS itself facilitates any digressions from the principles of justice in
practice. The legislature has not gone far enough in seeking to ensure its reform of the
federal civil justice system is safe guarded from the FCJS being implemented in
individual matters in a manner that (unintentionally) serves to undermine the quality of
justice dispensed. There is no suggestion any individual judicial decision-maker has set
out to deprive litigants of access to justice. Instead, what we have seen with the study
group matters is a collective, and perhaps unforeseen, compromising of procedural
justice - in one matter there may be evidence of unfairness in the transfer decision,
whereas with another matter the problem may have been the absence of the provision
of adequate reasons for decision. This has occurred because there is no legislative
requirement for adequate reasons for transfer, the judge may order the transfer of their
own motion (and contrary to the wishes of the parties), and so on. In short, in striving
to give the FCA sufficient flexibility in its decision-making processes, the system
enables this conduct to occur and even though it goes contrary to its stated objective of
making justice more accessible for litigants.

9.3.3

A Tension between FCJS Objectives and Procedural Justice?

A further possible explanation for the overall findings of the study group is that there
exists a tension in practice between the objectives of the FCJS, particularly the
objective of FCA workload reduction, and the principles of procedural justice. It may
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be recalled from Chapter 1 that the FCJS has a two-fold objective: (a) to provide a
cheaper, simpler, quicker forum for federal law disputes of a less complex nature for
litigants who choose or otherwise find themselves litigating in that forum; and (b) to
enable the FCA to reduce its workload by transferring appropriate matters to the FMC.
Were some of the study group matters transferred swiftly, without adequate reasons
furnished or the decision made in chambers, as a consequence of FCA workload
reduction endeavours? The desire to reduce the workload of the Court is not in itself a
flawed objective, provided the matters being transferred are in fact going to a ‘better
forum’ consistent with objective (a) above (as discussed previously) and there arises
no perceived or actual compromise of the attainment of procedural justice in the
process. There should also be no perception that access to justice was compromised
because the FCA put its own interests ahead of those of the litigants. It is seen the
busiest registry of the Court (the New South Wales District Registry) statistically was
not most likely to transfer proceedings during the study periods, but the phenomenon
of workload reduction can be viewed in broader terms; namely, as it relates to the
workload of the entire FCA and not just individual registries.
Two questions arise here. First, how is it that the FCA can transfer matters to the FMC
unilaterally and swiftly or seemingly as part of an effort to reduce workload - what is
the case management context in which this occurs? Secondly, by transferring the study
group matters, did the FCA reduce its workload - was this objective of the FCJS
actually realised in practice and, if so, to what avail? The broader implications of any
tension between the objectives of the FCJS (and law reform) and access to justice are
explored further in the final chapter.

9.3.4

Managerial Judging

The ability of a judge to transfer matters in a manner within his or her sole discretion
occurs because of the FCJS statutory framework (as argued in Chapter 2), but also due
to 'managerial judging’. Coined originally in the 1980s by Professor Judith Resnik in
the United States,317 this concept generally is regarded as a feature of the Australian
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federal justice system.318 In Australia, as elsewhere in adversarial systems in the world,
greater judicial control over the management of proceedings has come about largely
due to the growth in the volume and complexity of modern litigation over the past few
decades. This ‘philosophical approach’ to case management is said to be an inevitable
transformation of the judicial role.319 Its benefits include the ability of a judge to place
time limits on litigation processes, make orders and directions of their own motion and
restrict the availability or scope of various pre-trial procedures in an effort to save
costs and reduce delay.320 The FCA sees managerial judging as an integral part of its
IDS (as described in Chapter 2) and overall case management approach:

[M]anagerial judging must reflect the interests of justice in every sense.
The principal theme of Lord Woolf's reforms is that dealing with a case
justly is achieved, rather than denied, by managerial procedures that
embody the principles of equality, economy, proportionality and
expedition. These reforms parallel the evolution of the Federal Court's
case management philosophies and methods.321

The attitude of the FCA about managerial judging prevailing in case management is
demonstrated further by case law:
The Court always remains in overall control of the proceedings before
it. Judges have power, until the hearing is concluded, to make, and to
continue to make, such directions as seem to them best suited properly
and adequately to manage and direct the cases in their lists. ...[I]f an
investigation of a matter at a directions hearing reveals that existing
directions...are not adequate for, or are not suited to, the needs of the
case, the court has a duty to substitute appropriate directions for the
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existing ones, if necessary, against the will of the parties
themselves...322

Managerial judging in the FCA arises also due to legislation. Under the FCA Act, the
Chief Justice is ‘responsible for ensuring the effective, orderly and expeditious
discharge of the business of the Court’.323 Post 2009, FCA case management powers
are further enshrined in the FCA Act under pt VB. This overarching purpose of the
approach to case management, embodied in a practitioner and litigant notice issued by
the Chief Justice of the FCA, requires the Court and parties to seek the just resolution
of disputes as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.324 This is seemingly
consistent with the objective of the FCJS that federal matters be litigated cheaply,
simply and quickly. It is noteworthy, however, that the Notice does not include
reference to FCA-to-FMC transfers when it outlines the factors to which the Court
may be expected to have regard when considering what the interests of justice require
in a particular case.
Managerial judging has its staunch critics. Relevant to the findings of this thesis,
Professor Resnik argues that '[m]anagerial judges frequently work beyond the public
view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions, and out
of reach of appellate review'.325 As the professor notes, the problem stems from the
fact 'judicial management may be teaching judges to value their statistics, such as the
number of case dispositions, more than they value the quality of their dispositions'. 326
The doubts of Professor Resnik as to the benefits of the practical operation of
managerial judging arguably resonate in the words of a retiring judge of the FCA some
three decades later, who similarly queried of the FCA system:
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The question must be asked whether active case management is, in fact,
leading to shorter and cheaper cases. I do not know the answer to that
but it is certainly not clear that this has been so. Are cases prepared for
hearing sooner than would be the case with less active management?
Again, I do not know, but there is little evidence that it is so .... The
problem is that there has been no empirical assessment of the costs and
benefits of active case management as practised in Australia compared
with a system that has a clear set of steps to be taken by the parties (that
do not depend upon the vagaries of different judges) and with much
more party autonomy permitted.327

As indicated above, managerial judging occurs in the FCA partly because of the
operation of the IDS in that court. The IDS itself has been the subject of criticism
because of perceived unfairness to the parties and various inefficiencies in the delivery
of justice. The Law Council conducted a review of the FCA IDS in early 2002.
Although supportive of the system in terms of the benefits it produces for the Court,
profession and community through promoting greater efficient litigation, it did express
concerns about the scope for improvement that a properly utilised IDS could bring for
the swifter resolution of matters.328 It also expressed disagreement with the practice of
judges providing significant delegations of power to the registrars of a particular
registry, which it saw as adversely affecting the achievement of the objectives of the
system.329 More recently, it was reported in 2006 that members of the legal profession
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interviewed felt the IDS was not being managed by the Court in the manner originally
intended; that cost, delay and inconsistency remain for the main part.330
Similarly, the ALRC has considered whether fairness is enhanced by a large measure
of party control over the management of the litigation and that managerial judging
means parties perceive particular practices and procedures employed by the judge as
less fair. It has suggested that a managerial judge heightens the idiosyncrasies of the
Australian legal system and this, in turn, may mean the system operates unfairly for the
parties involved.331
There are, unsurprisingly, counter-arguments presented in the literature in response to
criticisms of managerial judging. They are essentially to the effect experienced judges
are accustomed to the making of discretionary decisions ‘in the interests of justice’,
and they take into account fairness towards a litigant balanced against broader notions
of fairness, such as the expeditious delivery of justice to other litigants within the
system.332 Such counter-arguments are pertinent within the context of case
management in the FCA generally, and within the specific area of FCA-to-FMC
transfers. It may be recalled from Chapter 8 that one of the few written reasons for
transfer published during the study periods indicated a key consideration in the
decision to transfer six-related matters pertained to the desire to facilitate ‘the
expeditious hearing and determination of other matters awaiting hearing in [the]
Court’.333 This was perceived to be in the interests of the due administration of justice
for court users in general. Any intrusion into the rights of the parties whose matters are
being transferred to the FMC might be viewed as a trade-off to the State providing the
necessary personnel and facilities for the determination of their disputes.334
Nonetheless, the High Court has made it clear ‘the ultimate aim of a court is the
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attainment of justice and no principle of case management can be allowed to supplant
that aim’.335
Herein lies the dilemma for the FCA. On the one hand, it seeks to deliver justice by
providing swift management of cases deemed appropriate for transfer to the FMC.
This satisfies the objective of providing access to justice expeditiously and of reducing
the workload of the FCA so that greater focus may be given to complex matters. On
the other hand, however, the quick transfer decision-making process may lead to the
taking of certain shortcuts, such as the failure to provide adequate reasons for transfer
decision, avoiding the making of transfer orders in open court, and the like. Such
argument finds indirect support from the ALRC when it said in 1987 the following:
One view is that managerial judging and case management may result
in the existing system of justice being replaced with a lower quality
system of justice, albeit one that is cheaper and quicker. The concern is
that case processing may become an end in itself, rather than the means
of achieving justice, with the managerial focus on speeding up the
process, rather than on improving the quality of decisions. Management
targets and other statistical goals have the potential to become improper
influences in decision-making.336
The FCA has, therefore, an unenviable task of balancing many competing needs, made
more difficult still by the pressures for financial accountability and how best to spend
public resources, as addressed previously in Chapter 3. The question is whether such
pressures, and the practices that eventuate from them, can sit comfortably and
consistently with the principles of procedural justice.337 The results of this research
suggest there may be a compromising of some of those principles in the process if
judicial decision-makers do not pay greater heed to the principles when exercising
discretion in individual cases.
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The task for the FCA when transferring cases is to perform, amongst other things, a
fine balancing act in timing. If a matter is transferred after progressing in the Court for
a long period, then to transfer it to a new forum unfamiliar with the intricacies of the
dispute, can potentially add to the delay and expense of its finalisation (unless the
judge is truly unable to provide the parties with a hearing date for an extended period
of time). This undermines the objective of the FCJS of enhancing access to justice
through cheaper, simpler and quicker litigation. By contrast, if a judge were to transfer
the matter too swiftly, and in circumstances where there is still not the depth of
understanding of the full nature of the matter, then this might lead to an inappropriate
transfer. There may be an under-estimation of the complexity of the matter, the
required hearing time or the jurisdictional issues affecting the ability of the FMC to
determine the matter, resulting in potential re-transfer to the FCA. The correct
approach must depend upon the specific circumstances of each case, but conceivably
sits somewhere in between these two scenarios.

9.3.5

What was Achieved?

It has been argued that many of the study group matters did not receive access to all
four principles of procedural justice. If this is correct, did at least the FCA achieve the
objective of the FCJS of reducing its workload to be able to devote greater attention to
more complex matters? There is evidence to suggest the practices and workload of the
Court changed following the establishment of the FCJS.
A perusal of the FCA annual reports over the period 1990 to 2008 reveals an
interesting trend relating to its transfers to other courts. As considered in Chapter 8,
both prior and subsequent to the creation of the FMC, the FCA has transferred matters
to other federal courts and to various state and territory courts in accordance with
federal statutes. The introduction of the FCJS in mid-2000 witnessed a marked
increase in the number of inter-court transfers from the FCA, which had hitherto been
consistent, as shown by the following table:
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Table 9.1: FCA inter-court transfers during the period 1990–2008.(a)
YEAR

ALL INTER-

TRANSFERS TO

COURT

FMC

TRANSFERS
1990-91

57

Not applicable (N/A)

1991-92

52

N/A

1992-93

26

N/A

1993-94

53

N/A

1994-95

53

N/A

1995-96

64

N/A

1996-97

58

N/A

1997-98

49

N/A

1998-99

43

N/A

1999-00

57

N/A

2000-01

162

141(b)

2001-02

263

246(c)

2002-03

736

695

2003-04

462

442

2004-05

204

197

2005-06

120

80

2006-07

73

62(d)

2007-08

54

49

FCJS established

Sources and notes:
(a)

Source: FCA, Annual Reports for the periods 1990-1991 to 2007-2008.
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(b)

According to annual report figures. The figure is deemed higher in this

thesis for the reasons explained in Chapter 4.
(c)

This figure includes a high number of migration transfers with the

introduction of that jurisdiction in the FMC.
(d)

The FCA and FMC have different figures regarding transfers in their

respective annual reports for this period and the following reporting year.

The picture emerges from the statistical information that the workload of the FCA
prior to the establishment of the FCJS had for the main part increased steadily each
year since 1990. The number of matters transferred to other courts remained mostly
consistent (apart from 1992-93). Then, in the first year of the operation of the FCJS, a
substantial increase in the number of inter-court transfers occurred, the bulk of these
transfers being to the FMC. Transfers to this court consistently represented the vast
majority of inter-court transfers from the FCA during the periods 2000-01 to 2007-08,
as illustrated in the following graph. Many of the transfers were of migration matters,
as indicated by the sharp increase in the number of transfers in 2001-02, and
coinciding with the conferral of migration law jurisdiction upon the FMC. With the
changes to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in late 2005 vesting the FMC with the bulk of
migration law jurisdiction for matters decided at first instance, a corresponding marked
decline in the number of FMC transfers occurred, a trend which continued over the
next few years.
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Figure 9.1: FCA-to-FMC transfers compared to other inter-court transfers for the
periods 2000-01 to 2007-08.*

Number of transfers
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Sources:
*

FCA, Annual Reports for the periods 2000-01 to 2007-08.

Such clear utilisation by the FCA of transfer mechanisms under the FCJS raises a
number of questions. Why did the emphasis upon FMC transfers occur? Was it part of
managerial judging and in the pursuit of reducing FCA workloads? Are the statutory
criteria for transfer to the FMC more vague and broad than those for transfers to other
courts, enabling judges to exercise their discretion more liberally? Many of the types
of cases previously transferred to the state and territory courts involved several of the
areas of concurrent jurisdiction under the FCJS (for example, matters under the
AD(JR) Act and TPA). What became different from 2000-01 onward? The answers are
not immediately obvious.
That the FCA arguably saw the FMC as both an appropriate forum for less complex
matters, and as a beneficial means of reducing its own workload and increasing its
performance indicators, is reflected in the following statement made immediately
preceding the introduction of the new court:
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... [T]he Court expects that in future years a greater proportion of its
workload will consist of complex cases as simpler matters are
commenced in, or transferred to, the FMC. This will have an impact on
the Court's ability to meet its goal of disposing of 85 per cent of matters
within 18 months.338

After the FCJS had been in operation for a year, the FCA reported that '[t]he reduction
in the number of simpler cases has enabled the Court to increase the number of
complex cases completed in the reporting year'.339 Interestingly, it made no direct
mention of the impact of the establishment of the FMC or transfers to it, but there is
little doubt the FCA perceives the FMC as a valuable means by which it can seek to
reduce its own workload. In 2002-03, the FCA claimed the decrease in the number of
matters in its original jurisdiction older than 18 months had continued to decrease from
the peak in 2001, a decrease which it felt ‘confirms the positive impact that the [FMC]
is having on the Court's capacity to finalise more complex matters more quickly’.340
This research uncovered that almost 84% of judges engaged primarily in FCA work
used the transfer mechanism at least once during the first year of the establishment of
the FCJS in the management of their docket. By the third year of the system, however,
the percentage had dropped to 50% of judges, with no clear indication of the reason(s)
for the decrease other than the fact fewer non-migration matters were transferred in the
latter period.
If case transfers represent a reduction of the workload of judges, they do not constitute
a positive change to the workload of the relevant registry. As described in Chapter 2,
the registries of the FCA serve as registries of the FMC in the provision of
administrative and other assistance to that court and services to its general federal law
jurisdiction parties. A FCA matter transferred to the FMC does not remove the matter
from the workload of the FCA registries, and in one regard increases the workload;
namely, the administrative duties associated with the creation of the new FMC file.
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The reports of the FCA send mixed messages. Accurate and reliable assessments of
actual reductions in workload and meeting of performance indicators can be a difficult
task. It is not assisted by somewhat confusing figures provided in the above-mentioned
FCA annual report publications, which appear to vary from year-to-year as to what
types of matters and criteria are included in the definitions or calculations used to
report on the workload of the Court, the number of filings and matter disposition rates.
The Court has tended to report that its workload (number of filings) consistently
increased for each subsequent reporting period and that its case disposition rates and
performance benchmarks remained fairly uniform and consistent over the past two
decades. In other words, the introduction of the FCJS does not appear to have resulted
in any significant change to the performance levels of the FCA (as reported by it).
Possibly the single most important exception to this is the reduction in workload
caused by the transfer of up to hundreds of migration matters in any given year.
If the FCA benefited from a reduction in workload through the operation of the FCJS
(including the study group matter transfers), then it seems that any such benefits are
not necessarily being seen by the public in the form of enhanced access to justice. The
Productivity Commission has found the cost of justice in the FCA increased by almost
45% in a single year resulting in every case finalised in the Court in 2004-05 costing
taxpayers $16 767 in recurrent funding.341 In 2006, the Steering Committee of
Government Services released data showing the FCA struggled with significant
backlogs with more than two-thirds of its cases pending for more than two years rising
to 42 %, some 10% higher than the preceding year.342 The media reports the FCA has
abandoned the Steering Committee national standard on backlogs for a less demanding
one of 85% of cases being determined within 18 months of filing set by the Court
itself.343 Differences in approaches to assessing performance indicators and workloads
of the FCA render more difficult the task of evaluating the true nature of the operation
of the FCJS.
341
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The actual effect of the operation of the FCJS in reducing the non-migration cases
workload of the FCA in relation to its original jurisdiction, so that it may concentrate
on the more expeditious and effective disposition of complex cases, is thus far from
clear. What is more apparent, however, is the tangible effect the operation of the FCJS
has had on the use of judicial resources of the Court nationally within the context of
appeals. This is capable of assessment from findings of the study group matters that
returned to the FCA on appeal following their determination by the FMC.
Prior to considering those findings, it is helpful to explain briefly the nature of appeals
from the FMC to the FCA as applicable during the study periods. An appeal may lie as
of right from the FMC to the FCA pursuant to s 24 of the FCA Act. The appellate
jurisdiction of the Court is covered under s 25, and amendments have occurred with
respect to the provisions governing appeals from the FMC since the study periods
(specifically, under the new s 25(1AA) appeals from the FMC are to be heard by a
single judge, unless a Full Court is considered more appropriate). Under the former
relevant wording of s 25(1AA), an appeal from the FMC to the FCA was to be heard
and determined by a Full Court unless the Chief Justice determined the matter was
suitable to be dealt with by a single judge sitting within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court.
Typically, under O 52 of the FCA Rules, an FMC appeal at the time of filing received
a date for a first directions hearing before a single judge. At such directions hearing (or
at some further date) the parties would be invited to make submissions as to whether
the matter is appropriate (sufficiently complex) to warrant determination by a Full
Court of the FCA; that is, a minimum of three judges (in exceptional cases, as many as
five judges). Upon consideration of those submissions, the relevant judge would
prepare a memorandum to the Chief Justice with his or her recommendation as to the
composition of the bench at the hearing of the appeal (a Full Court or, typically for less
complex matters, a single judge sitting within the appellate jurisdiction). The Chief
Justice would then provide a determination of the composition of the bench pursuant to
the (former) wording of s 25(1AA).
In the experience of the researcher whilst involved in FCA appeal case management,
most FMC appeals were during the study periods determined on appeal by a single
judge, which is consistent with the notion that the appeal is not particularly complex
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given it was either commenced in, or transferred to, the FMC. Typically, appeals
involving general federal law decisions of the Chief Federal Magistrate are heard and
determined by a Full Court of the FCA. Single judge appeals can take slightly longer
to determine than those before a Full Court (mainly because of the forces at play with
the operation of the IDS), whereas Full Court hearings and case management are
particularly streamlined (depending upon the nature of the case and parties).
In relation to the study group matters, 22 decisions of the FMC (or 10.8% of the
transferred matters) were appealed to the FCA. Of those 22 appeal proceedings, four
matters discontinued or did not otherwise proceed to hearing. According to FCA
computer records, each such remaining matter was heard and determined by a single
judge. Most matters also had the involvement of an additional judge at a single brief
directions hearing (callover) in preparation for hearing of the appeal. The MAGCAMS
records relating to the six Kurniadi matters (referred to Chapter 8) imply appeal
proceedings were on foot at one stage, however, this is difficult to reconcile with the
reference in the same records to the matters being re-transferred to the FCA. The
matters had a particularly convoluted and protracted history in the FCA and FMC and,
accordingly, it is prudent to leave them out of the findings in the table below.

Table 9.2: Bench composition for study group matter appeals.
BENCH COMPOSITION

Full Court Single Judge

First Study Period Matters

0

14

Second Study Period Matters

0

4

The above findings mean that the transfer of proceedings to the FMC would
significantly reduce the number of judges that would deal potentially with the study
group matters upon any appeal from the FMC. There would be a single judge (or
possibly two) involved in the entire appeal process. By contrast, if the matters had not
been transferred to the FMC (and assuming they would have been appealed even if a
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judge had determined them), then the minimum number of judicial resources involved
with the matters at first instance and on appeal would be four judges. There would be
the original docket judge at first instance and then a further three judges sitting as a
Full Court on appeal, plus the judge responsible for the conduct of the Full Court
callover. Appeals from a single judge of the FCA are heard and determined by (at
least) three judges sitting as a Full Court.344
The existence of a philosophy, if not a formal policy, of considering the implications
for judicial resources within the context of FMC transfers and potential appeal
proceedings that may eventuate is arguably demonstrated in FCA transfer judgments,
both during the study periods and subsequent thereto. In the latter scenario, there is the
judgment in Kheir's Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Ltd.345 In that
matter, the Court of its own motion made a FMC transfer order in respect of a trade
practices matter. In noting the parties neither consented to nor opposed the order for
transfer, her Honour went on to hold:
I agree that it is not clear whether the matter will be heard more quickly
and cheaply in the [FMC] but there is certainly no basis to conclude that
the order would result in a delayed or more expensive resolution of the
dispute. The potential for resolution of an appeal by a single judge if
appropriate, rather than a Full Court, is also relevant.346

Her Honour considered also the views of the transferring judge in the case of
Kurniadi347 (discussed previously) to the effect a transfer to the FMC has the potential
for savings in judicial resources in the event the matter should be appealed to the FCA
in the future. This was seen as being key to the interests of the administration of
justice, the transfer criterion in s 32AB(6)(d) of the FCA Act. This position is reflected
in a further decision of the FCA involving the same judge, but it should be borne in
mind the words were said within the context of a migration matter transfer and that
such matters at the relevant time represented a case management problem for the FCA:
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However, one aspect of the administration of justice is the efficiency of
the allocation of resources. In many matters such as this there is a
familiar pattern of a trial at first instance followed, virtually
automatically, by an appeal to the Full Court of the [FCA]. This means
that four judges of this Court review the documents and Tribunal’s
reasons, and three of those judges will also review the decision of the
judge at first instance. Alternatively, if this matter is transferred to and
heard by the [FMC] and then there were an appeal this Court, it is likely
that there will be less consumption of judicial resources. There are
provisions whereby the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in such
circumstances may be exercised by a single judge. Any further appeal
would be by way of application to the High Court of Australia for
special leave to appeal. The likelihood is, in my view, (given the pattern
of these cases) that a transfer of this application will give rise to a
considerable saving of judicial resources, being a vital part of the
administration of justice. At the very least there will be the potential for
such saving. In my view, the administration of justice includes not only
the giving of a fair hearing to the parties in this matter and a right of
appeal, but also the expeditious hearing and determination of other
matters awaiting hearing in this Court.348

In its annual reporting, the FCA has indicated openly that
[a]ny increase in the number of Full Court hearings adds to the
workload of the Court and, as judges who sit on Full Courts have less
time to devote to their own individual docket work, impacts on the
Court's ability to dispose of first instance work...The Court monitors the
effects on its workload of increases in the number of appeals and, as
necessary or relevant, will introduce changes to appellate practice and
procedure to ameliorate or limit these effects so that the Court continues
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to deal with its appellate and first instance work in an efficient,
effective and timely manner.349

The case law discussed above supports a perception gained from the findings of this
study that the Court is using FMC transfers as a means to ameliorate or limit the
effects of its workloads, if not unequivocally so within the original jurisdiction of the
Court within particular registries, then certainly at the national level in relation to its
appellate workload. The findings of the appealed study group matters verify that the
FCJS operates efficiently in achieving this goal.

9.4

Conclusions about FCA Case Transfers

The findings arising from the study group matters paint a picture of the general
attainment of access to procedural justice for the majority of matters studied, but when
one looks closely the picture reveals also certain failings of the operation of the FCJS
in practice resulting in negative outcomes for litigants seeking access to justice. This
occurs because of a combination of the intrinsic nature of the FCJS, its implementation
by the FCA (as studied) and the potential incompatibility between the objective of
FCA workload reduction and full adherence with the principles of procedural justice.
In particular, the operation of the IDS and managerial judging enables idiosyncratic
approaches to the implementation of the FCJS by the FCA. What case transfers under
the FCJS ultimately achieve is the reduction of workload of the FCA within its
appellate jurisdiction.
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CHAPTER 10: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF LAW REFORM
'The most odious of oppressions are those which mask as justice.' 350

10.1 Reflections
This chapter reflects upon what this thesis sought to achieve and what it ultimately
reveals, both as to the transferred cases studied and for access to justice law reform in
general. It also addresses the implications of the findings of this study for interested
stakeholders and the development of jurisprudence, and offers suggestions for law and
policy reform and for further research in the fields of FCA-to-FMC case transfer
decision-making and access to justice.

10.2

The Research Experiences

Chapter 1 explained the impetus for this research into the workings of the FCJS and
the effect of its operation on access to justice. Significant law reform of the Australian
federal civil justice system (confined in this thesis to the FCJS, but involving also
family law matters and the Family Court of Australia) occurred in 2000 with the
creation of the FMC as an additional federal court for the cheaper, simpler and quicker
resolution of 'less complex' federal law disputes. Under this system, the FCA exercises
the power to transfer matters it regards as 'less complex' to the FMC, and thus reduces
its workload to concentrate upon its 'more complex' cases. Noting the initial
reservations of the Law Council concerning the introduction of the FCJS to achieve the
goal of enhancing access to federal civil justice (Chapter 1), it is important to learn
whether the operation of the FCJS creates any impediments to access to justice for
matters transferred by the FCA to the FMC.
The above research question was answered by taking a group of 204 (now finalised)
transferred matters and evaluating, using quantitative and qualitative research methods
in Chapters 5 to 8, the extent to which the transfer decision-making processes adopted
in those matters accorded with four main principles of procedural justice (equality,
350
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openness, fairness and the provision of adequate reasons for decision). Access to
procedural justice, rather than any other approach to evaluating access to justice, was
chosen for two main reasons. First, the FCA has significant power in its discretionary
transfer decision-making, both in accordance with the transfer provisions and as part of
its approach to case management under the IDS (Chapter 2). Secondly, it is important
litigants can participate fully (consistent with the participation model) in a court
system that affords them due process and fairness, is accountable and promotes public
confidence (Chapter 3).
There were both benefits of, and limitations with, the research methods and tools used
or available to evaluate the degree of procedural justice provided to the study group
matters (Chapter 4). For example, the existence of few (detailed) published judgments
on the transfer decisions made it difficult to understand the true reasons for the
transfers as they relate to the specific matters. Transcript of court listings at which the
study group matters were transferred would have shed light on precisely what
transpired on such occasions and any reasoning provided by the Court, but
unfortunately was not available. It was consequently necessary to seek to evaluate the
adequacy of time spent in open court for the parties to be heard on the subject of
transfer and for the judge to give reasons for transfer by reference to a more subjective
measure of 10 minutes (anything under that period is arguably inadequate for the
purposes of due process). Although not a perfect measure, this method enabled
quantitative evaluation of what could have transpired in open court within this
relatively brief timeframe and the appropriateness of the speed of transfer decisionmaking.
Using quantitative and qualitative methods in Chapter 7 to evaluate whether the FMC
was a cheaper, simpler and quicker forum for the resolution of the study group matters
helped to reveal that there are a number of hidden facets concerning transferred matters
in practice (including pertaining to the payment of court fees and legal costs). File
inspections particularly assisted the researcher in discovering the volume of paperwork
filed in respect of several matters, thereby suggesting the FMC was not necessarily a
simpler forum. Using a two-fold quantitative approach to the question of 'speed' meant
that the issue could be assessed from the perspective of the time spent litigating in the
FMC, as well as the true overall length of the entire proceedings.
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Inaccessibility to all of the study group matter files was regrettable, but unavoidable.
The court computer records pertaining to each matter were instrumental to the conduct
of the research, although they were occasionally incomplete (for example, the status of
legal representation of a party - Chapter 5). Working with information on the nature
and extent of the workload of the FCA was also complicated at times because the
Court does not always keep full or consistent statistics concerning its workload in
individual registries in all the areas of concurrent jurisdiction. In the end, the
researcher was grateful for her professional knowledge of the workings of the FCA
and FMC, without which this research would have been more difficult to undertake at
times.

10.3 The Research Findings
Notwithstanding the above outlined limitations, this thesis reaches various findings
and conclusions concerning the research question. The empirical findings (from
Chapters 5 to 8) analysed in Chapter 9 indicate that, on the surface, the majority of
study group matters appear to have been transferred to the FMC in a manner consistent
with the notion of access to procedural justice. In particular, the participation model
(Chapter 3) is seen to be generally satisfied. Most study group matters appear to have
been treated with equality and not discriminated against by reasons of the type of
applicant, place or area of jurisdiction involved (Chapter 5). Most matters were
transferred in open court and a clear majority of matters was transferred to the FMC as
an appropriate forum for the resolution of the disputes (although it is argued in this
thesis that the question of whether the FMC is necessarily a cheaper, simpler and
quicker court than the FCA in all cases is debatable).
As positive as these findings may be, under the FCJS some impediments may be seen
to arise in respect of the delivery of access to justice to all litigants studied. A number
of arguable failings of the system to provide full transparency and fairness to many
matters are observed when the system is examined closely. For example, many cases
were transferred at the instigation of the judge in chambers without the parties
appearing in open court in relation to the proceedings or seemingly having any prior
notice of the pending transfer (Chapters 6 and 7). Matters were at times transferred
after only a brief directions hearing and, arguably, before the full nature and
complexity of the matters could be ascertained fully. The true nature of the
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involvement of registrars in the transfer process in some cases is not readily explicable.
The provision of adequate reasons for decision is seen to be limited.
The weakness of the system in places is due to both the statutory nature of the FCJS
and its implementation. Such implementation occurs as part of discretionary decisionmaking within the context of managerial judging under the IDS. Managerial judging in
the case of the study group matters resulted in a reduction in the judicial resources
required on appeal (that is, a workload reduction for the FCA). A tension between the
objectives of the FCJS of court workload reduction and promotion of access to justice
is a possible explanation for the system providing anything less than full access to
procedural justice for cases transferred to the FMC (addressed more fully below).
The findings of this study, and the need for procedural justice to be manifest during
case transfer processes, are of relevance to the ongoing operation of the FCJS.
Although the FCA nowadays seems to be transferring fewer cases to the FMC than
during the first eight years of the operation of the FCJS (Chapter 9), such transfers
continue to constitute the majority of its inter-court transfers. During the periods
2008-09 to 2010-11, the FCA transferred in total 65 matters to the FMC, compared
with 24 matters transferred or remitted to other courts.351 Should the concurrent
jurisdiction of the FMC expand in future, the potential exists for the FCA to increase
significantly the volume of transfers to that court.

10.4 Unanswered Questions
In the course of this research, several questions emerged beyond the scope of this work
to resolve, and which therefore remain unanswered. Two main questions require some
elaboration.
First, Chapters 1 and 2 referred to the rhetoric of the legislature and FCA prior to the
introduction of the FCJS about the system being predicated on the notion that 'less
complex' matters belong more appropriately in the FMC and 'more complex' matters
351
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alter the findings of this research. See, eg, FMC, Annual Report 2009-2010 (2010) 12 ('FMC AR 20092010') for an outline of the proposed restructuring.
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require the attention and resources of the FCA. Why did not the legislature translate
this seemingly essential factor for FCA-to-FMC transfers into a formal statutory
transfer criterion? To the extent it has done so indirectly within the transfer provisions,
why has it not done so in more clear and express terms? Furthermore, why is it the
legislature and FCA have not elucidated, at even the policy level, what ought to be
regarded as less or more complex within the context of general federal law litigation?
Other courts and statutory frameworks provide for objective indicators of complexity,
or when a proceeding might be regarded as appropriate for transfer, such as monetary
limits of the courts concerned. Thus, a party (and their legal practitioner) may be aware
that a matter commenced in a state or territory superior court with a claim for $4000
stands firm prospects of transfer to an inferior court or small claims tribunal (subject to
any jurisdictional issues). The legislature has arguably followed a similar approach in
respect of the trade practices concurrent jurisdiction of the FCA and FMC, by capping
the jurisdiction of the latter at a particular amount. Such an amount ($200 000 at the
time of the study periods and $750 000 subsequent thereto) is substantial, and does not
imply a low level of complexity is involved in any matter with a claim for damages
within its vicinity. As seen in Chapter 2, however, the degree of complexity of some
matters (especially in trade practices law) cannot be assessed necessarily by reference
to the quantum of the claim alone.
What does the FCA regard as 'less complex' in practice? The findings on equality in
Chapter 5 suggest human rights proceedings are regarded as satisfying this concept in
light of the volume of such matters transferred during the study periods. This finding
(and those in Chapter 8 on reasons for transfer) does not explain, however, what
factors distinguished those matters transferred from the matters that remained in the
FCA for determination. The other findings in Chapter 5 also suggest it is difficult to
predict with any certainty which type or place of proceeding will most likely be
transferred at any point in time.
This general uncertainty is unaided by the limited published judgments on these types
of inter-court transfers, or judgments explaining fully the basis for the transfer
decision. Consequently, it is difficult to discern in which circumstances the FCA is
likely to regard a matter as being 'less complex' or otherwise appropriate for transfer.
Perusal of the AustLII website in 2012 reveals a sharp increase in the number of
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judgments published annually by the FCA over the preceding two-year period.
Judgments on the topic of FCA-to-FMC transfers, however, continue to be
conspicuous by their scarcity (judgments on other types of interlocutory issues are
observed).352 Given the importance of transparency and promoting the principles of
procedural justice, why does this general lack of judgment writing occur? Is it due to
workload considerations, or does it boil down to the fact transfer decision-making is
non-appealable and written reasons are not required for an appeal court to enquire into
the soundness of the decision (or both)? Such issues require further consideration
below.
Secondly, why does the FCA seemingly give so little recognition publicly of the
operation of the FCJS as an important mechanism for its workload reduction? It
acknowledged in its annual reports at the commencement of the FCJS that the
establishment of the FMC has considerable potential for it being able to concentrate on
complex matters by reducing workload in the areas of concurrent jurisdiction (see
Chapter 9). To this end, this thesis has established the FCA has transferred more cases
to the FMC than to all other courts combined and continues to do so today. Yet, its
annual reports make typically only brief reference to the number of matters transferred
during the relevant reporting period. The role of case transfers is acknowledged,
however, in a handful of judgments (considered in Chapter 9) within the context of
reducing the requirement for a Full Court in the event of an appeal.
The problem goes further in that the FCA has not to date provided much, if any real,
guidance, on how the FCJS should operate in the course of any proceeding. As seen in
Chapter 2, the Court has no publicly available policy or set of guidelines (or practice
notes or other information available on its website) on how the transfer provisions
under the FCA Act and rules of court are likely to be applied or interpreted. Despite the
FCA recently substantially revamping its rules of court and practice notes, such
opportunities to redress the limited information on the topic of transfers under the
FCJS went begging. For example, r 5.04 of the new Rules provides for litigants an
(inclusive) list of some 35 potential directions the Court may make at a directions
hearing. It makes express mention of inter-registry transfers, but not inter-court
transfers.
352

The notable exceptions are the two judgments of Flick J in Uen v Honeywell Limited [2010] FCA
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10.5 What the Study Reveals about Access to Justice Law Reform
In reflecting upon the findings of this study and the further questions it leaves
unanswered, the researcher is confronted by some compelling realities of the nature of
access to federal civil justice law reform. As seen in Chapters 1 and 2, the purpose of
law reform under the FCJS, as with other court or litigation systems, is to enhance
access to justice for more people (a cheaper, simpler and quicker FMC) and efficiency
within the courts (FCA workload reduction). Law reform is, however, a complex
phenomenon with multiple layers, each one peeling away to reveal a deeper truth about
the inter-relationship between its objectives of achieving access to justice and
maintaining court efficiencies.
The main aim of this research (discerning whether the FCJS impedes access to justice)
sought to address directly the surface layer of this phenomenon. The study found the
FCJS appears to have operated as intended in respect of the majority of matters
studied. Those matters received justice through decision-making processes that
transferred them to a forum that was appropriate for their resolution. It is seen the
busiest registry of the FCA is not necessarily the one most likely statistically to
transfer cases to reduce its workload. Nonetheless, Chapter 9 established case transfer
decision-making has achieved the objective of the FCJS of court workload reduction,
at the very least in relation to the appellate workload of the Court.353 On the surface,
therefore, the system is working to achieve the goals of law reform.
The research reveals more lies beneath the surface of the operation of the FCJS and
which provides a truer indication of whether the objectives of law reform are being
met across the board within the system. Legislatures often seem mostly concerned with
the establishment of a system (and its statutory framework) to enhance access to
justice and court efficiencies at the macro level, but do not necessarily appreciate how
the system operates on a micro level. Quite correctly, its operation is left to the specific
court to determine in individual matters and in the overall administration of justice.
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Paper No 20/2011, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, April 2011) 3.
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The legislature cannot make the legislation overly prescriptive because it will become
too difficult to implement or tailor to the needs of specific cases. The problem that
arises, however, is that the operation of the system becomes part of the individual case
management approaches of the judges within the court. The absence of any formal and
public policy or guidelines on case transfers by the relevant court highlights those
idiosyncratic approaches. Transparency, consistency and predictability in the law are
undermined potentially in the process.
What this study shows is that seemingly unimportant and procedural aspects of case
management - case transfers - can be real impediments to access to justice for the
litigants involved if the principles of procedural justice are not adhered to fully during
the transfer decision-making process. This can be so even where the system otherwise
appears to be operating successfully. Although important endeavours, enhancing
access to justice is not simply about increasing physical accessibility to court systems
by creating a new court and the mechanism by which matters may be transferred to it.
The task is also to ensure both litigants are treated fairly and openly when they are
within the system and the court is perceived to be doing so.
The quality of justice dispensed should not be compromised by transfer decisionmaking that occurs too swiftly and without the true nature of the claim being ventilated
in one or more directions hearings, away from open court, without the parties having
an adequate opportunity to be heard on the subject of transfer or without the provision
of adequate reasons for transfer. As said by the Access to Justice Advisory Committee:
There is a tension between the goal of fairness – implying both that the
law itself is fair and that each party has a reasonable opportunity to
present his or her case – and the goal of swift decision-making.
Fairness, thus, has its price, both in terms of cost and delay. Of course,
unfairness may have an even greater price.354

There is a potential challenge to the notion advocated by this thesis that greater steps
are required for adherence to the principles of procedural justice within the FCJS, and
which adds another layer to the complexity of dealing with the issue of justice law
354
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reform. Such challenge emphasises the second objective of (FCJS) law reform - court
efficiencies. With increased access to justice comes increased demand on a court
system with limited resources.355 Professor Adrian Zuckerman has considered such a
dilemma when writing:
When we consider the reform of civil procedure, we must therefore be
deterred by arguments that the introduction of savings may lead to a
deterioration in the accuracy of judgments. What matters is not any
particular level of accuracy but the correct balance between accuracy of
justice and timeliness of justice and between accuracy and affordability.
... [N]ot all cases are important, intricate and difficult, and not every
case requires access to the maximal procedural provision. A well
organised system should contain, therefore, a mechanism for
husbanding procedural resources by ensuring that the procedure
employed is proportionate to the needs of the particular case.356

Professor Zuckerman is correct in his appraisal that the system requires proportionality
when determining the extent to which limited court resources are to be applied to any
given proceeding.357 This thesis does not contend procedural perfection is warranted or
even attainable in each case before a court, or that the FCA should spend an inordinate
amount of time in seeking to ensure every aspect of a transfer decision is addressed to
the satisfaction of the parties. It is argued caution should be exercised in a court
automatically assuming the question of transfer of proceedings is not sufficiently
important to warrant its close and well-reasoned attention.
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The tension in practice between the need for swift justice and more careful
consideration of the nature of the proceedings to be transferred is seen, for example,
within the context of matters transferred after no, or only a single, directions hearing
being held. On the one hand, there is the judicial need to avoid requiring the parties to
have frequent and costly appearances before the court.358 This is a sound argument and
matters should not incur too much expense or delay within the FCA during the
transfer-decision making process. What is of concern, however, is the situation of
transfers occurring without any directions hearing or at (or shortly after) a relatively
brief first directions hearing. As regards the latter scenario, the limitations of the first
directions hearing in exposing the precise nature of the proceedings are described thus:
As presently conducted, the first directions hearing is generally
administrative in nature. It is often not attended by the parties’ lead
counsel. Further ... at the time of the first directions hearing, the
respondent may not yet have indicated its position. Because of these
matters, the first directions hearing does not usually provide an
appropriate opportunity to identify and narrow the issues in dispute.359
The level of complexity of a proceeding is difficult to gauge at such a preliminary
stage.
Decision-making that overlooks procedural justice may prove to represent a false
economy in the saving of judicial resources. How a court handles procedural matters as
part of its case management approach may have implications for other courts and the
court itself (as explained further below). The following factors, amongst others,
support why procedural shortcuts should be avoided in relation to transfer decisionmaking, as seen from the findings of this study:


Impulsive transfer decision-making may lead to errors (for example, as
to the jurisdiction of the FMC). At least one directions hearing may be
required for both the parties and Court to understand properly the ambit
and complexity of the proceedings. Inappropriately transferred matters
may be re-transferred to the Court.
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Greater efficiencies are not achieved necessarily when cases are
transferred contrary to the wishes of the parties because such cases also
risk re-transfer. As this thesis shows, this adds to the time
considerations and costs of the parties, FMC and the FCA (especially its
registries). Empirical research reveals the true (personal) costs of the
operation of a justice system.360



As discussed in Chapter 3 and further below, a lack of adequate
transparency and fairness in the transfer decision-making process can
undermine public confidence in the justice system. Enhancing access to
a justice system is rendered futile if there is a lack of confidence in the
system. A lack of confidence in a system may result in a decrease in the
funding of that system.361



The provision of inadequate reasons for transfer decision (written or
oral) has obvious implications for transparency, but also for the FMC,
the development of jurisprudence and any judge reviewing the transfer
decision (see below).



The findings in Chapter 7 (and analysis in Chapter 9) suggest the
question of what is a cheaper, simpler and quicker forum for the
resolution of a general federal law matter is not straight-forward. What
might be considered as satisfying this objective in family law cases and
other cases generally may not hold sway in relation to transferred
general federal law matters. Detailed, rather than superficial,
consideration of the true benefits of transferring a given proceeding
from the FCA to the FMC is required if any transfer is to be regarded as
being in the interests of justice.

The question is, therefore, one of which objective of law reform should prevail to the
extent of inconsistency - that of access to justice or court efficiencies? Is it fair for a
court not to grant a hearing to certain cases, which have a legal right to be in that court,
360
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so that it may have the resources to grant a hearing to various other cases with a
similar right to be in that forum? Questions of equality arise. Transferring matters to
the FMC can provide cheaper, simpler and quicker justice for the matters, but this
study has argued these benefits are not necessarily present for all transferred general
federal law matters or all of the time. By deciding to transfer a case to the FMC, is the
FCA potentially, albeit unintentionally, risking reducing access to justice for the
parties involved?

Finally, it is argued less complex claims should be dealt with by an appropriate court,
but (as has been argued) we have a system that fails to define adequately what those
matters actually are in practice or, indeed, which court is best suited for such purpose
(see, for example, the discussion regarding costs in Chapter 7). Chapter 5 showed that
self-represented applicants, who might reasonably be expected to have less complex
proceedings, are not transferred more than their represented counterparts. Does this
mean their matters are not 'less complex' by definition? Given the system is vague
about the definition of complexity and its application, the transfer of proceedings
under the FCJS does require some explanation. If to achieve this objective requires the
expenditure of marginally more time and expense (for example, a directions hearing of
more than 10 minutes duration), then such should be the cost of providing justice
within a world class superior court like the FCA (further suggestions on this issue are
offered below).

10.6 Broader Lessons and Implications
In contemplating what this research reveals, it becomes apparent certain broader
lessons and implications emerge in relation to the stakeholders most directly affected
by the operation of the FCJS: the litigants involved in the transferred proceedings, the
FCA, the FMC and the legal community relying upon the development of
jurisprudence in this area of civil procedure.
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10.6.1 Litigants

Under the FCJS, litigants may litigate in the FCA (or the FMC) in relation to a number
of areas of concurrent jurisdiction. A notable aspect of the operation of the FCJS, as
affirmed by the findings of this research, is that litigants may have their choice of
forum or wishes overridden by the choice of the judge, including on the motion of the
latter. It has been acknowledged elsewhere in this thesis that this occurs in other areas
of civil procedure.
What is different about the operation of the FCJS is that the findings suggest the FCA
is more likely to transfer a matter to the FMC of its own motion, than it is to transfer a
proceeding to another registry of the Court or to another court. This may be because
the parties are in such other types of transfer decision-making more alive to whether
another venue favours the balance of convenience because of the location of witnesses
and the like, but this observation has not been tested. It may be also as a consequence
of the desire of the Court to reduce workload so as to concentrate on more complex
matters, as discussed previously. If so, we see the wishes of the parties to a matter
overridden by the notion of the 'greater good' - enabling other cases in the FCA to
achieve hearing sooner. This approach of considering the broader interests of other
court users sitting in court queues is reflected in High Court authority.362
The realities of a judge overriding the express wishes of the parties and for transfer
decision-making processes not adhering fully to the principles of procedural justice are
that a party may feel so aggrieved by the transfer decision that they wish to appeal it.
Many of the problems revealed by the findings concerning the transfer processes of the
study group matters might have been redressed in this manner, yet the right of appeal
is not available. It was explained in Chapter 2 that FCA Act s 32AB(8) provides no
appeal shall lie from a decision to transfer a FCA matter to the FMC. As has been
noted, this is similar to the approach under the cross-vesting legislation. It may be
regarded positively as limiting the ability of a party to prolong and increase the costs
of the litigation.363
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These are valid considerations, however, the absence of any appeal right under the
statutory transfer provisions is unfair when one considers the situation in respect of
inter-registry appeals in the FCA. It was seen in Chapter 8 that the Court made a
number of such transfers during the study periods of this research. Such decisions are
interlocutory in nature and are appealable with leave of the Court under FCA Act
ss 24(1)-(1A). By contrast, FCA-to-FMC transfer decisions, although similarly
interlocutory in nature,364 are treated differently statutorily by being barred a right of
appeal. This thesis has shown an incorrect transfer decision can have tangible and
significant consequences for the parties concerned, and potentially greater ones than a
decision merely to change venue. A party seeking to correct a FCA-to-FMC transfer
decision may only endeavour to do so by way of an application for judicial review
seeking a constitutional writ against the judge, and which are relatively rare and
difficult applications to run (especially for self-represented litigants). 365 An aggrieved
party also would not have the ability to make an interlocutory application to the FCA
for a re-transfer order, as it is likely to be regarded as incompetent as an abuse of
process.366
It is not advocated here that FMC transfer decisions should be appealable as of right,
but that parties who wish to challenge them legally for whatever reason should be
afforded the same basic right to seek leave to appeal as their counter-parts affected by
an inter-registry transfer decision. There is no real justification for treating inter-court
transfers differently from inter-registry transfers in this regard. Moreover, there are a
number of benefits of appeal rights touted often in the literature, including '[p]ublic
confidence in a system of justice can only be maintained if that system ensures there
are effective mechanisms to correct errors’.367
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10.6.2 The FCA

Whilst the operation of the FCJS may have some negative (short term) effects for
certain litigants, the potential implications for the FCA flowing on from the existence
of those effects are conceivably longer-lasting. It is not argued the FCA-to-FMC
transfer decisions are so integral to the administration of justice that they should be
viewed in the same light as certain other types of critical judicial decision-making
which can affect all of society profoundly, such as in the situation of general
deterrence in criminal sentencing. Most of the general public will never learn of a
particular case transferred inappropriately, but the importance of public confidence in
the FCA transfer decision-making process should not be underestimated. As observed
by Professor Stephen Parker in his study on the improvement of relationships between
Australian courts and the public:
[T]he stakes may be higher than first appear. Legal systems in
modern liberal democracies rely ultimately on public confidence
and the consent of the governed. That confidence and consent
may drain away over apparently small matters which, when
accumulated, constitute a predominantly negative image of the
courts.368

As seen in the above quote (and discussed in Chapter 3), judicial accountability is
linked to the notion of public confidence in the judiciary, a confidence that is
developed gradually and shattered easily. If litigants, perhaps following the advice of
their legal practitioners based on actual or anecdotal experience, perceive their
proceedings may be transferred suddenly or handled without due process, then the
FCA may no longer be their choice of forum for general federal law dispute resolution.
Given the FCA is depended upon public funding (discussed also in Chapter 3), its
ongoing viability as a court requires the support of the public and elected politicians
who collectively control the purse strings. So, too, is required the support of legal
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practitioners, who play a pivotal role in the determination of the forum for federal civil
law litigation through the advice they provide clients engaged in such disputes.
If transfer decision-making processes appear to be influenced or dictated primarily by
considerations of achieving FCA workload reduction, and occur at the expense of the
total promotion of the principles of procedural justice, then this may lead to a
perception of judicial decision-making not being impartial and in the best interests of
the parties to the specific litigation in question. This problem is not new for the FCA
and other superior courts. It was feared in 1988, in relation to the implementation of
the then new cross-vesting scheme, that judges would use the transfer power in
'sloughing off what is seen as menial, unwanted or financially insignificant litigation'
to other courts.369
This thesis has already touched upon the approach seen in the (limited) FCA case law
to the effect the interests of the parties may give way to the broader interests of other
litigants within the system. It is the contention of this thesis that it is important judicial
decisions are determined by reference to objective standards,370 and decisions based
upon notions of workload reduction within individual dockets or in respect of the
appellate workload of the Court nationally do not provide such objectivity. If matters
risk transfer based on the dynamic and uncertain factor of the workload of an
individual docket judge or the Court generally at any given point in time, then court
users are at the mercy of shifting forces, rather than clear and consistent rules.
Unpredictability in rule interpretation and application, and the confusion and
uncertainty that follow, do not foster confidence in a judicial system and can be
counter-productive to the successful operation of the FCJS. The preparedness of court
users and the broader community to accept the (transfer) decisions of the FCA
influences the effectiveness of the delivery of justice, and ‘such willingness is more
likely to be found where the public ... generally believes that courts are operating in
accordance with the law, rather than in accordance with their own whims’.371
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Transparency and openness in the application of the transfer criteria in any given
proceeding can assist litigants and their legal representatives to feel some degree of
control over the management of their litigation.372 Joanna Kalowski has argued certain
assumptions can be made about the already precarious state of litigants struggling to
understand the litigation process around them.373 It is reasonable to suppose the
additional confusion caused by a sudden change of forum can only add to this overall
state of agitation experienced by litigants. The ALRC has written of the dilemma of
litigants being anxious about the treatment their claims might receive within a 'justice
system that over-emphasises the need to be affordable, efficient and timely'.374
The development of mistrust of the Court and its ability to deliver effective justice can
be fuelled by miscommunication between the Court and its users. Criticism of courts
may stem from a lack of information or a misunderstanding of available
information.375 This may flow from the fact the FCA has published little, if any,
substantive judgments or information on its policies and practices regarding transfers.
The Court has been critical of its taxing officers who have provided ‘unduly
uninformative’ reasons and on the ground that ‘the obligation to give adequate reasons
is an important one to uphold if public confidence - but more importantly the
confidence of litigants - is to be maintained in our courts and their processes’.376 The
inability to appeal, and therefore scrutinise publicly, transfer decisions exacerbates the
problem of insufficient information on the operation of the FCJS.377
There are two provisos to the above suggestions as to the potential implications for the
FCA arising from court user perceptions of a lack of due process. First, it is
speculative in the absence of detailed empirical study conducted in this country on the
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opinions of persons conducting litigation in the Court.378 Secondly, Professor Elizabeth
Handsley has argued:
Public confidence is an inappropriate aim of judicial administration.
While it is reasonable enough to say that over time the judiciary should
maintain the confidence of the public, proper judicial administration can
frequently require incurring the wrath of the public in the short or even
the medium term.379
This is a valid argument within certain contexts, but not in relation to case transfer
decision-making by the FCA. It is true courts should not seek as their primary goal to
be popular and to reflect what the public wants to hear and see, as distinct from what
the law prescribes. The confidence in the judiciary addressed by this thesis is a more
subtle, long-term trust developed by court users in the practices and procedures of the
Court. Not all litigants will be satisfied or contented with the transfer decisions all of
the time, and not all transfer decisions will, with the benefit of hindsight, be seen to be
the correct decision to have been made at the time. Yet, an attainable goal is one that
seeks to ensure those same litigants are accepting of transfer decisions made by the
Court because they are apprised fully of how each decision was reached and involved
in the decision-making process. Canadian research has found the outcome of a legal
civil proceeding is perceived by litigants as less important than the fairness of the
process.380 At the end of the day, swift justice is good justice, but swift justice without
due process is meaningless and stripped of accountability and legitimacy.381

10.6.3 The FMC

Whether or not the FCA reduces significantly its workload as a consequence of the
operation of the FCJS through case transfers to the FMC, what is clear is that transfers
378
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under the FCJS have a significant resulting effect upon the workload and resources of
the FMC. Although annual reports reflect that by far the greatest number of inter-court
transfers during the study periods emanated from the Family Court (at times, running
into the thousands per annum), the transfer of general federal law matters (particularly
migration law) contributed significantly to that increasing workload.
When the FMC commenced operation in 2000, it had fewer than a dozen federal
magistrates appointed to the Court, but only a small number from their ranks were
dedicated general federal law federal magistrates. By late 2002, the then Chief Federal
Magistrate was calling for more judicial resources as it was becoming obvious the
FMC was experiencing difficulty coping with its increasing workload with the number
of federal magistrates it had - waiting times for judgments had reportedly 'blown
out'.382 The high workload of the FMC and need for greater judicial resources have
been ongoing issues for the Court,383 although it should be acknowledged the Court is
at the same time one of the busiest and most efficient courts in Australia.384

10.6.4 Development of Jurisprudence

The following quote sums up the arguably flawed nature of judicial judgments:
Judgments will inevitably indicate the reasons imperfectly. … Of
course, no judgment could be a complete account of the reasoning.
Especially in cases where there is a wide discretion, it is impossible,
even in a detailed judgment, to capture in words every detail and every
nuance. More fundamentally, to the extent that the judge's reasons are
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unconscious ones, of course the judgment will not deliberately disclose
those processes...385
Such limitations of judgments and judgment-writing are an inherent part of the
adversarial litigation system in this country, but they do not detract from the pragmatic
need for sufficiently clear articulation of reasons for transfer decisions. The reasons for
this are essentially two-fold. First, legal practitioners are required to report to their
clients the outcomes of stages of the litigation and the reasons for it. Secondly, the
knowledge gained from practical experience in matters assists the development of
legal expertise and skill for the conduct of future matters. The need for adequate,
preferably published, statements of the implementation of legal rules is fundamental to
the evolution of a body of rules of practice and procedure and of jurisprudence that
legal practitioners and other interested parties (such as legal academics) can research,
learn and apply in practice. This, in turn, assists legal practitioners and their clients in:
deciding whether to commence proceedings in the FCA (for example, do indicators
point strongly to a probable transfer to the FMC), whether (and if so, how) to make an
application for transfer and how to potentially successfully resist an application for
transfer if required.
The existence of case law on transfers to the FMC may also pave the way for greater
consistency and predictability in the interpretation and implementation of the law, as a
necessary and fundamental foundation of our legal system based on the doctrine of
precedent. Where the Court strives for consistency, it is no longer merely acting as a
collective body of individual judges exercising idiosyncratic discretions, but begins to
make broader principles and rules386 and performs its 'forward-looking function' as a
court.387 This enhances the accountability of the Court and enables users of the court
system to act with greater certainty and confidence.
Even with the somewhat limited written case law on the subject of transfers to the
FMC by the FCA (as seen in Chapter 8), it is apparent judges are at times approaching
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the topic from different philosophical perspectives. As observed during this research,
when ordering a case transfer, some judges consider the effects of the ongoing
management of the relevant proceedings by the FCA on other users of the Court
awaiting hearing. At least one other judge is seen, however, to have refused transfer on
the grounds costs would be saved by avoiding the additional directions hearings
required if the proceeding were transferred to the FMC.388
It might be countered the above arguments fail to give due recognition to the fact
transfer decision-making is discretionary and made by single judges sitting within the
original jurisdiction of the FCA. This means no binding precedent is established by
appellate judges and so the outcome of a transfer decision-making process can never
truly yield consistency and predictability in this area of law because individual judges
can readily, even if not intentionally, contradict one another in approach. Furthermore,
it has been written that all legal rules 'contain elements of uncertainty, because the
circumstances in which the rules come to be applied cannot be precisely foreseen, nor
can any rule, however detailed, describe in advance every possible future case'.389 This
is the very nature of discretionary transfer decisions, where uncertainty arises because
the practical application of the rule depends so intimately on the facets of each specific
matter.390
It may be responded that such arguments do not detract from the fact the predictability
of the law is what makes it respected within the community.391 As discovered by
Kovacs in relation to family law proceedings in the Family Court of Australia, even
where the doctrine of precedent does not work effectively in cases of the exercise of
discretion, legal practitioners experienced with the way in which that court exercised
discretion are able to predict reasonably accurately property proceedings outcomes.392
In other words, a perfectly functioning doctrine of precedent is not necessary for FCAto-FMC transfer decisions. All that is required is that the manner in which the
388
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discretion is being exercised by judges is discernible and this can occur most readily if
more (detailed) reasons for decision are being published by the Court.
Notwithstanding the policy of the FMC to not settle all of its (ex tempore) judgments
for publication on AustLII due to workload demands,393 there is a written judgment of
the FMC that bears mentioning in support of the main arguments of this thesis. In the
2005 matter of Warner Music Australia Pty Ltd v Swiftel Communications Pty Ltd,394
an intellectual property case involving an alleged infringement of copyright by an
internet service provider, a federal magistrate was called upon to decide whether to
grant an application for the proceedings to be transferred to the FCA. In the first of the
rulings,395 his Honour considered in detail the benefits to the parties if the matter were
to remain in the FMC, but ultimately was not persuaded the proceedings should be
transferred at this particular point in time. His Honour noted
[t]he Court has the ability to adopt as necessary the procedures of the
Federal Court to deal with more complex proceedings. The Court was
established to deal quickly, simply and cheaply with less complex
litigation to assist the Federal Court, but that does not mean that the
Court should shy away from dealing with novel issues or difficult
issues.396

The parties were permitted to file further, detailed written submissions on the question
of transfer to the FCA, and with one side favouring strongly transfer and the other side
opposed to it. The learned federal magistrate ultimately did make a transfer order for a
host of reasons.397 What stands out, for the purposes of this thesis, is the extent to
which the federal magistrate was prepared to enable the parties ample opportunity to
make their respective submissions, consider carefully such positions, and to arrive at a
different ruling in response to those submissions. This is a clear example of the
adequate provision of written reasons for decision (of both the decision to not transfer
393
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and later to transfer), fairness to the parties by the provision of opportunities to be
heard (both orally and in writing), and the judicial decisions being pronounced in open
court (the principle of openness). This promotes access to procedural justice in the
course of the exercise of judicial discretion and, further, develops case law that
facilitates jurisprudence.
Writing judgments is a time-consuming exercise and it is not advocated each transfer
decision requires the publication of extensive written reasons. A lack of published or
fully articulated reasons for FCA-to-FMC transfer decisions to date, however, means
that a suitably developed jurisprudence in this field has been unable to occur, or that its
arrival is stalled. Moreover, the making of transfer decisions in chambers and without
the public articulation of the bases for transfer decision-making can lead the FCA itself
to not understand how transfer decisions are being made across all of its registries.

10.7 Recommendations for Law and Policy Reform
Whilst it is easy for an external observer to be critical of the nature and operation of a
court system, it should be acknowledged the legislature and FCA do not have an easy
task of seeking to ensure effective procedural justice for all users of the system, whilst
simultaneously managing finite resources in an accountable manner. Be that so, the
following suggestions for law and policy reform are offered so that some of the main
problems identified by this thesis may be redressed.

10.7.1 The Legislature

Legislative reform in this area would be beneficial in several regards.398
As noted previously, if the fundamental basis for case transfers from the FCA to the
FMC is the level of complexity of the proceedings, then it should be spelt out more
expressly and clearly in the statutory transfer criteria. The legislature should define
more precisely what 'less complex' means within the context of general federal
398
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litigation. Should the term be interpreted as referring to the estimated duration of the
hearing (bearing in mind some highly technical points of law may be canvassed before
a judge in a couple of hours with the benefit of carefully drafted written submissions)?
A matter involving a relatively simple point of law may become convoluted and
protracted due to the personalities of the litigants involved.
The issue of complexity might be approached from the perspective of a more objective
criterion, such as (alluded to previously) a monetary limit in relation to the quantum of
a claim. The FCA commented, prior to the establishment of the FCJS, that ‘[i]t is now
accepted that, as a matter of proper judicial administration, relatively small claims
should not be dealt with by this Court unless there is a federal or other special element
to warrant a use of this Court's jurisdiction'.399 Quantum is, therefore, a factor that
should be of greater overt consideration under s 32AB of the FCA Act, although
exactly where to set the threshold in relation to particular areas of law (for example,
trade practices matters) may require deeper consideration. This is particularly so if one
considers the FCA is, with respect, providing some mixed messages about the
operation of the FCJS and the issue of quantum. This is illustrated in the following
statement concerning the concurrent copyright jurisdiction:
Generally, the Court has taken the view that copyright litigation is
appropriately commenced in this Court, even where the claim is small
in monetary terms...400
If the legislation were to define more clearly what is the most appropriate forum for
the determination of a dispute (such as through setting a monetary limit or establishing
an exclusive jurisdiction), then there would be less requirement for the transfer of
matters. The transfer mechanisms would be utilised more sparingly and in exceptional
cases because parties would know where to commence proceedings most
appropriately. The legislature has largely achieved this with the amendments to the
migration legislation in 2005 by simply conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the FMC
in respect of most types of migration matters. Consequently, the FCA no longer
transfers hundreds of such matters to the FMC.
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Secondly, consideration might be given to amending s 32AB(8) of the FCA Act (and
the reciprocal FM Act provision) so as to grant a right of appeal by leave of the Court.
If there are concerns that the ability to appeal a transfer decision will lead to the
protraction of proceedings by a litigant bringing a meritless appeal as an abuse of
process or vexatiously, then there exist already provisions within the rules of the court
to counter such improper actions. 401
Finally, there might be considered amendment to the AAT Act s 44 to enable appeals
from the AAT to lie directly to the FMC in relation to decisions involving a nonpresidential member of the AAT. At present, an appeal lies to the FMC only by way of
an appeal to the FCA first and then a transfer order to the FMC. Such a convoluted
process adds to delay and cost. If such amendment is not possible for legal reasons,
then perhaps they should be enunciated.

10.7.2 The FCA

This chapter identified earlier the problems relating to the delivery of procedural
justice within the FCJS whilst balancing the finite resources of the FCA (maintaining
efficiencies by reducing workload). Whilst it is not suggested such problems are
capable of a 'quick fix' or total solution, there are a number of measures the FCA can
implement that would not involve the expenditure of significant time and resources,
but would be effective in ameliorating or avoiding the tensions operating within the
system.
To begin with, the FCA could increase public discourse and education about the
operation of the FCJS. It could formulate and implement a clear policy approach and
other informative publications (including on its website and in its practice notes and
annual reports) in relation to FCA-to-FMC transfers. Such policy or guidelines could
help better direct both court users and judges in striving for consistency, certainty and
predictability in this area of civil procedure. The FCA Judges' Equality and the Law
Committee might consider and oversee the operation of the FCJS in relation to FCA-
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to-FMC case transfers to seek to ensure its objective 'that in all aspects of the Court's
operations, persons who have contact with the Court are treated fairly and equitably'.402
Greater liaison or collaboration between the FCA and FMC on the subject of intercourt transfers would promote the efficient and proper development of the FCJS in
practice. For example, there might be established a FJCS case transfer monitoring
committee along the lines of the Cross-vesting Monitoring Committee of the FCA (or
the existing committee might be expanded to cover the FCJS). The committee could
monitor and compile statistics on the workings of the FCJS and consider solutions to
problems identified in, and recommend overall improvements to, its operation.403
This greater liaison between the courts could help ensure FCA matters are not
transferred at times when the FMC is struggling to deal with its own workload. It
would help reduce or avoid the inconsistencies appearing at times in their respective
publications, such as conflicting reporting on the number of transferred matters for a
given period.404 Improved communications between the courts on this subject might
also help avoid the type of situation where judicial officers of the two courts have
seemingly contrary publicly expressed views on when cases should be transferred most
appropriately, which may serve to undermine public confidence in the system. For
example, in Y v Australian Postal Corporation405 the FCA considered the purpose for
the enactment of s 39 of the FM Act, the provision which enables the FMC to transfer
matters to the FCA. His Honour commented:
Sometimes s 39 does not serve its various purposes. For example, on
occasions the [FMC] refuses to transfer cases that quite clearly should
be heard in the [FCA]. Warner Music Australia Pty Ltd v Swiftel
Communications Pty Ltd [2005] FMCA 627 is an example. On other
occasions the [FMC] transfers proceedings to the [FCA] that should
remain in the [FMC].406
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For the reasons argued in this thesis, the Court should seek to provide as full and
adequate reasons for transfer decision as possible. It is unrealistic to expect the Court
to provide lengthy written reasons for transfer in every case, but a few more judgments
addressing the specific aspects of this decision-making would assist in both the
development of jurisprudence and enhancing transparency. Where transfer decisionmaking transpires in open court, the provision of a little more time on such occasions
for the parties to consider and be heard on the subject of transfer, and to be apprised of
the reasoning of the Court, would be beneficial in avoiding some of the more negative
findings of this research. Ideally, transfer decision-making should not occur prior to, or
at, a first directions hearing. If the Court had in place a practice note (or some other
indication that the topic of transfer is to be raised at the next directions hearing), then
the parties would be prepared better to seek instructions and make submissions. The
risk of a perception of ambush of the parties by any transfer decision would be reduced
significantly and the articulation of reasons for transfer could reflect more fully the
true basis for the decision. This, in turn, would promote public confidence in the
system.

10.8 Future Research
This chapter has discussed, as a potential implication for the FCA arising from the
operation of the FCJS, the undermining of public confidence in the FCA and FCJS as
regards to the delivery of quality justice. A logical and beneficial next step would be
for the conduct of empirical research into the perceptions of users of the system within
the specific contexts of the attainment of justice during FCA-to-FMC transfer
processes and the achievement of the objective of the FMC as a 'cheaper, simpler and
quicker' court for general federal law matters. The court user surveys commissioned in
the past by the FMC (mentioned in Chapter 9) were helpful for the purposes of this
thesis, but had a strong focus upon family law litigation and matters commenced in the
FMC.
It is regrettable such investigation of public attitudes was beyond the scope of this
research, as it would no doubt have provided deep insights into the workings of the
system and have added another dimension to the findings reached. The value of
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research into the perceptions of litigants of procedural justice is recognised
internationally as a key aspect of a research project known as 'Measuring Access to
Justice in a Globalising World - The Hague Model of Access to Justice'.407 Closer to
home, perhaps the task of ascertaining user perceptions of the FCJS is of sufficient
interest for the Federal Litigation Section of the Law Council to undertake.

10.9 Concluding Comments
This thesis has concentrated upon a particular aspect of access to justice law reform in
Australia, but the insights gleaned are relevant to the justice system of any country
concerned with the enhancement of access to justice whilst striving to maintain
efficiencies of court operation. The 204 study group matters examined instil a degree
of confidence in the ability of the FCJS to provide access to justice for the majority of
cases, but the findings also cause some misgivings about the delivery of quality justice
across all of the matters studied. The findings indicate this facet of discretionary
decision-making occurs as part of the IDS and so it is difficult (including for the FCA
itself) to be conscious fully of how the FCJS is operating across the board in the
absence of empirical research illuminating that which is not otherwise readily visible.
This study does not find that transferred matters (including the study group matters)
are disadvantaged in any substantive way; that is, they are determined incorrectly by
the FMC.408 Procedural injustice arguably is not as serious as substantive injustice but,
as has been said within other justice system contexts, ‘[i]njustice anywhere is a threat
to justice everywhere’.409
Even if access to (substantive) justice has not been undermined in practice, the
perception may arise that this has occurred where matters are transferred without
sufficient transparency or fairness. How to account most appropriately for judicial

407

This particular project explores the methodology for measuring costs and quality an average court
user may expect in accessing justice. See, eg, Klaming and Giesen, above n 372; Barendrecht, Mulder
and Giesen, above n 360.
408
Over 80% of general federal law appeals to the FCA finalised during the period 2009-2010 were
dismissed - see FMC AR 2009-2010, above n 351, 51.
409
Martin Luther King Junior, 'Letter from a Birmingham Jail [King, JR]', 16 April 1963
<http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html>.
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legitimacy and accountability has long been a difficult problem facing courts.410 What
occurs at the micro level of the administration of justice underpins what ultimately
occurs at the macro level and, when it comes to justice, it must be done and be seen to
be done at all levels if accountability is to be achieved. Part of the cause of this overall
situation is the inherent nature of the FCJS itself, but the role of the FCA in the
implementation of the system also plays a crucial role. The Court may consider that in
the course of it seeking to reduce its workload to do justice for other court users by
transferring so-called 'less complex' matters, it becomes ‘easy to dispense injustice
quickly and cheaply, but it is better to do justice even if it takes a little longer and costs
a little more’.411 Inefficiencies in courts often lead to loss of public confidence in the
legal system, however, such loss of confidence can be due also to measures aimed at
achieving greater efficiency in the business of courts.412
This research has shed light on FCA discretionary decision-making and case workload
management practices and the delivery of procedural justice under the FCJS. It has
raised also some questions about the nature of the system and the objectives of law
reform. It is hoped the findings will be of value to law reform bodies, the legal
community, court users and the courts themselves. Specifically for the Law Council,
this research has addressed its concerns expressed some decade ago that the
introduction of the FCJS would undermine the delivery of justice within the federal
civil law system based upon well-established justice principles. The answer is that it
has not, but there is still more work to be done in ensuring the delivery of quality
justice for all litigants concerned. If there is one clear message from this research, it is
that case transfers under the FCJS should not be regarded as 'mere procedure'.

410

A R Blackshield, 'The Legitimacy and Authority of Judges' (1987) 10 University of New South Wales
Law Journal 155, 157.
411
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n 321, 186.
412
See Shetreet, above n 203, 24.
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APPENDIX A - FCJS TRANSFER PROVISIONS
Sources:
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), AustLII website
<http://corrigan.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/fcoaa1976249/>
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), AustLII website
<http://corrigan.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/repealed_reg/fcr186/>
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), comlaw website
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2011L01551>
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), AustLII website
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/fma1999186/>
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), Austlii website,
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/fmcr2001307/>

TRANSFERS BY THE FCA

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 32AA (during study periods)
Proceedings not to be instituted in the Court if an associated matter is before the
Federal Magistrates Court
(1) Proceedings must not be instituted in the Court in respect of a matter if:
(a) the Federal Magistrates Court has jurisdiction in that matter; and
(b) proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in the Federal
Magistrates Court.
(2) If:
(a) proceedings are instituted in the Court in contravention of subsection (1);
and
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(b) the proceedings are subsequently transferred to the Federal Magistrates
Court;
the proceedings are taken to be as valid as they would have been in subsection (1) had
not been enacted.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 32AB (during study periods)
Discretionary transfer of civil proceedings to the Federal Magistrates Court
(1) If a proceeding is pending in the Court, the Court may, by order, transfer the
proceeding from the Court to the Federal Magistrates Court.
(2) The Court may transfer a proceeding under subsection (1):
(a) on the application of a party to the proceeding; or
(b) on its own initiative.
(3) The Rules of Court may make provision in relation to transfers of proceedings to
the Federal Magistrates Court under subsection (1).
(4) In particular, the Rules of Court may set out factors that are to be taken into
account by the Court in deciding whether to transfer a proceeding to the Federal
Magistrates Court under subsection (1).
(5) Before Rules of Court are made for the purposes of subsection (3) or (4), the Court
must consult the Federal Magistrates Court.
(6) In deciding whether to transfer a proceeding to the Federal Magistrates Court under
subsection (1), the Court must have regard to:
(a) any Rules of Court made for the purposes of subsection (4); and
(b) whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending
in the Federal Magistrates Court; and
(c) whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient
to hear and determine the proceeding; and
(d) the interests of the administration of justice.
(7) If an order is made under subsection (1), the Court may make such orders as it
considers necessary pending the disposal of the proceeding by the Federal Magistrates
Court.
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(8) An appeal does not lie from a decision of the Court in relation to the transfer of a
proceeding under subsection (1).
(9) The reference in subsection (1) to a proceeding pending in the Court includes a
reference to a proceeding that was instituted in contravention of section 32AA.
(10) This section does not apply to proceedings of a kind specified in the regulations.

FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 (Cth)- (repealed)
Order 82 rule 5
Application for transfer by a party
(1) A party may apply by motion on notice:
(a) under the Act for the transfer of a proceeding to the Federal
Magistrates Court; or
(b) under the Tribunal Act for the transfer of an appeal to the Federal
Magistrates Court.
(2) The heading of the notice of motion must refer to the Act under which the
application for transfer is made.
(3) The motion must be heard and determined by a single Judge.

Order 82 rule 6
Transfer on Court's own motion
(1) Subject to the relevant Act, the Court or a Judge may at any time on the Court's or
the Judge's own motion transfer a proceeding or an appeal to the Federal Magistrates
Court.
(2) This rule applies whether or not there is an application under rule 5 before the
Court.
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Order 82 rule 7
Factors to be considered
In deciding whether to transfer a proceeding or an appeal to the Federal Magistrates
Court, factors that the Court or a Judge may take into account, in addition to the factors
to which the Court or the Judge is required to have regard under subsection 32AB (6)
of the Act or subsection 44AA (7) of the Tribunal Act, include:
(a) whether the proceeding or appeal is likely to involve questions of general
importance, such that it would be desirable for there to be a decision of the
Federal Court on one or more of the points in issue;
(b) whether, if the proceeding or appeal is transferred, it is, in the opinion of
the Court or the Judge, likely to be heard and determined at less cost and more
convenience to the parties than if the proceeding or appeal is not transferred;
(c) whether the proceeding or appeal is, in the opinion of the Court or the
Judge, likely to be heard and determined earlier in the Federal Magistrates
Court;
(d) the wishes of the parties.
Note Subsection 32AB (6) of the Act and subsection 44AA (7) of the Tribunal Act
provide that, in deciding whether a proceeding or appeal should be transferred to the
Federal Magistrates Court, the Court must have regard to:
(a) any Rules of the Court made for the purposes of the transfer of
proceedings; and
(b) whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in the
Federal Magistrates Court; and
(c) whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient to
hear and determine the proceeding; and
(d) the interests of the administration of justice.
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FEDERAL COURT RULES 2011 (Cth) (current)
Division 27.2 Federal Magistrates Court
27.11

Transfer to Federal Magistrates Court
A party may apply to the Court to transfer to the Federal Magistrates Court:
(a) a proceeding other than an appeal; or
(b) an appeal under the AAT Act.
Note 1 AAT Act and proceeding are defined in the Dictionary.
Note 2 The Court may make an order of its own motion — see rule 1.40.
Note 3 For a party’s right to appeal under the AAT Act, see section 44 of the AAT Act.

27.12

Factors to be taken into account

(1) For an appeal under the AAT Act, the parties must address the matters
mentioned in section 44AA (7) of that Act.
(2) For a proceeding, the parties must address the matters mentioned in
section 32AB (6) of the Act.
(3) For an appeal under the AAT Act or a proceeding, the parties should address
the following:
(a)
whether the appeal or proceeding is likely to involve questions
of general importance;
(b)
whether it would be less expensive and more convenient to the
parties if the appeal or proceeding were transferred;
(c)
whether an appeal or proceeding would be determined more
quickly if transferred;
(d)
the wishes of the parties.
Note If the Court makes an order transferring an appeal or proceeding to the Federal
Magistrates Court, the Registrar will send all documents filed and all orders made to the
proper officer of the Federal Magistrates Court.

TRANSFERS BY THE FMC
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT 1999 (Cth) s 39
Discretionary transfer of proceedings to the Federal Court or the Family Court
(1) If a proceeding is pending in the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal
Magistrates Court may, by order, transfer the proceeding from the Federal Magistrates
Court to the Federal Court or the Family Court.
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(2) The Federal Magistrates Court may transfer a proceeding under this section:
(a) on the application of a party to the proceeding; or
(b) on its own initiative.
(3) In deciding whether to transfer a proceeding to the Federal Court under
subsection (1), the Federal Magistrates Court must have regard to:
(a) any Rules of Court made for the purposes of subsection 40(2); and
(b) whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in
the Federal Court; and
(c) whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient
to hear and determine the proceeding; and
(d) the interests of the administration of justice.
(4) In deciding whether to transfer a proceeding to the Family Court under
subsection (1), the Federal Magistrates Court must have regard to:
(a) any Rules of Court made for the purposes of subsection 40(4); and
(b) whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in
the Family Court; and
(c) whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient
to hear and determine the proceeding; and
(d) the interests of the administration of justice.
(5) If an order is made under subsection (1), the Federal Magistrates Court may make
such orders as it considers necessary pending the disposal of the proceeding by the
Federal Court or the Family Court, as the case requires.
(6) An appeal does not lie from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court in relation
to the transfer of a proceeding under subsection (1).
(7) A reference in subsection (1) to a proceeding pending in the Federal Magistrates
Court includes a reference to a proceeding that was instituted in contravention of
subsection 19(1).
(8) This section does not apply to proceedings of a kind specified in the regulations.
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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT 1999 (Cth) s 40
Rules of Court about discretionary transfer of proceedings
(1) The Rules of Court may make provision in relation to transfers of proceedings to
the Federal Court under subsection 39(1).
(2) In particular, the Rules of Court may set out factors that are to be taken into
account by the Federal Magistrates Court in deciding whether to transfer a proceeding
to the Federal Court under subsection 39(1).
(3) The Rules of Court may make provision in relation to transfers of proceedings to
the Family Court under subsection 39(1).
(4) In particular, the Rules of Court may set out factors that are to be taken into
account by the Federal Magistrates Court in deciding whether to transfer a proceeding
to the Family Court under subsection 39(1).
(5) In making Rules of Court for the purposes of this section, the Federal Magistrates,
or a majority of them, must have regard to:
(a) whether particular matters could be more appropriately dealt with in
the Federal Court or the Family Court; and
(b) whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient
to deal with particular matters; and
(c) the interests of the administration of justice; and
(d) anything else that the Federal Magistrates, or a majority of them,
considers relevant.
(6) Before Rules of Court are made for the purposes of subsection (1) or (2), the
Federal Magistrates Court must consult the Federal Court.
(7) Before Rules of Court are made for the purposes of subsection (3) or (4), the
Federal Magistrates Court must consult the Family Court.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT 1999 (Cth) - s 41
Mandatory transfer of proceedings to the Federal Court or the Family Court
(1) If a proceeding of a kind specified in regulations made for the purposes of this
subsection is pending in the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Magistrates Court
must, before going on to hear and determine the proceeding, transfer the proceeding to
the Federal Court.
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(2) If a proceeding of a kind specified in regulations made for the purposes of this
subsection is pending in the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Magistrates Court
must, before going on to hear and determine the proceeding, transfer the proceeding to
the Family Court.
(3) If a proceeding is transferred under subsection (1), the Federal Magistrates Court
may make such orders as it considers necessary pending the disposal of the proceeding
by the Federal Court.
(4) If a proceeding is transferred under subsection (2), the Federal Magistrates Court
may make such orders as it considers necessary pending the disposal of the proceeding
by the Family Court.
(5) An appeal does not lie from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court in relation
to the transfer of a proceeding under subsection (1) or (2).
(6) A reference in subsections (1) and (2) to a proceeding pending in the Federal
Magistrates Court includes a reference to a proceeding that was instituted in
contravention of subsection 19(1).
(7) The Minister must cause a copy of regulations ( transfer regulations ) made for
the purposes of subsection (1) or (2) to be tabled in each House of the Parliament.
(8) Either House may, following a motion upon notice, pass a resolution disallowing
the transfer regulations. To be effective, the resolution must be passed within 15
sittings days of the House after the copy of the transfer regulations was tabled in the
House.
(9) If neither House passes such a resolution, the transfer regulations take effect on the
day immediately after the last day upon which such a resolution could have been
passed.
(10) Subsections (7), (8) and (9) have effect despite anything in:
(a) the Acts Interpretation Act 1901; or
(b) the Legislative Instruments Act 1999 .
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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT RULES 2001 (Cth) - r 8.02
Transfer to Federal Court or Family Court
(1) The Court may, at the request of a party or of its own motion, transfer a
proceeding to the Federal Court or the Family Court.
(2) Unless the Court otherwise orders, a request for transfer must be made on or
before the first court date for the proceeding.
(3) Unless the Court otherwise orders, the request must be included in a response or
made by application supported by an affidavit.
(4) In addition to the factors required to be considered by the Court under subsections
39 (3) and (4) of the Act for transfer of proceedings to the Federal Court or the Family
Court, the following factors are relevant:
(a) whether the proceeding is likely to involve questions of general
importance, such that it would be desirable for there to be a decision of
the Federal Court or the Family Court on one or more of the points in
issue;
(b) whether, if the proceeding is transferred, it is likely to be heard and
determined at less cost and more convenience to the parties than if the
proceeding is not transferred;
(c) whether the proceeding will be heard earlier in the Federal Magistrates
Court;
(d) the availability of particular procedures appropriate for the class of
proceeding;
(e) the wishes of the parties.
Note 1 Subsection 39 (3) of the Act provides that, in deciding whether to transfer a
proceeding to the Federal Court, the Court must have regard to:




the factors set out in these Rules to be taken into account





whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in the
Federal Court





whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient to
hear and determine the proceeding





the interests of the administration of justice.

Note 2 Subsection 39 (4) of the Act provides that, in deciding whether to transfer a
proceeding to the Family Court, the Court must have regard to:
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the factors set out in these Rules to be taken into account





whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in the
Family Court





whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient to
hear and determine the proceeding





the interests of the administration of justice.
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APPENDIX B - FCA AND FMC FEES SCHEDULES
(First Study Period)
Sources:
John Mathieson, FCA (Registry, Australian Capital Territory), Fee Increase
(Canberra, 5 September 2000)
John Mathieson, FMC (Canberra Registry), Fees in the Federal Magistrates Court
(Canberra, 5 September 2000)
Filing Fees

FCA

FMC

(Corporation/Individual) (Corporation/Individual)
Filing an initiating proceeding,

$1262 / $526

$500 / $250

$2104 / $1052

Not applicable

$50 / $50

$50 / $50

$258 / $129

$300 / $150 (other than for

including a creditor's petition and
an application under the
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (other than
an appeal, an application for leave
to appeal or special leave to appeal
or an incidental proceeding in the
course of a proceedings or an
application under s 170CP of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996).
Filing a notice of appeal from the
AAT.
Filing an application under
ss 46PO and 46PP of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act 1986.
Filing a notice of motion or
document seeking non final
orders.

human rights applications)
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Filing Fees

FCA

FMC

(Corporation/Individual) (Corporation/Individual)
FCA: Filing a cross claim.

$1262 / $526

$500 / $250

$42 / $42

$0 / $0

$516 / $258

Not applicable (review of FMC

FMC: Filing a document seeking
final orders different from those
sought by applicant.

Issuing a subpoena.
Fling an application to review a
decision of a registrar (under

registrar decisions potentially

s 35A(5) of the FCA Act).
Mediation by a court officer (for

attracted no fee)
$526 / $263

$200 / $200

$2104 / $1052

Not applicable

$0 / $0

Not applicable

$840 / $420

Not applicable

the first attendance).
Filing a notice of appeal from this
or another court where a fee for
leave or special leave to appeal has
not been pad, except for appeals in
relation to s 170CP of the
Workplace Relations Act 1966 or
ss 46PO and 46PP of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act 1986.
Filing of a notice of cross appeal
or notice of contention.
Filing a document originating an
application for leave or special
leave to appeal, except for
applications in relation to s 170CP
of the Workplace Relations Act
1996 or ss 46PO and 46PP of the
Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission 1986.
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Filing Fees

FCA

FMC

(Corporation/Individual) (Corporation/Individual)
Taxing a bill of costs (for each

$8 / $8

Potentially no fee charged

Actual salary or hourly rate of

Actual salary or hourly rate of

officer involved plus reasonable

officer involved plus reasonable

expenses incurred.

expenses incurred.

$2 / $2

$2 / $2

$21 / $21

$0 / $0

$3 / $3

$0 / $0

$1 / $1

$0 / $0

$100 or part claimed).
For service or execution or
attempted service or execution of
process.
Poundage for seizure and sale of
goods in execution of process (for
each $100 value).
Searching a file, except by a party.
For a copy or copies of
documents:
- for each request, plus
- for each page provided
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Setting Down Fees

FCA

FMC

(Corporation/Individual) (Corporation/Individual)
FCA: For an application (or an

$2104 / $1052

$600 / $300

$2104 / $1052

$600 / $300 (AAT appeals)

issue or question in an
application), except for an
application under the Bankruptcy
Act 1966, s 170CP of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 or
ss 46PO and 46PP of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act 1986. (Fee
reduced by the amount of any fee
previously paid for mediation.).
FMC: For a hearing for final
orders, or an issue in question in a
proceeding, other than a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy
Act 1966 or ss 46PO and 46PP of
the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission Act 1986
For an appeal, including from the
AAT, except for an appeal in
relation to s 170 of the Workplace
Relations Act 1996 or ss 46PO and
46PP of the Human Right and
Equal Opportunity Commission
Act 1986.
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Daily Hearing Fees

FCA

FMC

(Corporation/Individual) (Corporation/Individual)
For notice of motion, except for

$420 / $210

Not applicable

$420 / $210

Not applicable

$842 / $420

Not applicable

$842 / $420

Not applicable

notice of motion under the
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s 170CP of
the Workplace Relations Act 1996
or ss 46PO and 46PP of the
Human Right and Equal
Opportunity Commission Act 1986
(per half day or part of a day).
For review of a decision of a
registrar under s 35A(5) of the
FCA Act, except under the
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s 170CP of
the Workplace Relations Act 1996
or ss 46PO and 46PP of the
Human Right and Equal
Opportunity Commission Act 1986
(per half day or part of a day).
For an application (or an issue or
question in an application),
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s 170CP of
the Workplace Relations Act 1996
or ss 46PO and 46PP of the
Human Right and Equal
Opportunity Commission Act 1986
(per day or part day after the first
day of hearing).
For appeal, except for an appeal in
relation to s 170CP of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 or
ss 46PO and 46PP of the Human
Right and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act 1986 (per day or
part of a day after the first day of
hearing).
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APPENDIX C - FCA AND FMC COSTS SCHEDULES
(Second Study Period)

Sources:
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), AustLII website,
<http://corrigan.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/repealed_reg/fcr186/>
CCH Australia Limited, Australian High Court and Federal Court Practice, vol 2
(2004) ¶30-030
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), notified in the Commonwealth of
Australia Gazette on 13 July 2001.
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), AustLII website,
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/fmcr2001307/sch1.html>

FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 (Cth) - sch 2 (repealed)
Scale of costs for work done and services performed (26 November 2002 - 29 August
2004)

Item Matter for which charge may be made
Instructions
To
sue
or
defend,
to
appeal or oppose an appeal
1
or for any other originating proceeding
To make or oppose an interlocutory application
2
or motion to the Court or a Judge or an officer of
the Court
For a case for opinion of counsel or for counsel
3
to advise (including attendance on counsel with
brief)
For an interrogatory, answer to an interrogatory
4
or an affidavit (except a formal affidavit), an
admission or a list of documents (and affidavit
verifying)
For brief for counsel on application in chambers
5
or brief notes for solicitor (if necessary)
or

Charge ($)
191
85

83

114

104

318

Item Matter for which charge may be made
in respect of items 1 to 5 of this scale, having
regard to all the circumstances of the case

6

7

8
9

10

11

12

For brief for counsel or brief notes for solicitor
(if necessary), having regard to all the
circumstances of the case
For a necessary document not otherwise
provided for, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case
Documents
Any notice of appearance, including copies,
filing and service by respondent
Any application or notice of motion, including
fixing return day, copies to file and serve, and
attendance to file
if more than 3 folios -- add for each folio

85

6

A brief to counsel (including a brief to hear
judgment) and attending counsel with the brief
if more than 3 folios -- add for each folio

73

For copy documents to accompany brief

the other
charges in this
scale that are
appropriate
58

14
15

Engrossing or Typing
Any necessary document -- for each folio

16

105

Any simple notice or memorandum such as a
68
notice for discovery, including copies, filing (if
necessary) and service
Notice to produce, notice to admit or any similar 85
notice, including copies, filing (if necessary) and
service
if more than 3 folios -- add for each folio
6

Any necessary subpoena, including issuing 1
copy to serve and arranging for service
Drawing
Any necessary document -- for each folio

13

Charge ($)
any other
amounts that
the taxing
officer
considers
appropriate
a sum that the
taxing officer
thinks fit
a sum that the
taxing officer
thinks fit

Copies
Of any document, including carbon,
photographic or machine-made copy -- for each
page
except if allowance for 10 or more pages is
claimed in respect of any document or
documents

7

8
4
2

at the discretion
of the taxing
officer
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Item Matter for which charge may be made
Perusal
Of
any
document
(if
necessary) including
17
special letter, telegram or telex, up to 3 folios
or per folio

18

19



solicitor

68



clerk

15

23

Special letter or letter including opinion

24

4
at the discretion
of the taxing
officer
6

22

21

15

except if allowance for 30 or more folios is
claimed in respect of any document or
documents
If it is not necessary to peruse but it is necessary
to scan a document -- for each page
except if allowance for 10 or more pages is
claimed in respect of any document or
documents
Examination
If it is necessary to neither peruse nor scan a
document, eg an examination of an appeal book:
for examination -- for each half hour

Letters
Short letter -- simple form of letter, eg formal
acknowledgment
Ordinary letter, including letter between
principal and agent
Circular letter (after the first) -- for each letter

20

Charge ($)

Telegram, facsimile copy, or telex including
attendance to dispatch

at the discretion
of the taxing
officer

11
22
7
46
or
an amount that
is reasonable
having regard
to the length of
the letter, the
questions
involved and
appropriate
items and
charges in this
scale
58
or
an amount that
is reasonable in
the
circumstances
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Item Matter for which charge may be made
Receiving and filing any incoming letter
25

26

27

28

Note Postage and transmission expenses may
be claimed as a disbursement properly incurred.
Service
Personal service (except if service is able to be
claimed under another item of this scale) of any
document of which personal service is required

Service of any document at the office of the
address for service, either by delivery or by post
Preparation of Appeal Books
Preparation of appeal books, including collating
all necessary material, attendances on the
printer, general oversight of their preparation in
cases where the taxing officer is satisfied it has
been done efficiently -- for each hour:

solicitor


29

30
31

clerk

Charge ($)
7

57
or
an amount that
is reasonable,
having regard
to time
occupied,
distance
travelled and
other relevant
circumstances
15

123
31

If appeal books are prepared in a solicitor's
office, a sum that the taxing officer considers is
just and reasonable, having regard to work and
labour properly performed and charges for
material used. In exercising his or her discretion,
the taxing officer must have regard to
commercial rates for copying and binding and is
not obliged to apply the photographic or
machine-made copy costs otherwise allowable
in this scale
Attendances
An attendance that is capable of being made by
31
a clerk, such as at the court registry
An attendance that requires the attendance of a
solicitor or managing clerk and involves the
exercise of skill or legal knowledge (including
an attendance to inspect or negotiate) -- for each
quarter hour:
55

solicitor
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Item Matter for which charge may be made

managing clerk
32
33
34

35

36

37

Charge ($)
12

An attendance for which no other provision is
made in this scale
An attendance by telephone that does not
involve the exercise of skill or legal knowledge
An attendance on counsel:

51



32

with brief or papers (if not otherwise
provided for)

10



to appoint a conference or consultation

32



if appointment made by telephone

10

A necessary conference or consultation with
counsel:

if half an hour or less

85



123

if over half an hour -- for each hour or part
of an hour
In court or chambers or before the Registrar for
hearing without counsel:

for each hour or part of an hour of the
hearing

for each hour or part of an hour when
likely to be heard, but not heard

not to exceed per day
In court or chambers or before the Registrar for
hearing with counsel:

for each hour or part of an hour of the
attendance during the hearing

for each hour or part of an hour of the
attendance when likely to be heard, but not
heard

not to exceed per day

248
248
1110

201
201

912

If a person other than a solicitor attends in place
of a solicitor:
(a) attendance by a managing clerk:
 for each hour

85

 not to exceed per day

372

(b) attendance by any other clerk:
 for each hour

45

 not to exceed per day

198

38

To hear judgment

39

On taxation of costs:

57
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Item Matter for which charge may be made

if a solicitor attends -- for each hour or
part of an hour

if a clerk attends -- for each hour or part of
an hour
If
a
solicitor
attends at court or chambers for the
40
hearing of an application or appeal, or on
conference with counsel, at a distance of more
than 50 kilometres from his or her place of
business, and it is neither appropriate nor proper
for an agent to attend, the taxing officer may
allow for each day of absence from the place of
business (except a Saturday, Sunday or public
holiday) an amount that the taxing officer
considers reasonable -- not exceeding
General Care and Conduct
If
the
case
or
circumstances warrant it, an
41
allowance may be claimed under this item, in
addition to any other item that appears in this
scale, for general care and conduct (if
appropriate) including the following:
(a) the complexity of the matter and the
difficulty and novelty of questions raised;
(b) the importance of the matter to the
party and the amount involved;
(c) the skill, labour, specialised
knowledge and responsibility involved in the
matter on the part of the solicitor;
(d) the number and importance of the
documents prepared or perused, without regard
to length;
(e) the time taken by the solicitor;

42

(f) research and consideration of
questions of law and fact
Counsel's Fees
It is proper for a solicitor to incur an amount for
counsel's fees that appears to be fair and
reasonable according to the circumstances of the
case and the seniority of counsel. The fees
incurred may be claimed as a disbursement

Charge ($)
123
31
281

a percentage of
the total
amount of the
allowed costs
excluding
disbursements
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Item Matter for which charge may be made
If a solicitor briefs another solicitor as counsel,
43
when it would be appropriate to brief counsel

43A

43B

43C

43D

43E

Corporations Act 2001 -- Short Form Bill
The amount as to the costs of obtaining a
winding-up order, up to and including entry and
service of the order under section 470 of the
Corporations Act 2001 and the obtaining of a
certificate of taxation
Additional costs are allowable for any
adjournment in which costs have been reserved
by the Court in accordance with item 36 or 37,
as the case may be
Bankruptcy Act 1966 -- Short Form Bills
Short form amount that may be claimed by an
applicant on the making of a sequestration
order

Charge ($)
a sum as a
counsel's fee
that the taxing
officer
considers just
and reasonable
having regard
to the practice
of allowing
these fees that
is permitted by
the
Supreme Court
Rules of the
State or
Territory
concerned
(Order 62,
rule 35)
2732

1751

1509
Short form amount that may be claimed by an
applicant on the dismissal of a petition
Migration Act 1958 -- Short Form Bills
Short form amount, including costs and
4463
disbursements, that may be claimed by a party in
a standard migration case
Short form amount, including costs and
1575
disbursements, that may be claimed by the
respondent in a migration case on dismissal or
discontinuance of the case
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Item Matter for which charge may be made
Witnesses' Expenses
Witnesses
called
because of their professional,
44
scientific or other special skill or knowledge -for each day
Witnesses called, other than those covered in
45
item 44 -- for each day
Witnesses remunerated in their occupation by
46
wages, salary or fees
47

48

49

50

If a witness lives more than 50 kilometres from
the Court

Disbursements
All court fees and other fees and payments

If a solicitor attends at court or chambers, or on
conference with counsel, in the circumstances
outlined in item 40

Miscellaneous
Matters not included in this scale may be
allowed to the extent they are covered by Order
62, rule 21
Note 1 Bills of costs prepared in accordance
with Order 62, rule 40 must identify costs and
disbursements claimed with an item number.
Note 2 A folio comprises 72 words (there are
generally 3 folios to each page).

Charge ($)
147 to 727

85 to 136
the amount lost
by attendance
at Court
a sum that the
taxing officer
considers
reasonable for
the actual cost
of travel,
together with a
reasonable
amount for
meals and
accommodation
to the extent to
which they
have been
properly and
reasonably
incurred and
paid
reasonable
travelling
expenses to the
extent to which
they have been
reasonably
incurred and
paid
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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT RULES 2001 (Cth)- sch 1 (second study period)
Costs

Part 1 (omitting family law
amounts)
Work performed
Stage 1: Initiating or opposing application up
to completion of first court day
Lump sum
Plus: Court attendance
Stage 1A: Initiating or opposing application
which includes interim orders up to
completion of first court day
Lump sum
Plus: Court attendance
Stage 2: Interim or summary hearing -- as a
discrete event
(This stage applies to an interim application, or a
summary proceeding of a type not otherwise
addressed in this fee structure. It does not
include the stage 1 or 1A component.)
Lump sum
Plus: Court attendance
Stage 3: Up to and including conciliation
conference
Lump sum
Stage 4: Dispute resolution litigation
intervention
Lump sum
Stage 5: Preparation for final hearing
For a 1 day matter:
Lump sum
For a 2 day matter:
Lump sum
Preparation each additional hearing day
Stage 6: Final hearing costs for solicitor
Attendance at hearing
To take judgement and explain orders
Additional events
Stage 7: Application for family law location,
recovery or enforcement of an order
(This stage applies to an application where there
is an existing court order.)
Lump sum
Court attendance
Advocacy loading
Increase relevant daily hearing fee
Daily hearing fee
Short mention
Half-day hearing
Full-day hearing

General
federal law
amount
$1820
Daily hearing fee

$2275
Daily hearing fee

$1135
Daily hearing fee

Not applicable

$2045

$4090
$6145
$1295
Daily hearing fee
$190

Not applicable

50%
$190
$685
$1365

326

Part 1 (omitting family law
amounts)
Work performed
Disbursements
Court fees and other fees and payments, to the
extent that they have been reasonably incurred
Photocopying per page
Agents fees/travelling costs
Increase lump sum fee by
2 hours travel is the benchmark. There is no
entitlement to an increase in lump sum for under
2 hours travel time.

General
federal law
amount

$0.52
$385

